Volume 2

# The Many-Splendored Society:
# An Edifice of Symbols

*Second enlarged edition*

*This book describes how symbols in speech and script form social reality. It can be read on its own.*

*The book is also the second installment to a larger work in seven planned volumes about social theory and about a many-splendored society that is within mankind's reach.*

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An Edifice of Symbols, (the present book), 2010, chapters 6-10
Fueled by Symbols, 2010, chapters 11-18
Knowledge and Beauty
Wealth and Sacredness
Order and Virtue
Life and the Good Life

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VOLUME 2

# THE MANY-SPLENDORED SOCIETY: AN EDIFICE OF SYMBOLS

*Hans L Zetterberg*

*The Many-Splendored Society: An Edifice of Symbols*

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## Preface, Ambition, and Abstract

### From Volumes 1-3. To be Updated as Further Volumes are Completed

In this work, the adjective "many-splendored" describes a society with personal freedom and a sparkling differentiation of six self-governing realms: economy, politics, science, art, religion, and morality. When these societal realms are integrated, so that no one realm rules over any of the others, we have, in my view, a good society.

Readers who already have perused the Preface to Volume 1 or 3 can go directly to "Building the Social Order" below.

*The Many-Splendored Society* deals with emerging categories and spontaneous tendencies in a social science based on properties of language. It is a multi-volume groundwork that might eventually bind in one volume, or one Kindle-type file, as electronic reading devices become ubiquitous on campuses and elsewhere.

### Abstract

Volume 1 is subtitled *Surrounded by Symbols*. Here we pursue man's symbolic environment, meeting the basic elements of human living with a minimum of references to other parts of man's biology than his language brain, which is the latest addition in the evolution to the total human brain. Our message is that human selves and their social life and culture depend on, nay, consist of, and/or are organized using symbols generated by the language brain.

Symbols codify societal orders, represent wealth, summarize knowledge, embody beauty, define sacredness, and express virtues. We identify common abuses of language in the form of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge. An enormous potential of personal freedom is built into this language that so deeply

shapes our own lives and our own society. It contains an almost unlimited number of linguistic germs: any one of us can create sentences that never have been heard before. Its fertile environment, of course, is one of the freedoms of speech.

Taking a telescopic view of total symbolic environments we find recurrent vibrations. We present three proven pulsating strings: tradition vs. modernity, faithfulness vs. instrumentality, and materialism vs. humanism. They are found in many, perhaps most, symbolic environments. Their vibrations have, not a total, but an unusual degree of independence of their contexts of groups, networks, classes, and other social structures. In their various combinations, they give us advice about the Zeitgeist that prevails in mankind's spaces and times.

Taking a microscopic view of single symbols and sentences we find three recurrent usages: descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. We propose that they should enter into the minimum vocabulary of social reality. In other words, they are fundamental to a social theory.

*Surrounded by Symbols* introduces two default states of human conditions: First we hold that the urge to preserve social standing and to avoid degradation is more basic than the urge to improve. Second we claim that an emotive choice is initially more typical than a rational choice. These threads of thought will prove essential in our further explorations.

Let's speak in larger print of Volume 2, which you are now reading.

In the Volume subtitled *An Edifice of Symbols*, the use of symbols stripped of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge, will provide us with a set of general categories and dimensions, all based on properties of language, for the study of social reality. The categories are only starting points. The tale of society is how they interlace into processes and systems, i.e. into mankind's social and cultural achievements.

We look at structures of communication, rules and contracts, different stratifications and reward systems, diverse spontaneous orders, and several other social attributes. Most thinking about them comes from celebrated persons in the social sciences of past times, so in this presentation we pass many intellectual milestones raised by classical writers of social science, from Adam Smith to Max Weber. In the central Chapter 10 of this work, we follow and revise a lead from the latter that has not been fully explored. We spell out and explicate 18 attributes of societal realms. We discover that the same attributes are present, but take on different characters in science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality.

*An Edifice of Symbols* ends with two summaries in the form of a Periodic Table of Societal Realms, and (starting in the second edition) a Table of Valences of Societal Realms. A chemist might see these tables as kindred to his field, for they have some "periodic" properties of the type discovered in chemistry in the nineteenth century. By knowing the place in a Periodic table of a phenomenon in social reality, we will know a great deal of its characteristics.

The various societal realms have also different attractions to one another, a fact we spell out in our Table of Valences. The latter table tells about ease and difficulty in the collaboration and integration of societal realms. In the long run, a full merger of societal realms results in increasingly wobbly structures. For example, to merge the body politic and the economy into a socialist society creates an unstable mixture. Likewise, we sense instability coming, when the polity merges with the realm of morality into a European-type welfare state.

In the third Volume, *Fueled by Symbols*, we turn from the use of constructing society by language to find out how we use lan-

guage to inspire human beings to live in the home that language has built. We prompt ourselves by "justifying vocabularies" and we prompt others by "compelling vocabularies." These vocabularies of motives are short pieces of language with remarkable leverage. This use of symbols makes for civilized life, where conflicts are resolved, not by force, but by words, and violence is reduced to the minimum needed to defend civility.

We find that different justifications are used in all subdivisions of society that appear in our periodic system of societal realms. Compelling language shapes personalities by constructing vocabularies of identity. We look at some length at other compelling vocabularies that shape regulations and rights, avoidance of social exclusion, preserving a favorable self-image, and upholding the order that upholds us. The compelling and justifying vocabularies lock into each other in most interesting ways. One such way creates the human conscience. Another makes them work together like the left and right part of a zipper, making for a most reliable day-to-day motivation.

Such vocabularies, not Hobbes' strongmen of the state, give societies the motivations to flourish. Very few tasks of a modern state need overriding physical force for their executions. Instead the body politic needs compelling vocabularies, as do the other realms of civilized societies. To follow the temptation to use shortcuts of violence instead of diplomacy (i.e. language) to exercise ambitions and to solve routine conflicts have been political wisdom in past times. It is unfit as the highway to the future. We argue that those who still practice it are literally "uncivilized." They should, if they persist, be overpowered at the hands of the civilized side, which in this case — and this case alone — is justified to use a necessary measure of violence.

The end of Volume 3 is a small watershed in our text. At this point both the writer (certainly) and the reader (probably) can draw a sigh of relief. The main part of our analytical effort has come to an end. Numerous interconnected definitions and a good number of propositions, a total of 66 to be exact, telling how social reality is created and how it works, are now under

our belt. There will be additional definitions and propositions to come, but time has arrived to look at some of the lovely wholes that the already covered ones make possible.

With Volume 4 in the series *The Many-Splendored Society,* we begin presenting details about advanced socio-linguistic areas of life, the societal realms. As mentioned, they are science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. Each is dominated by usage of some specific types of symbols, and thus depends entirely on language brains. In an animal kingdom without language, they would not develop. Already in the first chapter of the first volume, we saw the emergence of these societal realms and their versions in European history. Now we can go into details about their cardinal values, communication structures, different stratifications, specific reward systems, and their diverse spontaneous orders. A striking fact is that they have the potential of becoming comparatively autonomous parts of society, a collective home for individuals that have civic rights, academic freedom, free trade, artistic license, and freedoms of religion and of conscience. Our slogan "Six Realms with Bounded Independence," signals both a discovery and a bias: science, art, religion, and morality are as important in society as are today's favorites, economy and politics.

Volume 4 is entitled *Knowledge and Beauty* and deals with the social reality of science and art. The societal realm of science contains not only descriptive verbalism. It has openings to the mathematical brain; physical nature has a structure that can be expressed in mathematics. Social science, however, is based on a grammar, i.e. on something found in language — but not necessarily in the old school grammars. Both physical and social sciences are dominated by descriptive discourses that help us understand the world.

The societal realm of art is concerned with aesthetic forms of revelations, appearances, and entries (*Erscheinung)* that are worthy of our contemplation. It also depends on descriptive symbolism, but on a different and more emotive kind that opens a door

for people to stay in touch with deep expressions of beauty and also with experiences from pre-language stages and worlds.

Volume 5 is entitled *Wealth and Sacredness* and deals with the social reality of economy and religion; we have now come to Mammon and God. Economy with its focus on wealth uses mostly evaluative language; it is not the goods and services we have that constitute our riches but the evaluation of them. We give particular attention to two pursuits of riches: manufacturing and finance, and test the capacity of our approach to social study to account for economic "bubbles."

Religion with its cardinal value of sacredness also uses mostly evaluative language but of a very different kind than the economy. The fact that language organizes identities and that all language-using beings are mortal has given rise to religions in which selves are turned into souls.

*Order and Virtue* is the title of Volume 6. It deals with the social reality of the body politic and morality. The body politic is focused on the exercise of power, using the tools of legislation and diplomatic treaties, usually phrased in the commanding speech of prescriptive discourse. A many-splendored society is a federation of societal realms. The key to ruling such a society is a 'central zone' where exponents of the six societal realms meet and interact. It is essential that access to the central zone is open to comers. 'Consent of the governed' takes on new qualities here. The borders of a society are set by the reach of its central zone.

The realm of morality also uses compelling imperatives but of a different kind than political legislation. In the past, morality had a strong focus on how we should cope with biological spontaneities, such as sex and violence. In recent times, a new moral focus has emerged in requiring mankind to live so that the physical environment is sustainable, and live so that the animal kingdom can survive. In a many-splendored society comes an additional new moral requirement of authenticity in the cardinal values of knowledge, beauty, wealth, sacredness, order, and virtue.

In dealing with grand societal realms two topics become interesting: how do they search for hegemony within their society, and how they seek a global reach? Now and then in the text we look at their infightings within a society: state vs. church, religion vs. science, morality vs. law, business vs. politics, et cetera. Furthermore, we discover that these realms are the main actors in the process of globalization that so preoccupies mankind at this juncture of history.

So far, the accounts of societal realms. What remains are some illustrative interpenetrations between the social world, on the one hand, and the biological and physical worlds on the other. Physicians, ecologists, engineers, and military officers use language-based skills to cope with bodily spontaneities, vagrancies of nature, technologies, and organized violence. In the seventh and final volume called *Life and the Good Life,* we go a very short distance beyond our main task of studying what is created by mankind's language capacity (that is almost "the good life" in Plato's sense) and pursue the impact of some more biologically based life areas. This is where needs for food and shelter and sleep give rise to mankind's tradition of living in households. Sex and reproduction give rise to the tradition of living in generational families. Here is also where biological age sets stages for lifecycles.

## Ambition

In all, in these seven short volumes we will tell a story — a social theory — of how man's use of language creates the framework for freedom in a many-splendored society. No author, dead or alive, is a supreme lord over his or her own formulations. New generations make their formulations. As George Herbert Mead (1936, 116) said: "A different Caesar crosses the Rubicon not only with each author but with each generation." I have made several reformulations of the classics of social science and humanities to fit into the above schema, and in order to be more relevant to the contemporary state of knowledge. The classics are treated, not as monuments, but as stepping stones.

In presenting thoughts and evidence from other authors I have tried to cite or mention those who formulated them first or, at least at an early stage, *and*, at the same time, gave evidence that they more fully understood their importance. Sometimes I underline the buildup from the past by mentioning the original year of publication in the Bibliography. You will find more old references in this text than in most others that profess to be up to date in the twenty-first century. I hope this practice will convince readers that there has been much accumulation of knowledge in the social sciences. I have not included the great number of other supporting statements and additional evidence from later dates than the original discovery.

With some ingenuity that at least sometimes goes beyond conventional wisdom, we may discover how our categories can build a set of testable and consistent propositions that give us an understanding of the past and a handle to cope with the future. Not that a future society can be forecasted, but that our options for the present and the future can be less myopically perceived.

The schema presented in these volumes is not the property of any particular academic discipline. In the latter half of my professional life, I have worked mainly outside universities and their somewhat archaic division of disciplines. Without inhibitions, it easy to draw on brain research, rhetoric, linguistics, semiotics, cultural studies, communications, journalism, public opinion research, demography, jurisprudence, political science, economics, business administration, market research, anthropology, history of ideas, as well as sociology, which was my field as a university professor. I hope that deans of liberal arts faculties will take notice: many of the different courses they offer in these fields have a common base; many overlap with one another. A great rationalization of students' study is possible if you can overcome the straightjacket of the historically given borders of university departments.

This text sums up my intellectual struggles searching for categories in a science of human society, and combining them into informative messages. I have thus expressed many of the ideas

presented here before, and sometimes with the same formulations as here.

There are differences between ordinary language and the language of learning and scholarship; we specify a most important one in a distinction used by anthropologists between emic and etic accounts (discussed on page 1: 136 et seq.). However, as mentioned, our categories of social phenomena in this work are based on properties of language. This has opened the intriguing possibility to write advanced social science in a way that can be understood by most everyone!

## A Short Aid to First-time Readers

While the professional language about social reality can be made compatible with ordinary language, the layout of a book on social science can differ significantly from pages in a diary, biography, or history book. Readers of *The Many-Splendored Society* are asked to cope with three such differences. By self-publishing, I have designed its typography myself, and the advice does not necessarily apply other texts in social theory.

First, unlike a text of a novel or a detective story in which the reader is challenged to keep track of previously presented characters and intrigues, our text contains numerous explicit cross-references, i.e. points referring to previous sections or sentences. Such is the nature of theorizing, even postmodern attempts. A theory is made up of ideas that hang together. To show that they hang together, we need cross-references.

Starting with a minimum vocabulary of grounded fundamentals, we present layers of details built on top of one another. Or, we present an overall system that is built on subsystems that cannot function without one another. These undertakings require a large number of cross-references in the text. Of course, the many admittedly tedious references in footnotes or running text can be ignored by readers who are uninterested in nitty-gritty congruence of theoretical arguments.

The *Many-Splendored Society* is long in the making. It is satisfactory to publish it piecemeal in several volumes. The latter represent natural divisions of the subject matters that traditionally have been studied on their own. The base of most of our cross-references in the printed version is simply the volume number and page number. For example, the designation "1: 151" leads you to page 151 in Volume 1, where we report that a universally available wide crack of freedom, in an otherwise deterministic universe, is given to mankind by her use of language.

Another base for cross-references is the numbering of chapters. Tables, figures, and propositions include the sequence number the chapter where they first appeared. Starting with the second edition of Volumes 1 to 3, the footer on each page also indicates the id-number and heading of the chapter. While all volumes stand alone, and can be read on their own, the chapter numbers run continuous from first to last volume in the interest of easy cross-referencing.

Second, in this text there are a number of tables that do not contain numbers, but are comprised of words. These tables specify classifications, a backbone of theory in all sciences[1]. To construct a straightforward sentence from a cell in our table of words, you must first read the column heads and, then, the row headings and finally and last, you must pay attention to what is written in the cell. Most people do the reverse, and find it difficult to understand the message of a given cell. The text found around some of our informative "tables of words," such as Table 8.2 on page 2: 75 and Table 8.4 on page 2: 93, give concrete guidance on how to read such tables.

A more advanced means of working with classifications is the so-called "semiotic square," a diagram introduced on page 1: 61 as Figure 3.1. Those who find such a diagram incomprehensible can simply read on in the text to find the intended categories. The semiotic square is actually more of a device for the author of a schema of classification than for the reader of that classification. An illustration of creative use is found in section "A Semi-

otic Square: The Discovery of Netorgs" (page 2: 72 below).

Third, some particularly informative sentences in our text are elevated to be numbered and named Propositions; they are also re-listed in an appendix at the end of each volume. These sentences state some well-grounded probabilities about social reality, sometimes supported by historical records or records systematically collected by researchers, sometimes simply convincingly declared by famous social scientists. Other considerations and conclusions solely based on such Propositions also carry some credibility, albeit attenuated, and some such reasoned hypotheses are occasionally included among our Propositions.

The Propositions summarize something of what I believe belongs to what we at present actually *know* from a scholarly study of society. Our Propositions about social reality are not the same as laws of natural science. The latter are immutable, and calculations and forecasts based on them command credibility. Our Propositions can be negated by social designs employed by rulers and free people – but only at a cost and with a human effort.

We introduce our first Proposition one on page 1:47 where we also describe the nature of our numbered and named Propositions. The freedom we have as human beings to rule over them is presented in another Proposition on pages 1:152. Needless to say, in the vast amount of past, contemporary and future literature of social science, there are other schemas of classification and other propositions, many containing different content and better wording than the ones applied herein.

The most important cross-references in a theory are to its various propositions. If a relevant proposition happens to belong in different Volumes, we repeat the content of the proposition in the current text, or if need be, we reproduce the entire proposition in a box in the margin.

## My Bias and Advantage

*The Many-Splendored Society* is written for a general public used to serious reading, and for college and university students

and their teachers in a social science. These seven short volumes offer my pick of a chock full of nuts in the form of exciting discoveries about social reality. At the same time, the text is meant to give professional social scientists a framework which is larger than their own specialty.

I will not and cannot hide the fact that I like the vision of a many-splendored society. However, my focus in these pages is not to convey personal preferences, but to give a broad-sided picture both of social reality and of social science.

A work of this kind can only be attempted by standing on the shoulders of giants, as a saying goes. It is also essential to have good people to give you a lift up, and it is particularly important to have many others who in various projects help you to avoid falling off. In the last chapter to last volume of *The Many-Splendored Society: Life and the Good Life,* I attempt to describe how it all happened, and to thank a number of colleagues and friends who have helped me.

The late Greta Frankel translated fragments of text that I originally had formulated in Swedish, but wanted to reuse here. She saw to it that excerpts from academic papers, newspaper columns, and lectures reappeared in a consistent style so that also non-specialists can understand

*The Many-Splendored Society* is dedicated to Karin Busch Zetterberg, partner in marriage and research, and my first reader.

Bromma and Strånäset in Sweden and Fuengirola in Spain in the years 2002–2011.

*Hans L Zetterberg*

## Our Typographical Border Signs of Social Reality

*The Many-Splendored Society* includes some warning signs when the text drifts off its central topic of language-based social reality. They were introduced in the previous volume in the section "Approaching Social Reality" on pages 1: 3-5. Here follows a summary.

[BIO] This book does not focus on biological spontaneities and processes, but when needed to understand social reality we bring them in. When we touch the biological base in a more decisive way, we will flag the occasions by a special sign, [BIO], in the margin of the text or after a heading.

[TECH] Homo sapiens are better at using tools than other beings, and the relation between technology and human social reality is fundamental, but it is not the main topic of this work. The impact of technology on social reality has no separate treatment in this treatise; you find it scattered in the text. However, whenever technology is discussed, you will see a [TECH] in the margin or after a heading.

[NAT] Continents and oceans, valleys and mountains, rivers and lakes, sunshine and rain, earthquakes and tsunamis, and numerous other features of nature have great impact on the shapes of human societies. Ecology has recently gained extraordinary attention. This topic, however, is not the center of attention here, but when we bring it in it is marked by a special sign, [NAT] for nature.

[ANIM] A border between man and animals — or between the speaking animal and other animals — is hinted at times in our text. [ANIM] is our fourth and last sign that we have left our central topic of language-based social reality.

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[1] A so called postmodern approach has tried to dispense altogether with stable classifications in the social sciences. This can be done by writing in Saussarian symbols, ever changing symbols referring only to

other changing symbols. However, there is in any language, and also in scholarly terminology, what we call Meadian symbols, described on pages 1: 54-58. We appeal on page 1: 93 to a generous use of the latter to achieve more stability in our thinking about social reality.

# Introduction: Building the Social Structure

## A Fishing Story

One day, a man who has done a great deal of fishing encounters a young boy in his community, and begins to show the young boy how to fish. He instructs him and demonstrates the ins and outs of fishing, prescribing: "Do this!" and "Do that!" Another day he shows another boy how to fish, and then a third and a fourth. During these events, he becomes known and described in the community as the "fishing teacher." And the youngsters take on the position of "fishing apprentices." The community now has established a 'social relation' (social role) of the teacher-apprentice in fishing. Others may take on the position of "fishing teacher" along with the original teacher, or after him. As some teachers prove to be better than others are, they receive different ranks: master teacher and regular teacher. Henceforth, any talks about learning how to fish or any showing others how to fish are *both enabled and constrained* by these experiences. The joint process of enabling and constraining is the 'linguistic mechanism of structuration.' This process created the position of fishing teacher, as it has created most every single position in the edifice we call human society. The process includes the pressures of convergence that we will discuss in the next volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*.

The linguistic mechanism of structuration is always ready to go to work. Listen to the talk in the fishing community! Parents say "The fishing teacher shall bring the children back for dinner." The priest says "Fishing teachers shall not work on religious holidays." The community chief rules: "The catch shall be divided equally among the apprentices, as among the members in our hunting teams." Moreover, the chief may come upon the idea: "Every tenth fish shall be given to the chief as tax." The community thus establishes 'social norms' (prescriptions) for the new position.

Elementary processes of structuration by means of the language result in 'positions,' 'relations,' and 'ranks.' More advanced processes of structuration take these concepts as building blocks. The fishing teachers in a community can form a 'network' to stay in touch with one another. They may establish a 'mass medium' that broadcasts weather and fishing conditions, for example, by visible hand signals or flag signals. A part of a network of fishermen may band together in a lasting fishing team with a common leadership and top rank, in short, what we call an 'organization.' To stay out fishing longer, a separate group may process the caught fish, thus engaging more people and having a division of labor. Moreover, and not to be forgotten, the fishermen will undoubtedly discover that they cannot, themselves, consume all of their catches. So they exchange some of it for utensils and firewood, for warm clothing to be able to fish in the cold season, et cetera. Therefore, 'markets,' networks for exchange of properties, become parts of their community. We, thus, have new positions in the social structure: producers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers of fish.

[TECH] Some of the producers were entrepreneurs who invented and put to use new technology and new organizations for fishing and its marketing. New tools helped fishermen to catch more fish in less time, and with less effort and labor. An innovation in cooking appeared: to preserve a concentrate of the fish in the form of a sauce, marketed under the name *garum*. Factories for its production were built along seashores. The factories had adjacent potteries to make the vessels in which to keep the product. A far-flung trade in *garum* came to light; and factory owners and tradesmen amassed fortunes. In other places, and with different climates, one learned to preserve fish by drying and here a big trade in kabeljou (cod) developed. Fishing was now an important branch in the 'societal realm' of economy.

Eventually, in a recent generation, the efficiency of fishing raised concern about the reproduction of the fruits of the waters. Representatives of the realm of science spoke up about this. Then, another realm, called government, intervened, and used

the language of diplomacy to work out a fishing 'treaty.' Since a great number of peoples from different regions shared the fishing waters, this became an international treaty. An 'intergovernmental institution' was created to reinforce ecologically-based restrictions on fishing. Excessive fishing continued. Certain countries initiated a discussion concerning the provision of private 'property rights' specified by GPS readings of fishing areas, so that owners would be better motivated to pursue sustainable fishing.

This is a fishing story about the major topic of a societal structuration, shaped by technology and ecology, but based on the linguistic mechanism of structuration.

A large number of ordinary terms, referred to above in single quotes, await explication and definition. Let us first consider the term structuration.

## Structuration as Taxonomy

Human beings, who interact over time, repeat and freeze certain of their activities, turning them into habitual and customary forms. A linguistic mechanism of structuration is at work to create a complex edifice. For the study of this social reality, we use scholarly symbols stripped of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge, to provide us with a set of general categories and dimensions, all based on the properties of language.

Structuration is a very large field in the study of societies. It includes everything from conversation routines in everyday life — such as saying "Hello" and "Goodbye" when we meet and depart — to the processes of establishing positions, roles, and organizations. Structuration also embraces complex historical processes differentiating and shaping major realms of societal life, such as the institutions of knowledge, religion, art, ethics, economy, statecraft, and law. We saw that in the opening Chapter in Volume 1 of this work when our topic was the differentiation of Europe, a special case of structuration.

In English, the awkward term for this is "structuration." To make matters worse, the results of structuration also receive the same label, "structuration." A pioneering German sociologist, Georg Simmel, referred to the structuration phenomenon as *Vergesellschaftung*, an equally uncomfortable label. In spite of this, he managed to write with insight and beauty about this phenomenon in an introductory book, *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Simmel 1908/1923).

"Taxonomy" is the name we give to labeling and presenting characteristics. To provide the Latin names of every bone and tender of the human anatomy to the students of medicine is intrinsically tedious and, indeed, taxing. This is similar to exploring the details of a geographic territory and, at the same time, assimilating its foreign language. The same is true for the social edifice. In the twenty-first century, it seems impossible to write the taxonomy of social reality with Simmel's elegance. Simmel actually worked more in the realm and reward system of a literary artist than that of a scientist. (On such difference see 175 et seq.) While he enjoyed people citing him, he hardly ever cited contemporary scholars, only classical texts. This made him an outsider at the University of Berlin, but not in the intellectual life of Berlin.

Simmel gave us lively portraits of characters, such as city dwellers, strangers, noblemen, et cetera. A German critic, Walter Benjamin, continued this type of inquiry. Like Simmel, he did not accept the discipline of academe. For example, he exhibits an idiosyncratic version of Marxism – both Marxists and non-Marxists agree on this – and an irresponsible view of the use of violence that would not pass in university seminars. His scattered essays on city life from the period between the World Wars of the twentieth century have been collected and translated into an English volume, *Reflections, Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings* (Benjamin 1978). Here one finds astute observations and analyses of Berlin, Moscow, Marseilles, Naples, and, most memorable, the Paris Arcades. Similar to Simmel, Benja-

min excelled in portraits of the emerging characters of his times, for example, flâneurs, gamblers, and collectors.

In dealing with the structuration of social life, our task, in this book, is academic. We give up any attempt to the artistic flair of Simmel and Benjamin, in return for a systematic approach that ends with a periodic table of societal realms and a sketch of their valences. We work, instead, in the tradition of the greatest German social scientist, Max Weber.

Before the First World War, Weber (1913) put together his first taxonomy (*Kategorienlehre*) for the entire social sciences – or what he, at that time, called "general sociology." A revised and extended version appeared after the War in the initial chapters of his *Economy and Society* (Weber 1920/1978). At his death in 1920, he had not entirely closed his taxonomical project. Outside his systematic schema, we find the well-known term "Charisma" in later chapters of *Economy and Society*; we deal with this term on page 63 below. The term "Eigengesetzlichkeit" means bounded autonomy. This Weberian concept is central to my books on the many-splendored societies; see, for example, pages 163-169 below. However, this term is also outside Weber's formal scheme of definitions for social science, and found only in his work on religion (Weber 1921).

Weber used the same term to designate both an emic, pure ideal-type – for example, "the economy" – and an etic concrete societal phenomenon, for instance, "the Prussian agricultural economy in the 1890s" with its special political rules, kinship structures, aristocratic ethos, et cetera. He sought precision in his study of society. He achieved this, for the most part, via a sharpening of ordinary language, not by using unusual words. Contexts tell what is local and what is general; or etic or emic, as some anthropologists say[2].

In my work on categories, I am not much bothered by the dilemma that the same terms may stand for both the abstractly pure and the messily concrete limits to time and place. Normally, one can easily figure out the usage from the context. In communicating social science to laymen, I have, instead, appreciated

Weber's praxis of using the language of the sources, but at the same time attributing the key terms with a more formal, or ideal-typical, meaning. However, Weber's written language has an unfortunate distance from direct, short, and easily accessible every-day sentences. In this sense, Weber is a poor model for a social science that accepts the obligation to be accessible to the public with which it deals.

In our time, we meet a taxonomic challenge via the realization explored in our previous volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*, namely, that linguistic symbols make up social reality. Therefore, we can legitimately approximate social reality's technical terms by ordinary language. That may not be elegant, but non-professionals can better understand the outcome.

## Language-Based Structuration

The modern usage of the term structuration dates from foundations by Anthony Giddens (1984). Prior to Giddens' work, it was customary to refer to man's actions meeting the resistance of social structures. Moreover, the writing of famous sociologists, Talcott Parsons for one, suggests that people repeatedly bang their creative heads against walls raised by society. Of course, this could well be the actual experience of many a man and, even more women. However, reality is not so one-sided. If you look closer, you find that social structures are also human activities, and the process of structuration is a creative one in which many parts are voluntary. Social reality created by man's free use of symbols is, and remains, our central fact in the study of its structures.

It is my aim to honor and maintain this aspect of Giddens' criticism, but to also focus on the use of language in the structuration process. We shall make full use of the idea that language used in human encounters makes some of its components stiffer and turns them into forms that are more permanent, and with special designations. This approach – 'the linguistic mechanism of structuration' – provides an easier and more parsimonious

entry into this field of study, than other approaches. If you do not start with the language base of structuration, you may end up in painfully complicated texts, such as the one by Alexander and Colomy (1990).

We can all readily learn to identify and cope with the majority of social structures (or part of structures) that we encounter in our personal life: family, friendships, work places, public authorities, stores, et cetera. We may even be able to enumerate and describe many of the structures we have personally encountered. However, to cope professionally with contemporary and historical structures is an overwhelming task. The enumeration can be huge. We must use *classifications* reducing the multitude to manageable amounts. Social scientists in the past century accomplished much of this task, and we will select from their works for our presentation.

A first starting point for our contribution to the task of classification in the study of social reality — and what might justify asking readers to pay some attention — is the Tri- and Bisections of Language Usages (Volume 1: 145-150). It separates into descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions, and each of these contains executive and emotive components. These properties of language are the unique parts of terminology that social scientists need; the rest we can obtain from logic or borrow from other sciences.

Such was one message in the previous volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*. For those who have not read that volume, we may repeat our first intuitive usage of this Tri- and Bisection when we looked at lifestyles entirely dependent on language (1: 145-151) and met the natives of any Many-Splendored Society. They are the Learning-Buffs concern themselves with what we know from executive descriptions in scholarship. Business-Minded pursue the best executive evaluations in the market places of goods and services. Civic-Minded prepare and promote executive prescriptions for the order of their community. Aesthetes seek emotively loaded expressions typical of artistic products. Believers engage emotively charged evaluations of life

and death. Moreover, we have the Compassionate who follow emotively charged prescriptions of doing good to humankind.

In this volume and the next one, we shall present further concepts based on these components of language. Underling our effort is another message from our first Volume: If humanity has the capacity to compose previously unheard-of sentences, it also has the capacity to cook and serve social structures never before seen.

## The Text Ahead

In Chapter 6 we take a first step of creating a taxonomy of social reality by separating the personal from the social. If we fail to detach what we do alone and what we do in consort with others, we will make all sorts of subsequent mistakes in our thinking. We have two drills to go thorough: separating habits and customs, and separating uniformity and individuality. Then we can practice or illustrate what we learned, for example, on the writings by Adam Smith (1776) and views by others about these, hopefully avoiding common misreading of his work.

The chapter continues with a presentation of two basic tools for ordering social reality: norms and contracts. Both organize prescriptions in society. We get a flying start to our discussion by standing on the shoulders of the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1934) in the case of norms and the American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1913) in case of contracts. They were remarkably foresighted, and used a logic which was sharp as an owl, that has yet to be fully applied in anthropology, cultural studies, sociology and economics that otherwise inform us a great deal about either norms or contracts. To study the major difference between a law-dominated society and a contract-dominated society is a promising territory of future scholarship and for finding future political agendas.

Chapter 7 deals with social positions and relations, the most common building blocks in all human structuration. Those who

have taken a course in introductory sociology will recognize certain of the terms.

Chapter 8 shows how the positions and relations cluster into organizations, networks, media, and, in addition, a previously familiar but unnamed structure that we baptize as 'netorgs.' The latter seems to be able to outdo all the others in shaping the history of societies.

In Chapter 9 we bring in the effects of certain numeric restrictions. We look at mankind's physical limits of actions, and particularly its limits in reaching accurate knowledge about large societal structures. We become interested in how limits promote a structuration into two master clusters of society: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Folk Life and City Life). They were discovered in most of their implications by Ferdinand Tönnies (1887). These clusters are an intermediary resting point in our study, a first notion of how total societies may differ. We will see (beginning on page 148 below) how scholars have continuously added discoveries to these two types of societies. Here, then, is a glimpse of what one can achieve in social science by a paradigm from the turn of the century, a hundred years ago.

Chapter 10 is a central one in our presentation. We reach an important floor for our edifice of symbols, the 'cardinal values' of knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue. A 'societal realm' is all social phenomena (positions, roles, organizations, networks, media, functions, stratifications, rationalities, freedoms, spontaneous orders, etc.) that have a stake in one and the same cardinal value. In a drastic revision of Weber's work, we settle for six such realms: science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. We summarize the content of each realm in a Periodic Table of Societal Realms and their interactions in a Table of Valences of Societal Realms. The choice of labels for these tables indicates that we think that social science has reached the level of chemistry in the year of 1869 when Dimitri I. Mendelévy discovered the periodic system of elements.

The periodic table of elements does not contain the laws of chemistry. However, it classified the chemical reality so that

chemists could formulate efficient laws regarding this science. Likewise, our Periodic Table of Societal Realms maps the language-based parts of human society into efficient categories, but it does not tell what happens in society. What apparently has happened in social reality, and what constitutes grounds for future happenings is, rather, hinted at in our Propositions. We number them, discuss them in the text, and list them beginning on page 248.

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[2] On emic and etic usage of language, see Volume 1, pages 136-139.

# 6. Uniformity and Individuality. Laws and Contracts

## The Individual and the Collective

Let us sort out human actions that are alike, or, rather nearly alike, as we rarely, or never, can take two actions exactly alike. Certain physical actions do look alike or as "the same" on simple inspection, for example, people brushing their teeth. When in doubt, we recognize the similarity of such actions from the words we attach to them: "brushing teeth." Communicative acts, such as descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions, are alike if they have the same meanings. Here, it does not matter very much whether the meanings in an expression are down-to-earth "Brush your teeth every day!" (a Meadian way of talking), or if they are synonymous, such as "Attend to a daily dental care" (a Saussurian way of talking[3]). In either case, we treat them as similar.

Usually actions are similar because they are embedded in uniform symbolic meanings — for example, Mr. X's reading of an editorial and Mr. Y's reading of the same editorial, or Mr. X's reading of an editorial one morning and his reading of another editorial in his paper the following morning. All of these acts of reading are "alike."

Actions that are repeated in this manner, or would be repeated if the opportunity presented itself (e.g. the appearance of the newspaper on a breakfast table), are 'persistent actions.' We might further distinguish between intra-individual and inter-individual persistence, as one of the fathers of American pragmatism, John Dewey (1922, Part 1, sec. 2) did, by separating habits from customs. A 'habitual action' is a persistent action by one and the same individual: for example, Mr. York's habit of voting for the Democrats in every election. A 'customary action' is a persistent action by several persons, for example, the Democratic

vote of New York City in the 1960s. We envisage persistent actions in dispositional terms; if the opportunity presents itself, they are repeated — by the same person in the case of a habit, and by several persons in the case of a custom.

Customary actions are a main topic of a cluster of learning about societies that includes traditional sociology and social anthropology, as well as economics, political science, history, and cultural studies. Here we meet concepts, such as community, bureaucracy, institution, market, culture, schools of thought and tastes, and so forth. Habitual actions are a main topic of another cluster of learning, i.e. psychology and biography. In this cluster, we meet concepts such as trait, ability, drive, personality, and other complexes of such actions. Social psychology bridges these two clusters of learning; its propositions link habitual and customary actions to one another. I would include both psychology and social psychology under the broader umbrella of social science. You cannot fully understand, say the customs of politics, trading, prayer, or art collecting without psychology, and certainly not without social psychology.

The last chapter in the first volume of *The Many-Splendored Society* left us with what we promised should be light luggage, a minimum vocabulary of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions that had more or less of emotive loadings. Let us unpack this luggage and use it to begin to write a theory of social reality.

We might consider our basic terms, descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions, as either habitual or customary communications. In this way, we arrive at definitions of a series of well-known and useful terms. ‘Cognition’ is a habitual description, whether quite recently acquired or since long established. To elaborate on an example, the reader's knowledge that this text is devoted to social science is cognition. You could, or would reassert, this cognition, as the occasion requires. A habitual evaluation — for example, the reader's emerging feeling that this might be a difficult text — is what we call an 'attitude.' A habitual prescription — for example, a teacher's assignment to his students — is an 'exhortation' (or its mirror term 'expectation'). When we

say, "This book is devoted to social science" (a cognition) or "This book is difficult" (an attitude), or "You, too, should read Chapter Six in Zetterberg's book!" (an exhortation), we usually give stable responses: we repeat them as the occasion arises. When the time comes when we no longer repeat these responses, we have given up or forgotten a habit.

T6.1

*Table 6.1. The Tri-section of Language in Habitual and Customary Forms.*

| | Habitual | Customary |
|---|---|---|
| Descriptions | Cognition | Social beliefs |
| Evaluations | Attitudes | Public sentiments |
| Prescriptions | Exhortations | Social norms |
| | Individual opinions | Public views/opinions |

The parallel customary communications are also readily organized. We call customary descriptions 'social beliefs', or simply 'beliefs.' “Smoking shortens your life” is a growing belief at the turn of the century in Western countries. Customary evaluations may be called 'public sentiments,' or simply 'sentiments'; an expression, such as "The Vietnam war is bad for the United States," was once a public sentiment, an evaluation shared by many Americans and non-Americans in the 1960s. Customary prescriptions like “Vote in general elections!” are usually called 'social norms,' or simply 'norms.' We should not confuse a social norm with a statistical norm, which tells what is most common, not what is prescribed.

As you see, all these terms stand for language products. We are able to illustrate these products by words that we can put into quotes, and many people, not just some odd individuals, express them.

Those interested in the architecture of science can stop to consider Table 6.1. It illustrates how concepts in social science can be constructed from a minimum vocabulary of terms grounded in linguistics (description, evaluation and prescription) plus cer-

tain terms from logic and other sciences, namely ‘applied to one person’ (habitual) and ‘applied to more than one person’ (customary). It is almost too simple to be true. (We developed a full minimum vocabulary on pages 1: 145-151).

We can add a summary term for all types of customary communications as 'public views’, or ‘public opinions’. An easy means of visualizing what is customary is to visualize a table summarizing poll data from a large number of people. When a high percentage of respondents in an urban and educated category of the population say, for example, "all children ought to have a college education," they express a customary prescription, i.e. a social norm prevailing in that part of society. When one parent repeatedly says to a son or daughter to finish college, we have an exhortation.

## Uniformity and Individuality

Usually habitual and customary actions overlap. Parents’ exhortation about education enters as one element in the customary prescription concerning school attendance. However, there are also completely idiosyncratic exhortations (e.g. whims) and there are shared outbursts in collectivities that have no counterparts among the habitual actions of its members (e.g. panicking crowds). Moreover, even if we assume that overlap is normal, points of strain will remain. Modern society is far from homogeneous. There will be frequent instances when someone has an established cognition that clashes with a new description that is becoming customary, or when someone, who has established attitudes, meets new public sentiments. Therefore, we do not take the overlap between the habitual and the customary for granted, but, rather, view this overlap as problematical. We accomplish this when we study 'convergence,' that is, the degree of such overlaps. Convergence is also found in the operation of the linguistic principle of structuration.

Convergence of actions may range from "altruism" to "egoism," to use Émile Durkheim's (1897) somewhat archaic vocabu-

lary. The former is a condition in which all habitual actions are also customary ones; in other words, man is totally submerged into society. The latter is a condition in which none of the habitual actions are also customary actions, and in which people, thus, behave, completely, individualistically or idiosyncratically. Durkheim saw both extremes, not only the latter, as dangerous to individuals and to society at large; both may, for example, lead to high suicide rates. For the less extreme aspects of this continuum we nowadays use the terms 'collectivism' for doing something similar and together, and 'individualism' for doing the same thing one's own way.

Elaborate philosophies, social movements, and political constitutions have developed around the poles of collectivism and individualism. Located only 100 miles apart, ancient Sparta stood for collectivism; while ancient Athens stood for individualism. (This stereotype may actually be true for males only. Spartan women, the mothers of soldiers, had more freedom and better status than the women of Athens, whose most attractive sons were raised by established men in homosexual relations.)

Neighboring historical periods have also been characterized differently. Collectivism characterized the European Middle Ages, and individualism were the mark of the spirit of the Renaissance. In Post-Renaissance political thinking, Rousseau and Hegel promoted collectivism, and Locke and de Tocqueville promoted individualism. The term "individualism" was actually an invention of the latter. It seems more typical of the “Anglo-Protestant Civilization” (described on pages 26-28 in Volume 1) than any other civilization.

In the twentieth century, a political and economic liberalism embodying individuality was at the center of the political scene. This liberalism faced deadly conflicts with the uniformity of the right, embodied in fascism, and with a uniformity of the left, embodied in communism.

In the twenty-first century, Western individuality faces the collectivism of Islam. This is an uneven ideological struggle. The standard-bearer on the side of individualism, the United States,

has many Christians in its population, but the US is not a Christian state. That would be contrary to individualism and to its constitution. By contrast, the standard-bearers on the collectivist side are constituted as Islamic states. It is patently easy for them to use the power of the state in ideological struggles, just as Nazi Germany and the Soviets had done in the previous century.

## Adam Smith

It may seem self-evident that there is a difference between the customary and collective, on the one hand, and the habitual and individual, on the other. Bypassing such distinctions, people are apt to misunderstand a great deal of social sciences. For example, a famous theorem advanced by Adam Smith reads: In a free market, (that means without monopolies or coercions) both sides to a trade generally gain from the trade, even when everyone is motivated solely by their own self-interests. In other words, a person's or a company's gain is never entirely at the expense of those they trade with. If the latter did not gain anything at all, they would not agree to any trade in a free market. Smith's thesis is not a celebration of a morality of personal greed; it is an observation about free trade and free markets. His discovery stunned economic thinkers for over two centuries, so it took reminders from psychologists and brain researchers supporting the premise that mutual aid and bigheartedness are important factors in economic behavior. This is what the Austrian-Swiss economist, Ernst Fehr, among others, has observed (Gintis, et al. 2005).

"It is not from the benevolence from the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest," is his much quoted counter-intuitive insight in Adam Smith's multi-volume classic text, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). Thus, society need not be held together by threats from "the sovereign," such as a king or a priest or even a ruling assembly, such as a Parliament, as had been thought from Plato to Hobbes. In Smith's view, it can cohere through mutual self-interest. This process of

coherence eventually became labeled “the invisible hand.” Smith called his theory "natural liberty;" later writers have called it "laissez-faire."

The wealth of nations, which we nowadays usually measure as Gross National Product (GNP), is a collective attribute, not an individual one. Smith's book cannot be read to tell how an individual becomes rich or poor, only how a nation becomes rich or poor. For a nation to become rich requires abolishment of privilege, the provision of freedom to markets, and a division of labor, all collective attributes.

Partisans, who failed to distinguish the difference between the collective and the individual, have corrupted Smith so that it takes considerable effort to understand his original meaning. Smith’s conceptions have no affinity to any "procreation advantage" (Charles Darwin) or "the survival of the fittest" (Herbert Spencer), or to “the law of the jungle” (Rudyard Kipling). Such notions slipped into vulgarized versions of Herbert Hoover's American laissez-faire and Margaret Thatcher's British laissez-faire. Nor do they have any affinity with the Marxian ideas of “exploitation of the workers.” Such notions were subsequent additions to the image of laissez-faire. Incidentally, while many refer to Adam Smith as the father of capitalism, he never used the word “capitalism.” It is a term that gained currency in the nineteenth century and Smith lived in the eighteenth century.

Adam Smith held a professorship in "moral philosophy" at the University of Glasgow. Moral precepts and human compassion were self-evident ingredients in his view of society. One of his arguments reads: "when wages are high we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious than when they are low." Moreover, "the sovereign" in Smith's writing refers to the *state* as known to his times, not to a modern state involved in health and education of all its members, and with direct involvement in the financing of welfare to its youngest, oldest, and unemployed members who cannot support themselves. It is misplaced to cite Smith as an apostle dismantling welfare states.

What you can do is to cite Adam Smith as an apostle for removing the state from the running of ordinary businesses:

> Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society (Smith 1776, vol. IV, pp 51-52).

In his effort to demarcate the role of the state from the role of the economy, Adam Smith becomes an apostle of taking the first step towards a many-splendored society.

To achieve a fully many-splendored society, however, church and state must also separate from one another, and so must church and university. In a many-splendored society, religion and morality should be at arm's length, as was the case in ancient Athens and pre-Christian Rome. Likewise, art and morality

must become more independent of other realms. Ultimately, they should all be equal in esteem and career prospects to the body politic and the economy of today's society.

The study of such problems requires concepts concerning collective orders, not only of individual actions, i.e. we need the approach of Adam Smith. We might add a profound aspect that Adam Smith's generation did not give much attention. Language itself is a collective property. And, we need this collective property to express our individuality.

## Division of Labor

In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* we find Adam Smith's contribution to the theory of structuration. It deals with the division of labor and its effect on the wealth of nations. He discovered that an increased specialization in occupations in a market makes society richer. Here is the germ of a later idea in economics. If each geographical area of the world was to specialize in what it does best and cheapest, and free trade would spread the benefits, all nations would become richer. This may be the most important discovery that social science ever has made, and it became a cornerstone of academic economics. The prevailing vision prior to Smith had been "For ye have the poor always with you," as we read in King James Bible (Matthew 26:11).

In sociological thinking, structuration in the form of division of labor became associated primarily with the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. He found other consequences of the division of labor: such division makes us, paradoxically enough, at once, more individualistic and more public-spirited. The division of labor, he said in *De la division du travail social* (1893), is "the great innovation that distinguishes contemporary societies from the societies of the past."

The historical direction of development is from societies with a simple division of labor, in which people are expected to behave similarly, to societies with a complex division of labor in

which they are expected to behave differently, all according to each individual's specialization. Presumably, a society in which everyone faces exactly equal expectations does not exist. There is always a certain degree of differentiation between older and younger people, between men and women, and between insiders and outsiders. Nevertheless, clan and sect communities are, generally, organized around homogeneity of norms, beliefs, and feelings. When a member of the community deviates from these, serious disturbances arise and there is a high probability that the deviant will be rejected from the group, in extreme cases by exile or capital punishment. In these communities, with the sect's and tribe's demands for uniformity and loyalty, what Durkheim calls "mechanical solidarity" prevails. Here, the individual must fuse with the community. Individualism is not permitted, and degrees of freedom are few. Differentiated communities, on the other hand, are bound together by "organic solidarity"— mutual dependence on its members' specialized functions.

Nonetheless, for Émile Durkheim the individual in this kind of community, too, is, in all essentials, a product of society. Through their countless combinations, the various individual roles and life histories in the differentiated society create unique individuals with many degrees of freedom. Thus, differentiation in these complex societies gives birth to a new kind of human being: "a personality of his own, with his own opinions, his own religion, his own lifestyle, and who draws a clear line between himself and society, between private problems and public concerns."

In a society based on the members' dissimilarity, co-operation is essential. Co-operation must also continue to flow when someone deviates from the pattern. Order may be restored by the imposition of penalties on the deviants that allow them to continue in their co-operative role; such penalties may be fines or, possibly, brief and more symbolic prison terms. Here, organic solidarity prevails. This is what characterizes an urban society. Thus, one manifestation of development from mechanical to organic solidarity is the shift from criminal to civil legislation. In

addition to this differentiation in law, the process is illustrated in Durkheim's works by examples from family life, the education system, business and industry, and religion. He refers more seldom to specific historical courses of events. He prefers to seek general explanations for social life, and does not want to settle for tenuous historical links.

## Norms to Gain Order

It is impossible and bewildering to try to keep track of the activities in a society. To record everything with surveillance cameras would make most people mad, and it would not help very much as the task remains to make sense of and classify what the cameras have recorded.

Mankind has invented a different means to develop and to cope with regularities in societies. This does not focus on all the activities. One way humanity copes with the problem of creating regularities is to look for a limited number of norms, each of which produces a multitude of activities.

We have defined a 'social norm' in a society as a shared prescription. This differs from a statistical norm, which stands for either the average or the most common, behavior or some other measure of a central tendency. When social norms are effective, they produce statistical norms with low deviation around a prescribed behavior. We shall postpone the discussion of the conditions for compliance to norms to the next Volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*. Here, we shall address the form of manageable order resulting from the norms.

There are many kinds of societal norms.

If and when some form of violence is prescribed against the violators of a norm, we deal with a 'coercive norm.' The violence may be any forcible deprivation of "life, liberty, and property," including deprivation of any cardinal value (particularly economic), any rank or privilege, any basic biological necessity. In these instances, you are not merely expected to conform to a

norm stating that you are not to steal from your neighbor. You are fined or jailed if you do steal, and you are often liable to provide indemnity to your neighbor.

F6.1

*Figure 6.1. Different Types of Norms, Freely after Hans Kelsen and with Realm Norms Added.*




Here we deal with a 'two-tier norm' system. The first level is a general prescription, such as "Thou shalt not steal." The second level contains norms instructing certain individuals — police, judges, jailers, and others — to deal with you in prescribed ways, using violence if you resist. In legal texts, you seldom find an explicit reference to the first tier, but only to the second: "those who commit thefts shall be tried and jailed." Those who read only the second level, i.e. the agents of enforcement, easily understand the first level.

Two-tier norms, laws, are a great human innovation. They standardize punishments extracted at violations of norms. The personal decisions and whims of the mighty no longer determine penalties of those who violate the norms comprising the laws of the land. The second tier of the norm removes any option of arbitrary retributions. To specify second tiers is one of several steps in "the rule of law," in contrast to the rule of man.

Norms guiding the creation of laws comprise a special category. They are 'basic laws" or "constitutions.' They may be written or unwritten, or a combination of both. Constitutions are any lasting arrangements for establishing the rules of law. If we accept this broad definition of a constitution, we can agree with Edmund Burke (1790/1986) who argued that the basic law of people lies in the history of their institutions, not only in a text that they call their constitution. He holds that the real constitution for the United States is not only a paper document from 1787, but also the rules in an entire constellation of customs and values that had developed on the North American Continent during the two centuries prior to the American Revolution.

Rules determining how to make rules need to be stable; thus there are, usually, restraints on the process of changing constitutions. For example, it may be required that they be endorsed by a referendum, or by two parliaments separated by a general election, and/or by qualified majorities.

Two-level norms enacted according to the basic laws, written or unwritten, become defined as 'legal norms.' This is a necessary second step in the rule of law. Other norms are simply '*social* norms.' Coercive, non-legal norms are those of a 'mafia.' Figure 6.1 depicts the most common types of norms.

All these distinctions, and several important others, were codified by Hans Kelsen in his pioneering work *Reine Rechtslehre* (1934). (They were actually anticipated in one of his first treatises on law and state from 1911.) Late in life, he further refined them in a new edition in 1967. His distinctions are what he called "scientific," and, rightly so, in an old-fashioned, positive way. Thus, they are void of any assumption that the legal norms are divine

or are expressions of a higher morality. They are also void of ideas that legal norms are grounded in some universal human nature, something that would require empirical proof, which is not at hand, or, at least is not presently at hand in a convincing manner.

The ideal that norms and values shall be, or at least are able to be, the same at all times, all places, and all conditions, is called universalism. Many religions have certain beliefs that social reality and cosmos are universal, but there is no universal religion. Universalism is a term from theology that has found its way into social science, particularly jurisprudence, political science, and social philosophy. Here it means total universalism across all divisions of society.

In secular contexts, universalism saw many victories during the European Enlightenment. The urge for universalism in recent decades is attested to by frequent references to declarations from the United Nations, said to contain universal consensus. They include The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption. If general formulations are used, the universal norms and rights boil down to a total of ten principles, according to United Nations Global Compact Office.

In reality, humankind always develops certain non-universal norms for artistic and scientific activities and in economic, religious, and political life. We shall call them 'realm norms.' Differences built into every human language create societal realms, and the realm norms are language products. Such non-universal norms are actually the underpinnings of a many-splendored society.

The realm norms in the body politic are not necessarily two-tier laws enacted by legislatures. Many norms in the polity deal with administrative routines. Some are common to all government bureaucracies. Some are special ordinances and apply within only one of the bureaucracies created by the legislature to

administer special chapters of legislation, such as taxation, social security, foreign relations, et cetera. The bureaucracies, themselves, with an implicit or explicit approval from the executive branch, issue the latter realm norms.

In countries with swollen public sectors, for example Sweden where the public sector channels half of the BNP, these realm norms are legion. Here the legislated norms are, at best, 5 percent of all norms in the body politic; administrative rules account for about 85 percent (Sterzel 2009, 261).

## Plato on Realm Norms

Plato knew about realm norms. In Book 1 of *The Republic* Plato and a circle of people discuss what is "right," in some translations called "justice," that is, the legal and moral commandments concerning different roles in society and different aspects of society. Socrates asked Cephalus, a businessman of the third generation who had created a fortune larger than the one he had inherited, what was the greatest blessing his money had brought him. Cephalus, an aged man, looks back on his life in business and says that he has not had any reason "to lie to or cheat others, whether inadvertently or deliberately." These are the thoughts of a man who suggests that throughout his life, he has entered business deals based on honesty and voluntariness, that he has always kept his part of agreements and has repaid all debts. He can, therefore, meet death with peace of mind.

Socrates thought that Cephalus had put his answer well, but he was still not satisfied. Not because he doubts Cephalus or suspects that he is just a cheap crook, but because answers from the business community cannot be generalized to hold for all of society. He gives an example showing that good business ethics do not always apply.

> Justice, what is it? — to speak the truth and to pay your debts — no more than this? And are there not exceptions even to this? Suppose that a friend in his right mind, has deposited arms with me and he then asks for them when he is not in his

> right mind should I to give them back to him? No one would say that I should or that I would be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I should always speak the truth to one who is in his condition (Plato, *Republic*, Book 1).

Faced with this difficulty, Cephalus thought it best to leave the conversation. The gathering agreed, "a friend should always do well to his friend and never do him harm." Plato had thus revealed that moral dictates in the economy are not only different from those in the socially small world of friends, but that some of those dictates can conflict with those based on friendship. We can generalize this in modern terms to mean that the discovery of the norms of the business world differed from, and in some cases, were in conflict with those of the civil society. (Here I use the term "civil society" in its present meaning to connote family life, neighborhood circles, associations, religious and cultural life. In antiquity, "civil society" meant something quite different that was more in line with the realm of body politic.)

The dictates of the guardians, the ruling elite in Plato's Republic, also differ from others. Socrates asks: "Is then the best (man) to watch the camp the one who can sneak into the enemy's camp?" The gathering responds, "Of course:" For a guardian, stealing the enemy's plans is honorable.

Plato's norms for statecraft and business have been effectively updated by Jane Jacobs (1992). Similar to her antique model, Jacobs uses the form of a dialog to present her arguments. She regards the problem of whether or not to return the deposited weapon as a gulf between the commercial moral syndrome and that of the guardians: not to return the weapon is seen "as a form of policing" (p. 30). Jacobs is forced to this conclusion inasmuch as she does not acknowledge that civil society has its own moral syndrome, which differs from the syndromes of both the guardians and businessmen. A slightly modified version of Jacobs that also includes certain norms from Moses is shown in Table 6.2. Under the heading "Civil Society" we list three universal candidates from the Decalogue.

T6.2

*Table 6.2. Different Norms in Economy and the Body Politic. Freely, after Plato and Jacobs, with Norms in Civil Society Added.*

| BUSINESS: | CIVIL SOCIETY: | STATECRAFT : |
|---|---|---|
| Create wealth | | Maintain order |
| Reach voluntary agreements that are advantageous | | Use force effectively |
| Respect contracts | | Maintain discipline |
| Compete | | Respect the power hierarchy |
| Never use force | | Be loyal, promote loyalty of others |
| Be open to all information | Do not lie | Do not enter into business deals |
| Cooperate with foreigners | Do not steal | Use information selectively |
| Take initiative and be enterprising | Do not kill | Be generous in order to attain goals |
| Look for innovations and inventions | | Enjoy pomp and circumstance |
| Invest in effective production and trade | | Stand up for your rights and honor |
| Be industrious | | Be courageous |

The oppositions between the norms of the state and business are usually not apparent, but they become obvious to an inquiring Socrates. In civil society, we may assume that compassion is to rule, not the dictate of business to compete. In civil society, one shall not lie, steal or kill. However, in the name of the state, soldiers are commanded to deceive, steal from, and kill their enemies. Such conflicts, as familiar as they are irreconcilable, have always plagued sensitive young people in differentiated societies.

It is significant that the three norms from civil society that we have taken from the Decalogue are fully compatible with the norms of business but not the norms of polity, at least not at the time of war or danger of war.

## Contemporary Realm Norms

Those social norms that are anchored in an established ethic or in an institution in the realm of morality may be called 'ethical norms.' Any claim that ethical norms are universal and shall

overrule all other norms is, at best, only partially valid, as we shall see in Volume 6 of *The Many-Splendored Society*.

To conclude, we add six *realm norms* to the Kelsen-type categories of norms, as presented in Figure 6.1. The first two are business norms and administrative norms, as described in Table 6.2. Academic norms include, among other courtesies, rules of citation as regards references to discoveries by others. Aesthetic norms require generous amount of time to be given to contemplate works of art. They may also require tolerance of the bohemian lifestyles in art communities. Religious norms may be dietary or dress codes, observance of religious holidays, et cetera. The everyday moral norms present special concerns for the help and care of the youngest and the oldest and those adults who are sick, or down and out. In general, it holds that the lion's share of moral norms deal with welfare.

The ever presence of realm norms has not lead to a corresponding attention by scholars. The kind of pluralism that realm norms represent has been seen by many intellectuals as something backwards, and by many rulers as a threat. In the Western tradition, the celebrated attention is rather drawn to universal norms, such as norms of rationality, and more recently also norms of equality. The problems and possibilities of the coexistence of realm norms with rationality and universalism should be a research field of high priority. Michaels Walzer's book *Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (1983) is a praiseworthy achievement to study realm norms and the possibility of universally valid egalitarian norms.

One realm's norms require immunity from intrusions from other realms. Realm norms thus require special freedoms such as the free trade, academic freedom, and artistic license. We begin to deal with them on pages 216-218 below.

## Natural Law

All medieval European universities had law faculties, the leading ones being at the universities of Salamanca in Spain,

Bologna in Italy, and Paris in France. These law schools engaged in an in-depth exploration and a great systematization of the Roman heritage of legislation. Legal scholars, theologians, and philosophers also pursued theories of existence of natural norms in legislation in the service of a higher justice, either grounded in divine revelation or in God's creation of human nature. Given this natural law, laymen were taught to think of legislation as a tool of fairness and justice that punished evil people and left good people in peace.

The medieval giant of learning, Thomas Aquinas, held that God had given the world and mankind two sets of laws. One was composed of the eternal laws of nature implanted at Creation. The other constituted laws given by God at later times. At the time of the Old Testament, mankind received the Ten Commandments, and at the time of the New Testament the Golden Rule, affirming that man should love his neighbor as himself.

Conceptions of a natural and God-given judicial system are a leading theme in the West's history of ideas. This theme has been explored with great acuity and learning by Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Kant and many others. Legislation inspired by natural law lives on in our days, in a large measure because of Montesquieu's great influence on modern constitutions.

Lesser spirits compared to those who first presented natural laws have questioned the ideas therein during past centuries. Some of these individuals worked in accordance with the scientific method, and could, therefore, make major discoveries even though they were to no degree creative geniuses. Philosophers in Cambridge, Uppsala, Oslo, and Vienna developed this criticism. They proposed that it was possible to have jurisprudence without any elements of natural law. In the United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841–1935) put forth the fundamental idea that the law is that which the courts recognize as law, and that valid law is synonymous with their verdicts.

None of the modern theories of justice have room and need for natural laws. Utilitarianism wants to minimize social harm. It can execute its calculations of benefits and harms without natu-

ral laws. Libertarianism wants to maximize personal freedom. It reaches its conclusions without reference to natural laws. Communitarianism wants to cultivate civic virtues. It does not have to assume that these virtues are given by God or are given in human nature. Some communitarians argue that the virtues they pursue have their ground in the religion of their civilization. They may be quite right in this, but the issue is an empirical question and not one settled by fiat.

The Austrian jurist, Alfred Verdrass published a book *Abendländische Rechtsphilsophie* (1958), which contains thoughtful statements of a modern view of natural law. Its main maxim deserves capital letters:

"Human dignity is superior to all social order."

No orders, be they political, religious, economic, or what have you, have the right to destroy human dignity.

In order to realize this basic judgment of value, Verdrass specifies five prescriptions for humanity. With §-signs and numbers added here, they summarize in this way:

§1. A society must acknowledge a sphere in every individual within which he acts as a free and responsible person;
§2. The law must protect and guarantee this personal freedom;
§3. The exercise of public authority must be limited;
§4. Such curtailment must be guaranteed by law;
§5. Persons whose dignity has been offended by laws or authorities need not obey the offensive laws or directives.

A social scientist, like anyone else, can embrace Verdrass' theses and share in the admiration of them. All we have to realize is that these beautiful maxims are part of serious political and moral reasoning, and that they deserve to become laws enacted according to constitutions and those courts that enforce them. That, of course, is a tall order requiring personal pledges and civic courage. However, this does not require any belief that these laws are God-given. Nor do such commitments require any scientifically questionable belief that these laws are part of man's biological nature. What are called natural laws are, in re-

ality, great political and moral achievements of past generations requiring renewals from each new generation in order to survive. We, who have had the short historical privilege to live under these maxims, should be immensely proud of them, and pass them on to our children.

In Verdrass the question of natural law has, in effect, boiled down to issues close to what is called universal human rights. A civic movement for human rights can easily house and cultivate his maxims. The success of such movements depends on personal pledges and efforts by citizens and their leaders. Success for human rights does not come from relying on any special faculty of human nature, or on relying on a future victory of some divine justice.

## Contracts to Gain Rights

Norms, as we have seen, are shared prescriptions, a concept that takes for granted a certain agreement in a collectivity, small or large. There are also wholly individual prescriptions, such as "Tell me his name!", "Give me a hand!" or "Sell this item to me!" In ordinary discourse, such individually prescriptive language is as common, as is the language of shared prescriptions. In particular, mundane talk of modern life in a Western society is full of such expressions. Individual prescriptive sentences are the stuff of which contracts between individuals are made and rights established.

Contracts between collectivities are as essential as are laws for the order and functioning of a modern society. 'Treatises' are contracts between states. 'Concordats' we call contracts between societal realms, vital to make a society many-splendored.

We celebrate the American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld as a pioneering analyst of the language of contracts and rights. His raw material is not mundane conversations about rights in the general public but arguments and verdicts by judges based on tales told and lines of reasoning made in courts. In a seminal

paper from 1913 and a follow-up in 1919, Hohfeld sharpened the analysis of etic vocabularies of rights by separating four constituent parts of rights. This is how he starts out, and I cite:

"An effort will be made to pursue this method:

*Jural Opposites*

rights — no-rights
privilege — duty
power — disability
immunity — liability

*Jural Correlatives*

right — duty
power — liability
immunity — disability"
(Hohfeld 1913, 24 dashes added)

These are words from his blackboard in the years before World War I, when Professor Hohfeld lectured at Stanford University. Some of these concepts deal with acts we should undertake and also are allowed to undertake; rights, duties, and privileges belong here. Another set of concepts refers to what we have, or can acquire, legal competence to undertake; power, liability, and immunity belong here. Admittedly, Hohfeld's terms are not particularly easy to apply. Some have had their labels altered by later users but not their content. However, Hohfeld's terms are indispensable, and an effort to learn them is well rewarded.[4]

Hohfeld's main conclusion is that "the term 'rights' tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what, in a given case, may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense..." (*ibid*). His analysis reveals a "right" as a package of four separate prescriptions used in any social encounter between any two parties. They are claim, liberty, power, and immunity. To discuss these components, it has proven useful to present them as a table, as in Table 6.3, known in the literature as Hohfeld's Table.

T6.3

*Table 6.3. Hohfeld's Table. Distinctions between Rights of One Party and Burdens of Another Party.*

| First Party's Claims | Second Party's Correlates (Duties) | Negations (incl. no claims) |
|---|---|---|
| Liberty | No-claim | Duty |
| Power | Liability | No-power |
| Immunity | No-power | Liability |

Let us illustrate the above terms by a dialogue in an encounter between an immigrant from a country with a non-English mother tongue (Ego) and a teacher of English (Alter) in his or her adopted English-speaking country; let us say it is Canada, a country that sponsors English instruction to immigrants. On the left side, we spell out the content of the rights involved in everyday words, that is, what we have called mundane, emic language. On the right side, we note its formal properties in logically pristine etic language. In the right hand column of abstractions, I call the parties in the dialogue Ego and Alter. About mundane and pristine language see 1: 96-101, and about emic and etic language see 1: 136-140.

A dialogue initiating a transfer of property rights, in this case an immaterial right, the valuable property of knowing English, is shown in Table 6.4. The left-hand column shows what the parties say. The right-hand column shows how a Hohfeldian could interpret their messages.

To bring the notion of *power* in line with a common contemporary restriction, I have amended it with brackets into "doing anything [as long as it does not violate the rights of others]". Of course, one may bring in other restrictions, for example, from a list of human rights, or from the realms of religion or morality. The general idea behind such restrictions is that no one shall have a duty to do evil.

T6.4

*Table 6.4. The Beginning of a Dialogue concerning a Contract in Hohfeldian Terminology.*

| Mundane, emic language | Analytic, etic language |
|---|---|
| Immigrant: I want you to teach me English!<br>Teacher: Yes, I am an authorized English teacher. | Ego: I have a *claim* that Alter does X.<br>Alter: I have a *duty* to do X. |
| Immigrant: I can choose you or someone else to teach me English.<br>Teacher: Yes, you do not have to learn English from me; there are other teachers. | Ego: I am at *liberty* to do, or not to do X.<br>Alter: I have *no claim* that Ego does X. |
| Immigrant: I want to use the English you teach me to find a mate, to get a job, to worship, to get a degree, perhaps even to be a teacher like you, [yes, to do anything except to insult or deceive others].<br>Teacher: I do not care how you use the English I teach you. | Ego: I have the *power* to dispose of X [as long as I do not violate any rights of other persons].<br>Alter: I assume *no liability* about any disposition of X. |
| Immigrant: I don't want to let you or anyone else to make changes to these conditions<br>Teacher: I shall have no possibility to change the way you use the English I teach you. | Ego: I am *immune* from any attempts by any Alter to change my powers over X.<br>Alter: I have *no power* to change Ego's conditions for disposing of X. |

Contracts are legion in society. We shall return to Hohfeld and expand on the types of dialogues shown in Table 6.4 when we deal with the exchanges of property rights, such as those involving consumer and industrial goods. His Table is usable in all sorts of contracts: employment contracts, marriage contracts, peace treaties, and concordats, i.e. contracts of the type church-state.

## The Misuse of the Rhetoric of Rights

Hohfeld's Table helps us separate existing rights from magical ones. When a politician or someone else proclaims that "Every-

one has a right to education" this is a statement of the type "I have a dream that everyone receives an education." Dreams have immunity. Such statements become genuine rights only when amended to indicate who has the duty to provide and when the latter have accepted this duty: "Everyone has the right to an education, *and* it is the duty of the state (or church or family or the employer, etc.) to provide schools for everyone."

The brilliance of Hohfeld's distinctions lies not only in its specification of four meanings of right in column one, i.e. claim, liberty, power, and immunity. In the second column, he has added the necessary complements of a functioning right, namely a responsible response from others. Only by specifying who has to deliver on a claim, do we have a genuine right.

Finally, in the third column we have Hohfeld's negations to the four rights. This is helpful since it states what is valid whenever we conclude that no rights are present, i.e. a beneficial situation for human freedom. A society in which everything is a right or a duty seems unbearably restricted and void of human freedom.

Hohfeld's usage of the contrariety anticipates modern semiotics by half a century.

Let us look at practical semiotic ways of presenting this type of intellectual material. It is my suggestion that progresses in Hohfeldian analyses will be faster if we break it up in smaller so-called semiotic squares, discussed in Volume 1: 60-63. A single Hohfeldian table breaks up into several semiotic squares. This gives us more manageable units of analyses than full Hohfeldian tables. In Figure 6.2 we illustrate a shortcut to a semiotic square that covers immunity and liberty.

F6.2

*Figure 6.2. Shortcut Version of a Semiotic Square of Rights, Immunity, and Liberty.*




Looking at the right side of Figure 6.2 we locate the basic confusion that Hohfeld revealed between right and immunity. To say (in line with a UN Declaration) that "Everyone has the right to a job" is an immune pronunciation, very typical in political rhetoric. Political journalism rarely exposes its hollowness. The job declaration can become a full right only when the state has accepted the duty to give everyone a job.

This would presume that the state organizes public works financed by taxes for the unemployed in any occupation. Alternatively, it is implemented when the economy is socialized so that factories and offices can accept excess personnel and live with the resulting inefficiencies of over-manning.

In capitalist societies, a political rhetoric about jobs for everybody contains no rights, only immunities. A policy for more jobs

in a free society — not a job for everybody, which is impossible, but for as many as possible — requires a policy for as many and as big *employers* as possible, some in the public sector and many in the private sector. For example, a body politic that eases business burdens by lowering or abandoning payroll taxes can facilitate the expansion of the ranks of employers. This is hardly what the political left has in mind when they demonstrate for the right to a job for everyone.

Looking at the left side of the square in Figure 6.2 we have an illustration of Hohfeld's discussion of property rights, specifically the condition of trespassing someone's land. "X has a *right* or *claim* that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the *privilege* of entering on the land" (Hohfeld 1913, 26, italics in original. (Remember that what Hohfeld called "privilege" we now call "liberty.")

The controversy over file-sharing on the Internet provides a good illustration of contemporary controversies about trespassing. The Internet is a network once invented for exchange of scientific information. Scientists have free access. A scientist normally gives up economic property rights to his findings, in return for the honor of being recognized as the discoverer. This honor becomes visible in mentions and citations in future scientific publications. Trespassing is called "plagiarism," and is a sin in science. Such are the realm norms and the reward system of science. (We describe it further in Chapter 20 in Volume 4 of *The Many-Splendored Society*.)

However, file sharing of copyrighted songs, pictures, and literary products has caused conflicts due to the different reward systems in science and the arts. Science and arts have diverse realm norms. The artist sells his product for a lump sum or for royalty. That is part of the norms in the reward system of art. Then, songs on the Internet cannot readily be freely available except if and when they are explicit gifts to the world from the artist.

Hofeldian analyses of the misuse of the word "rights" are particularly relevant in a many-splendored society because here

different realm norms are manifest and different reward systems prevail in different realms.

## Universal Human Rights

Hohfeld's table is a shell; it does not provide concrete content of rights. The human rights that have emerged from mankind's encounters over the centuries include the right to life and the right to self-defense against beasts and aggressive enemies. Hunting and gathering societies have tenuous rights to collective territorial property. Firmer rights to a common territorial ground, "commons," are found in agricultural societies with cattle. In these societies, some individual property, at least of agricultural products, is established. Trading societies abound with rights to private properties, sometimes including those of chattel slaves.

In today's societies, you have the right to your own body and its free movements. A visible exception is strict Muslim societies, where female bodies are controlled in the first place by their fathers, and then by uncles, brothers and after marriage, by their husbands, and, during widowhood, by in-law males. In these societies, women's movements and speech in public places may also be restricted.

The legislation in an increasing number of countries that gives pregnant women with the sole decision to have an abortion is a recent extension of the right to own one's body. In the early stages of pregnancy, the fetus is seen as a tissue of the woman's body — to which she has all the rights — at best, it is a tissue handled with respect also by others.

There is a tendency in theories of rights to consider them as given, once and for all. The empirical evidence is that rights emerge and sometimes disappear as history marches on. Taking a long view, it is apparent that catalogues that people believe contain "universal rights" may be dated and local. For example, the United Nations' catalogue from 1946 includes a right to vacation, an amenity of an industrial era and its specific means of

organizing work. This was already in 1946 irrelevant to most of the world's farmers. It is also irrelevant for many self-employed, free-lancers, and others with voluntary and erratic working schemes.

It is an old rule that the public should be suspicious of politicians who want to include details of their party program in their country's constitutions. One should be equally wary of interest groups that propose their specific goals as universal human rights.

## Implementing Human Rights

We have accumulated much historical evidence since the days when constitutional assemblies in Philadelphia and Paris discussed human rights. The record suggests that widespread rights for citizens are the result of a combination of worldly political/military struggles and high-minded ethical arguments.

There are many theories by philosophers and jurists — for example, Grotius, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Verdrass, Rawls, Nozick — about the derivation of human rights. For a brief review, see Alan Gewirth, *Human Rights* (1982). No consensus has emerged among scholars about a correct theory of human rights. However, the authority of each of these scholars is considerable, and each one undoubtedly has contributed to the strong belief in universal human rights existing in public opinion in the Western world. The military and political success of the American and French revolutions gave palpable evidence to back this authority.

The Western rhetoric and legislation concerning human rights is faithful and idealistic. Fundamentalism is a rule when discussing human rights. Here, then, is a significant exception to the main trend, discovered by Max Weber, that recent Western civilization, in contrast to the Eastern civilization, is predominantly pragmatic (*zweckrational*) and with limited room for fidelity to ideals (*wertrational*)[5]. Western civilization grants no exceptions to human rights; it is not something about which you can be prag-

matic. For example, it was not acceptable for the United States to keep suspected terrorists imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. They have the rights of criminals, or the rights of prisoners of war (Boumediene *v*s. Bush, US Supreme Court, 2008).

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, a Western jurist or opinionated citizen could openly complain in their home country about the lack of human rights in Saudi Arabia or China, or anywhere in the world. Western editorial writers and intellectuals often gripe that their own national leaders were not energetic enough in complaining about foreign abuses of human rights, when leaders of their nations have diplomatic contacts. The Chinese diplomatic response was usually along these lines: "yes, we know that you Americans and Europeans are interested in human rights. So are we. But we are pragmatic about it in our country." In this way, they define the problem as one for the West, not for their own country. In earlier Chinese history, however, the celebrated position was actually the reverse. A well-known message of *The Analects of Confucius* (551-479 BCE) states:

> The Master said, "Exemplary persons understand what is appropriate; petty persons understand what is of personal advantage." (#4.16, translated by Ames and Rosemont (1998)).

The expression "appropriate" as opposed to "personal advantage" is perhaps the nearest we have in Classical China to the Western notion of "right." The Chinese version fits in a secular ethic. The frequent references in the West to human rights as "sacred," rather than pragmatic, indicate their roots in Christianity, a topic in Volume 5 of *The Many-Splendored Society*.

One should not sweep under a carpet the obvious dissonance between the mainstream of pragmatism of the Western world and its fundamentalism about human rights. It creates a difficulty for human rights intellectuals, at least for some of us who accept pragmatism in all other areas of life. The difficulties for the public are compounded by the slippery way our politicians talk about rights, using the term as a claim arising from special interest groups, far from the precision of Hohfeld's Table.

An important research project in social science would be a study of the degree of stability and development that a society could achieve with a few — a strictly limited number — of fundamentalist backbones of human rights securing the dignity of man and of animal, leaving other life areas and societal realms to pragmatism.

A bitter lesson from the twentieth century is that Kelsen 's edifice of pure law could be filled with Nazi legislation making, for example, confiscation of Jewish property "legal" in Kelsen's formal sense, and making existing legislation unable to stop the workings of the Holocaust. Among other things, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the General Assembly of the United Nation from 1946 was designed to prevent reoccurrences of such outcomes.

Two years later the European Council, a group of democratic states, specified a European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and established a European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg to enforce the Convention. The court in Strasbourg admits cases that have traveled through all national levels of a court system in a member country. Moreover, this court deals only with infringements of human rights by governments, a central theme of Verdrass' theses. The Court spells out the *duty* of governments according to a European catalogue of rights. Thus, enforceable rights in the sense of Hohfeld's Table are created, not only political spuma of immunities.

The European Court of Human Rights is not perfect, but it is shining in comparison with the frequently ineffective and sometimes incompetent, even farcical, treatments of violations of human rights around the turn of the century by the agency with the corresponding function in the United Nations.

## Pledges

The prescriptions that individuals issues to themselves deserve special attention, not only by psychologists, but also by

students of history and society. You tell yourself "I have to clean my apartment!" or "I must exercise more!" or "I will never more drink alcoholic beverages!" Such prescriptions may be echoes of social norms or even a part of a marriage contract, but they may also be very individual expressions of will, pledges often intended to have visible consequences also for others.

A 'pledge' is not a contract. It is a promise to do something, regardless of what other people do. As an illustration, we may take The Shakertown Pledge from 1973.

> Recognizing that Earth and the fullness thereof is a gift from our gracious God, and that we are called to cherish, nurture, and provide loving stewardship for Earth's resources, and recognizing that life itself is a gift, and a call to responsibility, joy, and celebration, I make the following declarations:
>
> 1. I declare myself a world citizen
>
> 2. I commit myself to lead an ecologically sound life.
>
> 3. I commit myself to lead a life of creative simplicity and to share my personal wealth with the world's poor.
>
> 4. I commit myself to join with others in the reshaping of institutions in order to bring about a more just global society in which all people have full access to the needed resources for their physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual growth.
>
> 5. I commit myself to occupational accountability, and so doing I will seek to avoid the creation of products which cause harm to others.
>
> 6. I affirm the gift of my body and commit myself to its proper nourishment and physical wellbeing.
>
> 7. I commit myself to examine continually my relations with others and to attempt to relate honestly, morally, and lovingly to those around me.
>
> 8. I commit myself to personal renewal through prayer, meditation, and study.

9. I commit myself to responsible participation in a community of faith.

A 'pledge' is an unconditional commitment (self-prescription) to act regardless of return. Conditional commitments are sometimes called pledges, but are simply exchange of offers to act and get specified favors in return, a normal event in any market.

Real pledges, if wide-spread, are not words in the thin air. The Shakertown Pledge, in whole or in part, spread globally from its original Quaker origin in the United States to many idealistic members in the civil rights and environmental movements of the 1970s and beyond.

Pledges have consequences. A class at the American officer school at West Point pledged that they would always speak loud and well about all their class mates, and never put anyone down. From this class came an inordinate large number of generals.

Strong pledges are likely to create resistance and contentious confrontations. Weak pledges are more insidious; they easily run out of steam, but in the meantime they may cause change without evoking much opposition. Insignificant actions pledged by many are known to have more significant consequences than strong actions by a few. This happens particularly in so called "tipping-point" situations compiled and explored by Malcolm Gladwell (2000). Sometimes the consequences may be unintended. Quite modest, but common pledges to let your children grow up in an ethnically homogenous community with persons like you, may quickly lead to a menacing residential segregation (Schelling 1971).

Not all pledges are for humanitarian goals. Pledges are made also for nationalistic, fascist, or racist causes. Many local strings of weak and insidious anti-Muslim pledges in 2009 in Switzerland tipped a referendum to an evident prohibition of any further constructions of Mosques on Swiss territory. It is questionable whether this is compatible with human right pledges of the Swiss government.

## The Balance of Norms and Contracts

Speaking generally, laws and contracts flourish in separate worlds. On at least two scores, however, law and contract need each other. Contracting parties need laws specifying the attributes of a valid contract, and they need laws to deal with those who break such contracts. Furthermore, a few persons, legislators, may be assigned a contract, specified in a constitution, to formulate laws according to the rules of the same constitution.

Once you get under its surface (as we did with Hohfeld's help), it is striking how complex a contract is. A contract to teach someone English has specified rights and obligations far more intricate than the simple social norm "Learn English!" Compared to the sophistication of contracts, prescriptions in the form of laws are plain and straightforward.

There are people who cry out at every frustrating turn, "There ought to be a law against this!" They have rarely the linguistic sophistication to say, "We should try to establish a better contract to avoid this!" The latter is a response available to those advanced in the structuring of social reality in words. Unfortunately, schools do not train many such people. They prefer to teach the simpler creations of laws. This is particularly the case when governments have the decisive say on curriculum.

Societies, if they choose, can rely more on contracts when they become sophisticated in using symbols. Primordial societies, as well as groups in advanced societies which lag in linguistic cleverness, depend heavily on social norms, some of which may be genuine laws, i.e. with two tiers of prescriptions.

Our Proposition Master Trends of Civility and Rationality in the previous Volume and reproduced here, predicts an increasing volume of language-based activities and an increasing level of rationality among the latter. On the coattails of such trends rides the greater sophistication in language use that opens options to increased usage of contracts. In short, there is a reason to

suppose that humanity advances through the centuries on a road toward more contract-based living.

While all modern societies have both contracts and laws, they differ greatly in the balance between the two. There is a striking divergence in spirit between a law-dominated society and a contract-dominated society. Conformity and regularity marks the former; creativity and perplexity marks the latter. Laws are the supreme tool of conformity, and contracts are the supreme tool of self-actualization. "This land shall be built by laws," is a much-cited adage; parliamentarians all over celebrate it. However, if legislators do not allow contracts, all lands they build will eventually be authoritarian, or socialist, or both.

Proposition 3:4 recalled. *The Master Trend of Civility and The Master Trend of Rationality:* The history of mankind is (a) a slow but increasing expanse of language-based activities, both in absolute and relative terms, in comparison with mankind's pre-language activities, and (b) a slow but increasing proportion of language activities based on rationality, both in comparison with the pre-language activities and in comparison with all language activities. (Volume 1, p 80.)

What could be more important for humanity than to explore this divide between laws and contracts? We need a world map showing us how many pursuits of individuals and organizations are open to contracts, and where in the world, and in which realms, laws regulate such pursuits.

A major failure of social science is that this divide between law and contract attracts little research. To be sure, scholars of jurisprudence and political science have some notion of the number of written laws in a society. (In modern times, they are many more than a citizen can master.) Economists, likewise, can analyze the frequency of entering contracts, for example, how many contracts between seller and buyers are entered daily on the publicly traded stock and commodity markets. We also know the number of contracts in labor markets and marriage markets. We know little, however, about the total number of contracts in a society in its relation to the total number of laws,

and about the resulting quality of life. Blame the partitioning of university faculties and departments. The campuses incorporate separate ivory towers for the study of laws and for the study of contracts. At the time of this writing, hope for a redress rests with some new professorships in "economics and law" or "law and economics," which a few forward-looking universities have established.

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, think tanks seem to have better organizations and motivation than universities to chart the balance of laws and contracts and the effects of this balance on a society. Some of the best think tanks are located in Washington DC. A drawback of this geographic location is that laws and legislation, not contracts and actualization, dominate the intellectual climate in this city and overshadow its ivory tanks[6].

Freedom of speech is an essential pre-requisite for the language brain to develop the language products that make up social reality. Freedom of contract is an essential device for structuring social reality beyond the stage of commanding legislation, command economy, command religion, et cetera. Freedom of contract opens the possibility of choices among different social structures and among individual paths of life.

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[3] On Meadian and Saussarian symbols see Volume 1: 55-59.

[4] For those accustomed to seek support from formal logic, the exposition of Hohfeld by Lars Lindahl (2005) is helpful.

[5] On the distinction between pragmatism and fidelity to ideals, see Volume 1: 119-120.

[6] In a section in Volume 4 "The Organization and Leadership of Research" we shall write more about universities and think tanks.

# 7. Positions and Relations

## Positions

In a socially small world, participants refer to each other as "I" and "You" in their in-person encounters. Martin Buber (1923) in his classic work with this very title, *Ich und Du,* explored how deep this relation can be before it is given a structure (i.e. become manipulated) by a society and losing its authenticity. In our meetings with one another as *I and You,* we do not need any prior designations of one another, or any knowledge about each other's background. We are just one whole human and another whole human being.

Buber celebrates this, and as a religious philosopher, he extends this relation to the true communication between believers and their God. The majority of relations, however, are not of this kind, says Buber. In most meetings, the other becomes someone you respond to in the third person, as an *"It,"* a sales clerk, a police officer, a student, a politician, an artist, a journalist, in short, anything that is more like a function than a whole person, sometimes almost as a thing or machine.

Buber, a student of Georg Simmel, focused on the dialogue. Many social scientists have found that a comfortable vocabulary when talking about structuration in society is the full language of drama: that is, roles, publics, scenes, actors, and so forth. This is not only the language of I and Thou. Admittedly, this dramaturgic language is better than behaviorist language, which belongs in the physical science of things.

The trend toward the language of drama in the social sciences started with the social anthropologist Ralph Linton (1936, 115 et seq.), who made "status" and "role" cornerstones in describing social structures. I will rephrase his definitions so their base in language becomes more apparent.

When they are speaking generally, anthropologists and sociologists use the term ‘position’ (some say “status”, others “identity”) to include every capacity in which an individual can be expected to act. Typically, the grammatical subject of a prescription is a label naming or describing individuals; this label denotes their position. Consider these sentences:

*Students* shall go to class.

*Gentlemen* are requested to wear jackets in the dining room.

*Drivers* should proceed carefully.

*The First Mate* is in charge of handling the cargo.

*Intellectuals* shall fight with words and not with swords.

The names at the left are descriptions of persons, not their proper names, but designations of categories of persons. The crucial aspect of these *descriptions* is that they are *subjects in prescriptions*. Each one defines a 'position.'

The different evaluations (e.g. prestige) given to positions assign them to different 'distinctions,' or 'ranks' as some prefer to say. Where ranks are given specific names, we talk about a 'hierarchy.' Positions also include ‘socially expected durations,’ abbreviated ‘SED’ by Robert K Merton. It is short for participants in an alumni reunion, long for wives and husbands in marriage. Uniquely human, with SED the future is imbued in the present!

Here is a first proposition using our linguistic principle of structuration:

7:1

Proposition 7:1 *Structuration into Positions and Relations:* As persons in the same symbolic environment speak to or about each other, some parts of their language begin to define positions, including their distinctions, relations, and durations.

Positions are a special kind of shared beliefs. When we call someone "father," a position, it is not because we have first-hand knowledge of our conception but because others, including the father himself, talk about him as our father. Doubts and ambivalences about one's positions can be a predicament, here as elsewhere.

## Sets of Positions

When we ask "Who is she (or he)?" the *first* routine answer is to mention one or more positions. "She is a student, lives in a suburban house, married, has a child, and has a part-time job downtown." The list of positions a person currently holds is what Merton (1957, 380-384) called "status-set." I prefer to say a 'set of positions' to avoid any confusion with ranks or distinctions that is glued to the word "status." The set represents her or his current 'commitments.'

At the dawn of European modernity, Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616) delved into the complexity of a self-described position inspired by the mass media of those days. He relates how Alonso Quijano, a good person of some distinction in the farming town of La Mancha, had read too many books on medieval knights. There were no such knights left in Spain at that time, but the stories about them were legion, produced by booming Gutenberg printing presses. Quijano's infatuation with these stories leads him to a one-sided change of his identity. He was not only an ordinary person but also a famous roaming knight, the fictional Don Quixote of la Mancha, who in his own words "set injuries and insults straight, righted wrongs, punished arrogance, conquered giants, and trampled on monsters." He did his deeds in honor of a lady of his heart and dreams, Dulchina from el Toboso, in mundane life a farm girl named Aldonza Lorenzo from a neighboring village. He had admired her from a distance in his youth.

The stories about Don Quixote and his adventures are hilarious because he acts out a pristine code of honor belonging to a bygone era. The readers laugh, and so apparently in the background, does Alonso Quijano, who occasionally seems to realize that he has assumed an unrealistic self-described position. In the end, a superior knight defeats Don Quixote, and he has to promise to give up his knightly armors and return to La Mancha. Having once lived in the great fiction, the old life in his hometown, in which also Dulchima is fiction, is never the same.

Cervantes shows how a language of story-telling in a new mass medium comes between a person and reality, a language that not only shapes reality but can become a substitute for reality. A very modern predicament!

Most of the time, we let the persons that we meet present themselves and their positions, and we accept what they say. When many others have done the same, it is actually hard to do otherwise, as we will learn from our treatment of convergence[7]. Self-designated positions become significant only to the extent that others accept them. An impostor claiming to be the legitimate heir to the throne of Russia will achieve a limited following. If an impostor actually believes in his or her outrageous self-designation, we face a human life gone astray.

In some cases, self-presentations remain effective but often unverifiable assertions. For example, some participants in an abortion debate claim to speak for the unborn child, but this does not mean that they have been designated to do so by unborn children. In the globalization debate, some claim to speak for the "the Third World or "developing countries"; this does not mean that they have been nominated by low-income populations. In the past hundred years, a large number of Western intellectuals have described their own role as speaking for the "working class," without first checking with the workers. At times, Marx and Engels fall into such a category.

We may accept such self-presentations from those who have a solid knowledge of abortions, or a long acquaintance with low-income countries, or command of genuine facts about working class experiences and conditions. However, in other instances skepticism about such claims is in order. Of course, when people appear as Prophets of God or Satan skepticism is also valid.

## Sequences of Positions

There is a *second* answer to the question "Who is she?" that we may elicit about the student we wish to describe. We may look for some life-story information. For example, when she finished

high school, she did not immediately start college. She held a couple of good jobs and started a family. When she, later in life, wanted a college education, she took a part-time job and entered a School of General Studies at a nearby university to study part-time toward a Bachelor's Degree. The list of her past positions constitutes what Merton calls her "status-sequence," that which in everyday parlance is often called "career." (See Figure 7.1.) Authors often frame biographies and autobiographies by such 'sequences of positions.'

A person's experiences in past positions and relations affect his/her behavior in later positions. Consciously or unconsciously, experiences in a past relation may, transfer (in Freud's sense) to later relations. Parents do not just raise children; they raise future adults. Basic features of childhood experiences of love, jealousies, and authority live on in grown-ups and may color their performance in adult positions and relations. If things then go wrong, psychotherapy is often backward looking, i.e. searching clues in half-forgotten childhood memories of significant others, and teach the patients to be friends with their past. An alternative or supplementary therapy that is gaining in importance among practitioners of "cognitive psychology" is to be forward-looking and help a patient get well by practicing on her or his path to new positions or revised relations.

## Attributes of Positions

We have already mentioned one attribute of any position, its distinction, or rank. This is a shared valuation of the position in its particular symbolic environment. A consensus usually emerges about relative ranking. A senator has a higher rank than a congressman, a doctor a higher rank than a nurse, and so forth. Ranks emerge insidiously; a mate from a prominent family may get a higher in-law rank than one from a less prominent family. Even if born equal, people develop differences in ranks when they grow up, first sex and age distinctions, then other differences.

It is natural to classify positions according to the bases used for describing the occupant. These could be a characteristic of the person himself — such as male, genius, invalid — or his characteristic relation to other occupants of positions — such as a mother, customer, guest — or his relation to a super-unit — as a citizen, subscriber, member (Lazarsfeld and Menzel 1982, originally written 1956).

Crosscutting such a classification is one that designates positions in accordance with the degree to which they are based on stable characteristics of the occupant; this classification is carried out in terms of 'ascription.' For example, sex, place of birth, and kinship are unchangeable characteristics; others such as religion and citizenship require efforts to change. Some positions such as those of the age cycle — baby, toddler, child, youth, adult, elderly, old — do change, but we have little control of such changes. Ascribed positions have their opposites in 'achieved' or negotiated positions.

One of the earliest treatises on the modernization of a society is Sir Henry Sumner Maine's *Ancient Law* (1861). Maine is a jurist and he traces the avenue of modernization as a trend "from status to contract." By status, he meant ascribed positions. By contract, he meant freely chosen achieved positions.

In traditional societies — whether tribal Africa, caste-dominated India, or feudal Europe — a person's entire life experience and destiny are forecasted by birth, sex, and other events beyond an individual control. Ascribed positions determine nearly all activities and affiliations, whether religious or secular, including occupational pursuit, business associates, mated in marriage, home style of life, and power and influence in the larger community. Legislation reveals the modernization of a society, according to Sir Henry. It consists of letting an ever-increasing number of actions and life histories to be dependent upon freely negotiated contracts into new positions, rather than on predetermined positions.

In a modern society, the individual, himself, can decide and negotiate his entry into a church, an occupation, a trade relation,

a marriage, a neighborhood, a political body, et cetera. Modernization — or shall we say 'emancipation' — thus consists of a lifting of restrictions of status and an opening of opportunities for contract. Emancipation is the better term, since there are other defining aspects of modernization.

By this reckoning, certain historical societies seem quite emancipated, for example classical Athens, Ephesus, Antioch, and Republican Rome; also a period of the medieval caliphate of Cordoba, the Italian medieval cities of Genoa, Florence, Milan, Venice, and at the dawn of modern commercialism in Antwerp and London. Shakespeare's Hamlet — first on stage in 1600-01 — is the epitome of a modern emancipated man:

> There is a bewildering range of freedoms available to Hamlet, he could marry Ophelia, ascend the throne after Claudius if waiting was bearable, cut Claudius down at almost any time, leave for Wittenberg without permission, organize a coup (being the favorite of the people), or even devote himself to botching plays for the theater. Like his father, he could center upon being a soldier, akin to the younger Fortinbras, or conversely he could turn his superb mind to more organized speculation, philosophical or hermetic, than has been his custom. Ophelia describes him, in her lament for his madness, as having been courtier, soldier, and scholar, the exemplar of form and fashion for all Denmark (Bloom 1998, 418).

Shakespeare's Hamlet vacillates between multitudes of existing, already structured positions, open to him through position-sequences available to a prince at the Castle of Elsinore. Cervantes' Don Quixote is creative and single-minded and chooses a self-described position as a wandering knight who is not routinely available for his contemporaries. Both figures open doors to a modern Europe of self-creating Europeans.

## Social Relations

To identify a 'social relation' (or role as some prefer to say) we mention two positions and hyphenate them: parent-child is one

social relation; student-teacher is another; customer-dealer a third, and so on in, almost, ad infinitum. Technically speaking, two positions define a social relation if the prescriptions addressed to one contain references to the other: "*Children* should do what they are told by their parents"; "*Parents* should guide their children."

*Figure 7.1. Sets and Sequences of Positions and Sets of Relations (Merton's Distinctions) Exemplified by a Student in a US College for Adults.*




Chart used in a presentation by Zetterberg (1959) updated for this book by Martin Ander.

F7.1

Occupants of the two positions constituting a social relation may be referred to as 'associates,' and the prescriptions involved are 'role prescriptions' (some say role expectations). It is often useful to indicate the social relations a person can enter into by virtue of occupying a given position — for example, student-professor, student-student, student-dean — and his or her associates in any social relation. Information about such 'sets of relations', or 'the role-set' in the terminology of Merton (1957, 967), constitutes a *third* routine answer to the question, "Who is she?"

Two organizations that have identical organizational charts, i.e. have identical positions and roles, may perform differently because (a) their members have different position-sets and thus different commitments outside the organization, and (b) because they bring experiences from different position-sequences, that is their past careers. For example, a college for older persons may be located on the same campus as a college for persons of conventional college age, have shared teachers, and the same departmental rules. Even so, their performances in student roles differ because the students have different position-sets and have gone through more or less different position. Compared to students of usual college age, (c) older students may also have different sets of present-day relations. Their role-sets are likely to require different ways of coping with the demands of every-day life. All these contribute to differences in school performance and to different levels of involvement in and satisfaction with campus life and its opportunities (Zetterberg 1959).

## Attributes of Social Relations

Perhaps the simplest classification of social relations is in terms of 'duration,' the time span of a relation. Some are lasting, like a marriage until death or divorce us do part; some are short, like a flirtation. Obviously, other things being equal, the total number of actions is likely to be higher in a more durable relation, than in a less durable one.

Certain longer-lasting relations may, nevertheless, be sporadic, such as voting every fourth year for the president. 'Sporadicness' stands for the extent to which the relation is inactive for any reason, such as temporary disinterest, interruptions because of more urgent tasks, sleep, an absence of a partner or associates, and so forth.

We can also make classifications that are more complex. For example, a social relation has 'contingency.' It is contingent to the extent that the position (and its distinction) in which a person enters the relation can be altered by the actions of his associ-

ates. Some relations, for instance, those involving ascribed positions, have practically zero contingency. In a man-woman or an adult-child relation nothing the man, or the adult, does can alter the fact that his associate is a woman, or a child. Likewise, a relation between two doctors has low contingency; not much one doctor does can revoke the doctorate held by the other.

The majority of relations have a tilted contingency. Consider students and professors. The student's status is in the hands of the professor, since the latter has the authority to flunk him out of his program of study, but it is virtually impossible for a student to force the professor to give up his chair. Only an organized student revolt with civil disobedience may accomplish this. This means that the *professor*-student role is different from the *student*-professor role. Still, other relations are more evenly tilted; for example, the buyer-seller relation is contingent on the needs and financial resources of the buyer, and the price, credit, delivery conditions, et cetera provided by the seller.

To be on the lower side of a tilted relation is an obvious restriction; the slave has less freedom than the master. Hegel showed that it is problematic to a slave-owner's self-esteem to expropriate the intellectual achievements of his slaves as his own properties. In such a case the owner will soon envy his slave. There is great joy in an un-tilted relation of friendship or love. Problems may begin when it becomes apparent that one loves the other much more than he or she is loved.

A further measure applied to any social relation indicates its degree of 'familiarity.' A relation of an individual is familiar to the extent that his associates can describe and evaluate many of his past and present activities. The more a person knows about the various actions of his associate, the more familiar is their relation. In other words, very familiar social relations are those in which the participants have little privacy: they know almost everything about each other. There are also social relations that are one-sidedly familiar; an instance is the psychiatrist-patient role, in which one party knows a great deal about the life of the other but the reverse is not true. Many urban social relations

have a very low degree of familiarity; our landlords, merchants, bosses generally know little about our lives.

The 'emotional involvement' in a relation may be high or low. A nurse does not use the same emotive charges in her or his language when talking to a patient, as when bending over a beloved. The number of emotive symbols in the communication, in relation to the number of executive symbols, is an index of emotive involvement.

A related measure is the extent to which a social relation is specialized. Here, the criterion is not how much our associate knows about us, but how much we actually do together. The smaller the proportion of a person's total actions at one period that enters a social relation, the more specialized the latter is.

The unspecialized jack-of-all-trades puts all his different skills in his trade, while the specialist concentrates on doing one narrow thing well, and has repertoires of actions outside his specialty. A young brother and sister do most everything together and have little specialization in their relation; as they grow older, they do more and more with other people and relatively less with each other. Their relation becomes more specialized, but it may remain familiar and highly emotively colored.

In the next step, we gauge social relations in terms of their 'impersonality'. A relation is 'impersonal' when the prescriptions governing one associate are the same no matter who occupies his or her position. Modern occupational roles are very impersonal; a sales clerk is supposed to treat all customers alike. By contrast, family relations are personal: The wife treats her own husband differently from the way she treats other husbands in the world; this shows that she is 'partial' to him.

Finally, let us note that in some relations we do things 'for others,' while in many relations, we do things 'for ourselves.' People in business can book all profit for themselves. Physicians want health 'for everybody.' This distinction signals that common benefits can have other sources than Adam Smith's invisible hand, an important reminder.

The many attributes of social relations that we have reviewed establish (i.e. are structuring) predefined positions and social relations. These attributes form the routines in society. Unstructured relations provide surprises and uncertainties.

### Pattern Variables

Some sociologists after Simmel have excelled in creating a special (sometimes ugly) lingo about relations. The emotive dimension of a social relation was given a technical name by Talcott Parsons (1951, 63-65) who called it "affectivity versus affective neutrality." The degree of specialization he called "specificity versus diffuseness." The extent to which we are partial to certain people in our relations was called "particularism versus universalism." He also classified social relations in terms of Linton's (1936) types of positions: "achievement versus ascription." Acting for our own benefits, he called "self-orientation, while acting for the benefit of others was labeled "collectivity orientation."

Talcott Parsons thought his five dimensions were so important that he called them "pattern variables." They are, indeed, useful tools for the study modern life. Parsons' labels, however, are far from the elegance of a Simmel or a Benjamin, and, except for a narrow circle of sociologists, they are not in use. They add little or nothing to our list that is phrased in plain English.

## Leadership

A minimum vocabulary of social reality comprises descriptions, evaluations and prescriptions, each of which can be executive or emotive. Let us look again at this remarkable set of terms, from pages 1: 145-150. Having defined positions, we can begin filling them with content from this Tri-Section and Bi-section of language. We will start this task here, and continue throughout the rest of this work, with the most concentrated effort in Chapter 10 below.

Certain positions include expectations, requirements, or privileges to issue *descriptions*. For example, we expect journalists to inform us. News is a special category of descriptive language, telling stories about contemporary events, preferably stories previously unheard of by the public.

Some journalists depart from descriptive language and routinely issue their own recommendations (evaluations and prescriptions) in their writing. Media's audience often appreciates this kind of content, particularly if they share the values of the writer. Responsible mass media publicly label such content "analysis," "columns" or "editorials," not just "news." (More about journalism on pages 95-105.)

Occupants of other positions, for example traders, are to not only describe their products in sales talk, but must also assign them *evaluations* in the form of the prices asked, or bid. Their evaluative language also includes the tooting of the good quality, or the unique properties, of their products, by advertising; the latter can be extra effective when it uses emotive elements, such as pictures with eyes, smiles, and inviting postures. (In the first part of Volume 5 on *Wealth and Sacredness,* we shall deal more with this.)

Leaders provide job descriptions for the different positions in their domain. They also maintain and communicate evaluations of the performance of their subordinates. In any 'leadership,' however, one lives with the core expectation of issuing *prescriptions.* This fact is so unpleasant for some authors on leadership that they avoid to give it full treatment.

## Authorized Leadership

Leaders have power (in Hohfeld's sense) to issue commands, instructions, role expectations and other prescriptions. We shall talk about a position of 'authorized leadership' whenever someone has as *some* part of his or her rights, duties, privileges, or expectations the responsibility of communicating instructions and directions, in short, to tell others what to do. An authorized

leader is a person who obeys the social norms of his society to issue prescriptions to others. Sovereigns issue prescriptions to subjects. Priests issue prescriptions to believers – and also to their gods. Normally, a leader is also responsible for results: credited for success and blamed for failure.

We will need this idea of sanctioned leadership to move on with our taxonomy. For example, to define "organization" we will refer to the fact that organizations have authorized leaderships.

No leaders in real life can function simply by giving commands. Leadership also includes the task of coordinating the diverse prescriptions applying to different followers. Good leaders at the top issue clear, but few, prescriptions. They leave the details to those who know the local circumstances. In practice, leadership also involves describing a vision of goals. If the followers do not know the goals, they tend to solve the wrong problems. Practical leadership also involves values; leaders inspire only when they communicate clear ambitions behind the expected activities. We give attention in Volume 3 to vocabularies of justification, and in Volume 6 we deal with the problems of the legitimacy of the prescriptions from leadership and the degree of consent that is required by the governed.

You are not necessarily talking about a leader when you describe how popular a person is, even that he or she is a model for others, takes time to listen to associates, and has clear values. If this wonderful person never tells and never shows others what to do or think, or how to do it, he or she is not an authorized or a full-fledged leader. A person may be an inspiration without being a leader in this formal sense of also being the boss. We expect a boss to tell and determine for others what to do, and to take responsibility for the consequences of such decisions.

The prescriptions from the boss may be individual instructions, but often they are iterations of social norms, i.e. prescriptions shared by others. In the latter case, leadership strengthens an existing social order. Creative leaders issue new norms.

The *sine qua non* of leadership, to repeat, remains an element of giving direction. When we use the term 'leadership' without qualifications, we refer to leadership as a source of prescriptions or at least of nudges, i.e. directions for others to consider and eventually obey; that may include a decision to do nothing.

## Instrumental and Expressive Leaderships

Returning to our Bi-section of language, we can fill positions with varying degrees of executive and of emotive contents.

Leaders, who with continuity mainly communicate emotive symbols and messages and evolve emotively loaded responses, exercise what is called expressive leadership. Those that primarily stay with executive communications are instrumental leaders.

In Britain, the Queen or King is primarily an expressive leader and the Prime Minister an instrumental leader. The President of the United States has to be both, a tricky but powerful amalgamation combining engaging rhetoric with often tough and unavoidable decision-making. "The buck stops here," was President Truman's memorable formulation of the requirement to issue the decisive prescription of what shall be done.

Experiments in small groups, having tasks to solve, have shown that already after a meeting or two one can observe a certain division of labor in the discussions. An instrumental style of leadership that moves the work forward appears among the group members, and an expressive style that soothes the disagreements on the road forward also emerges. Parsons and Bales (1955) generalized this to the division of labor between the father and the mother in a nuclear family. The idea reflected American families of the mid-twentieth century, but fifty years later when executive women are no longer an exception; this concept becomes a vestige of the past.

That a division between an expressive and instrumental style of cooperation occurs in couples is unproblematic, but they are not generic to the sex of the partner. In circles where gender roles so demand, for example, in Scandinavia in the twenty-first

century, young fathers have become able and willing to engage in what the old called intensive "mothering." They are nudged and encouraged, by a parental allowance from the welfare state which compensates for any loss of income during the statutory parental leave from their work.

## Nudging Leaders

In an ideal-type of a society entirely based on contracts instead of laws – something that does not exist in the real world – no leaders are needed. Each individual chooses for himself what to do, and if need be, confirms this by entering into contracts. The ideology of libertarianism promotes steps toward this kind of society. Ayn Rand has celebrated its acute individualism in her philosophy and novels.

In practice, however, "free" choices are often construed to include a certain amount of support for one alternative over the others, a 'favored choice.' In the supermarket one brand is placed at the eye level and is chosen more often than those brands on the higher or lower shelves. In addition, in a situation where some choice is expected or statuary, such as choosing a school for your children, an alternative may be designated for those parents who avoid making any choice at all. This is called the 'default choice.' In a modern country, this is usually a community school supported by public funds.

A special kind of leader emerges in societies in which contracts are legion. This type of leader also appears in welfare states that have discovered that one size does not fit all, for example, that a fixed age for retirement must be replaced by options to work beyond retirement age and options to retire early. The leaders here are called 'choice architects', a designation popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2009). The choice architects do two things. First, they give structure to the options, that is, they formulate alternatives in choice situations. In providing schooling in a modern welfare state, the legislators are the choice architects. They may allow the citizens a pick between public

and private schools. In a nation such as the United States, imbued with old-fashioned freedom, they may also give parents an option of teaching the children at home. Second, choice architects select default and favored choices. Most probably, they will make public schools appear as the cheapest and easiest ones for the parents. (However, the politicians are not in the habit of telling parents that politicians want power over what goes on in schools by having the schools in the public sector, which is under the control of politicians.)

When politicians provide a real choice, but with default and favored alternatives, we may call these legislators 'nudging leaders'. Instead of issuing outright prescriptions as other leaders do, they issue nudges, small pushes but nothing obligatory, in what they think is the best direction. Nudging leaders are found in all parts of a society, not only among politicians. They are often non-authoritarian and do not need much courage. However, they do have convictions, and by nudging, they get them realized – but only sometimes and in part.

## Charismatic Leadership

"Charisma" is a term that has come into social science from theology, where it stood for God's gift of grace to his messengers on earth. Max Weber (1922/1968, 141-171) took it outside the realm of religion. Any leader believed to have out-of-the ordinary abilities has charisma. Such a leader can break up the existing order. In several passages in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus of Nazareth quotes Mosaic laws. He follows each instance with the phrase "But I say unto you . . . ." and goes on to speak about his different version of order.

Weber sensed that history was full of bursts of charisma that brought societal upheavals, and after the departure of the charismatic hero, the upheavals became new customs. The pulse of Weberian-type history is that exceptional individuals with charisma bring change to old routines, and that this once groundbreaking change in the post-hero days becomes new routines.

After a charismatic Napoleon was gone, there remained a Napoleonic Code of law, and a French bureaucracy for dirigisme. We may also note that the geo-political structure that Napoleon gave to Europe resulted in strong reactions, ultimately the unity of German and of Italy.

There are a great deal of excitement and hype about charismatic leadership. Many leaders have caliber and clout. Some also have charisma. Let us debunk the latter and unveil what it is, namely magic beliefs about a leader among his or her contemporaries, beliefs that may extend to later followers.

To obey the physically strongest leader may be an instinct in the reptilian brain (1: 36). Public views held by the followers about a leader become more decisive in leaderships when and where language brains play a larger role in a society. Then physical strength and the stature of leaders is only one attribute among many. The followers – and his or her promoters – use words and pictures to communicate an image of their leader. The followers may attribute magical attributes to a leader who is successful and/or lucky in his pursuits. He or she receives any or all of the five magical attributes, that we have presented in the previous volume (on pages 1: 71-76) to define magical thinking.

First principle: to be present at the same *time* as the charismatic leader gives strength. At the time of this writing, some followers count themselves lucky to live in the era of Barack Obama, the first black president of the United States.

Second, a physical *touch* of the leader turns most everything into happiness or into gold or into whatever is needed at a given time in history.

Third, whatever *parts* that belong to the leader or his estate are as magical as the whole leadership. These parts are magic also as memorials or relicts and retain the same effects as exhibited by the larger-than-life living leader. Later generations, although the leader is no longer there, may find strength and inspiration to visit (say as a pilgrim) where he or she once lived and worked.

Fourth, the very *person* of the leader and his or her words is a cause of everyone's good fortune, not luck or circumstance, nor any law of nature or non-human developments.

Fifth, the charismatic leader is believed to control the present and the future by his or her silver tongue, in the form of *quick-fix verbal formulae,* an abracadabra of strength, like "we shall overcome."

Leadership, based on such beliefs, is charismatic. The 'charismatic leader' may not have to walk on water; it is enough if his followers believe that he can walk on water.

When charismatic episodes happen, the focus of the public is on the leader. Journalists and others excel in illuminating how exceptional the charismatic leader is. A social scientist would do better to focus more on the followers. It is among the latter charismatic power lies, and here is the folly is concentrated. Instances of infatuation and emotional surrender, similar to what happens when people fall in love, may also be observed.

Charisma takes in people in all places. At the time of this writing, a Norwegian Parliamentary Committee selects winners of the Nobel Prize for Peace. When the nomination period ended in January 2009, the name of Barack Obama was among those submitted. He had then been President of The United States for two weeks. Doubtless, he was the most charismatic of the nominees, but with no record of peace achievements. The prize went to him.

Charisma feeds on successes. A single failure, even a big one, does not necessarily bring down a charismatic person. It may even strengthen the magic among remaining followers, as shown by an episode of blatantly failed prophesy analyzed by Festinger, Riecken and Schachter (1956).

After many repeated failures a leader's charisma disappears. It is a longer run of failures that kills charisma. In addition, the sheer repetition by the followers of all charismatic qualities gets boring, and the aura disappears by sheer saturation. See more about this on page 141.

Many routines created during a charismatic episode survive the charisma of the leader. Thus, we can record another beat in the Weberian pulse of history.

## Realm Leadership

Different societal realms require different styles of justifications and leadership. For example, one should not assume that political leadership is identical with moral, business, religious, scientific, or artistic leadership. A politician does not have to be moral, pious, money-saving, learned, or artistic to be successful. In the sixteenth century, Machiavelli brought this kind of realism into the study of political leadership. To maintain power, a ruling prince should practice a decisive use of violence, a precise use of patronage, and an effective use of self-serving tales for those he ruled over.

Deceptive tales are implied in the modern adjective "Machiavellian," but lying was not Machiavelli's hallmark in his work in Florence as a senior civil servant, diplomat, and writer. He came to favor a republican rather than a hereditary rule. He certainly did not cheer immorality, blasphemy, squandering, ignorance, and gory tastes in a ruling Prince. The Church banned his book on *Il Principe* anyway, when it was finally published after his death. The Vatican in those days acted not only as an ultimate authority of natural science, as it had shown in the banning Galileo's astronomy, but also as the ultimate judge of a budding social science.

It takes a painful struggle for any societal realm with ambition to rule over all other realms in giving up such goals and becoming a good and helpful citizen in a more many-splendored society. Those religious leaders harboring ambitions of representing the ultimate authority over everything, for example, the Ayatollahs of today face a quicker defeat than the Vatican of Galileo's and Machiavelli's centuries. The secular realms of science, polity, economy, art – and even secular welfare morality – are much stronger today than in earlier centuries.

Half a millennium after Machiavelli's pioneering work on how princes lead their realms, handbooks and courses in leadership are legion. However, they rarely specify the societal realms to which their ideas apply. Most of them do not pay attention to the fact that business leadership differs from political leadership, and that neither applies fully to leadership of a research university. Most of them ignore that art, religion, and welfare institutions have their own profiles of leadership. If someone promises to teach you some touted "universally valid principles of leadership," you just may have encountered a charlatan, unless he makes provision for the differences in leading of different realms. To avoid this trap, we shall present in Volumes 4 to 6 of *The Many-Splendored Society* each societal realm separately, and we shall present separate sections on the nature of their leadership.

## Martin Buber Again

People's talk reveals, creates, and changes the way their positions and social relations differ. The many differences in relations that we have commented on are brought about by the joint process of enabling and constraining which we, in the jargon of this book, called the 'linguistic mechanism of structuration' (page 1 above). They are not results of mechanical or biological laws of nature. They make for huge diversity in social reality, and in the ways in which humans live together. Little wonder that a sense of bewilderment may be nearby.

In constructing our living with the many distinct attributes of social relations, we have completely left Buber's basic "*I* and *You*." If this is an inevitable alienation built into any differentiated modern social life, it is also a loss. To be on the lookout for compensations for this loss is a worthwhile pursuit. Buber, who also was a Hasidic theologian, found compensation in monotheistic religion. There might be other options.

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[7] See the section on "Convergence" in Volume 3 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Fueled by Symbols*.

# 8. Organizations, Networks, Media, and Netorgs

## The Loyalist and the Gregarious

As an introduction to the topic of Organizations and Networks, we may consider two well-known personality types and their lifestyles.

The Loyalists equate a large part of their self-image with the image of their associates and co-workers. They are always at the disposal of this group, even during leisure hours. Their clothing, be it, jeans or a suit, is chosen to represent the collective image. They listen to their superiors and uphold the norms of this group. As employees of this unit, they readily accept transfers to other locations: home is wherever the units of their kind are.

The Gregarious are people who swim among their associates like fish in water. They are friendly, and easily connect with others. Mingling in a company seems to come naturally to them; they are constantly gathering contacts. Their cheerful, outgoing manner attracts people who seek out their companionship. This suits them perfectly; in informal encounters with others, they are in their true element.

The Loyalists thrive in formal organizations, the Gregarious in informal networks.

## The Chicago School of Sociology: Revisited and Revised

Positions and social relations combine into larger communication structures. Such structures are resting-places in a powerful process of preserving valuable human encounters. Organizations, networks, and media are three such structures. We may call them unassuming, as they appear to the naked eye.

T8.1

*Table 8.1. Overview of Communication Structures. A Revisited and Revised Chicago School of Sociology*

| | Organization | Network | Media | Mass |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | J | K | L | |
| Is there a common symbolic environment? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes or No |
| Is there a common sender of communications? | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Are there mutual channels of contact? | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Structure of communications | Organization  | Network  | Media  | Mass  |
| Participants | Group members | Publics | Audiences | Atomized crowds |
| Lifestyle | Organization loyalists | Gregarious networkers | Media freaks | |

The letters on top of the columns are those found in The Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224.

Our starting point in studying them comes from ideas in sociology that emerged at the University of Chicago in the first half of the twentieth century. One streak of sociological research and theorizing dealt with the communication structures and their consequences; this was initiated by Robert E. Park. Another streak dealt with the structuration of the self and its social consequences and was initiated by Herbert Blumer. With these two platforms, Chicago sociology took the lead in the growing

American sociology. We will deal with the surviving parts of Park's platform here, and with Blumer's in the next volume.[8]

Park had studied in Germany, and his doctoral dissertation in 1904 at Bonn University had the title *Masse und Publikum.* A "mass," he said, is an agglomeration of people without contacts with one another, but, which is exposed to a common source of information, e.g. the same newspaper. A "public" is a gathering in which people talk to one another and become aware of one another's viewpoints. The group, the public, the crowd was the beginning of a schema of different forms of social interaction that came to characterize early American teaching in sociology (Park and Burgess 1924).

To streamline this thinking for our use, we first note that terms referring to humans, such as "group," should be separate from terms that refer to the structures, such as "organization." Chicago sociologists usually ignored the latter requirement. The proper expression, thus, is "an organization with a group of members." The members are employees, volunteers, senior citizens, or occupants of any other positions. Second, we note that the old designations do not always fit current everyday usage.

Updated definitions of lasting forms of symbolic interaction can be distinguished, in part, by the reciprocity of contacts and, in part, by the existence of a shared source or sender of communication. The shared sender is a shared leadership whenever the message includes explicit prescription about what to do, or implicit prescriptions such as "Read this," "Listen, "Remember".

With these two dimensions, reciprocity and leadership, we can define communication structures. The combinations provide four types. All are clusters of interconnected positions and roles. See Table 8.1.

Our definitions provide different labels to the participants and to the structures in which they are participating. Organizations thus have members. Networks house 'publics.' Media have 'audiences.' This streamlining of the terminology implies that Park's original definitions and labels are changed.

Organizations, networks, and media are the home of special personality-types and life-styles. We have already mentioned the Organization Loyalists, who equate their self-image with that of their organization, and the Gregarious Networkers, who swim among people in their networks like fish in water.

We can now add the Media Freaks that spend an extraordinary amount of time with dailies, weeklies, television and radio, movies, and/or the surfing on the Internet. They get upset when the papers they have subscribed to do not appear. They feel deprived when the TV-set or computer does not work. They are well informed, be it about soap operas or popular music or news, but they rarely find much use for all their information.

## A Semiotic Square: The Discovery of Netorgs

Organizations are relatively stable interactions of social relations guided from a leadership position. They are a kind of formalized resting-stages in the ever-going processes of changing and preserving human encounters. Their opposite is interacting with unorganized positions and social relations. This is what we call a network.

Let us use the device of a semiotic square – a model presented in the previous volume on pages 1: 60-62 – to spell out the ramifications of this difference. In Figure 8.1 we have put the opposite of organization and network into such a square. Such a procedure reveals, better than intuition, what is implicit in the speech we use.

We get two pay-offs. On the right side of the square is a well-known combination that we recognize as mass media. On the left side, we obtain a seemingly unfamiliar combination of a full-fledged organization and a full-fledged network. We have no generally accepted word for this. However, we know some illustrations, for example, the perfect firm (an organization) operating on the perfect market (a network). We shall use as a generic term 'netorg' for this phenomenon. All societal realms, not only in the economy, have netorgs.

F8.1

*Figure 8.1. A Semiotic Square of the Opposites of Organizations and Networks.*




The netorgs were not part of Ezra Park's scheme and the structuration of society taught by the pioneering Chicago sociologists. It took us a semiotic square to bring them out in the open in the study of social reality. We, thus, have this Proposition of ordinary structuration:

8:1

Proposition 8:1. *Formation of Communication Structures:* As positions and relations are formed in a shared symbolic environment, they cluster into four forms: organizations, networks, media, and netorgs.

Let us now explore these four in more detail.

## Organizations

Let us specify a minimum definition of an organization, the first structure mentioned in Proposition 8:1. An 'organization' consists of interacting social roles with a common leadership. If there is no common leadership, you do not deal with one organization but maybe with several ones, each one looking up to its leader.

Typical examples of organizations, that are more complex than our minimum definition, is a government agency with department heads and their staffs, a business concern with a managing director, middle management, and other personnel, an association with chairperson, functionaries, and the rank and file. The persons or coworkers in organizations may all be called 'members.' The standard measures taken of members are their numbers and ranks.

The fact that an organization has members means that there are non-members that are outside the organization. Thus, organizations have borders or frontiers delineating insiders and outsiders. To determine the existence of such borders, one should identify the point at which people begin to ignore, or consider irrelevant, prescriptions from leadership.

In the anatomy of societies, organizations are legion, and they appear in many places: Households, nurseries, schools, universities, firms, stores, factories, trade organizations, labor unions, cartels, legislatures, bureaucracies, lobby groups, theatres, museums, synagogues, churches, mosques, temples, congregations, hospitals, old-age homes.

Table 8.2 shows a scheme of organizations in social reality, the symbol-based part of human affairs. Again let us remember that when facing a table: read first the headings of the columns and of the rows. Read the row headings in this table as a sentence of the column headings: "Societal Realms have Organizations promoting Cardinal Values." Then, not any time before, comes the moment to look at the inside of a table. The first row be-

comes "Science has academies and laboratories promoting knowledge." Et cetera.

T8.2

*Table 8.2. Organizations in Different Societal Realms.*

| | A | J | D |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Societal Realm | Organization | Cardinal Value |
| 1 | SCIENCE | Academies, laboratories | Knowledge |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Firms, cartels | Wealth |
| 3 | POLITY | Administrations, bureaucracies | Order |
| 4 | ART | Theatres, museums, libraries | Beauty |
| 5 | RELIGION | Temples, Churches, Mosques | Sacredness |
| 6 | MORALITY | Welfare organizations and others associations in "civil society" | Virtue |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages on pages 223-224 below.

Table 8.2 is the first one in this Volume of a series of small tables that together return, sometimes in less detail, in The Periodic Table of Social Reality. The latter is found on pages 223-224 below. Most of our small tables have letters and numbers in the margins. These markers come from The Periodic Table, which is a summary depicting our version of a total social reality.

Organizations vary in different societal realms because they work toward different ends, i.e., they have different cardinal values, as shown in the rightmost column in Table 8.2. All realms have developed a common name in English for their cardinal value. A possible exception is the realm of art that has outgrown the designation "beauty" for its cardinal value. For many

modern people, art holds something more than mere "beauty," as understood in ordinary language. We return to cardinal values until page 172; here we deal with organizations.

In organizations, members have a measure of established (prescribed) routines to report back to the leadership. Reporting to the leadership varies. The reporting may be simple acknowledgements "Yes, sir" to the orders issued by the leadership. More often, it is comprised of intelligence (descriptions) from the internal workings of departments and from the frontiers of the organizations. Sometimes, this feedback is a full evaluation of the leadership itself, for example, as practiced in the regular elections in democratic states and voluntary associations.

Organizations have a measure of established (prescribed) channels for contacts between their different positions. However, in practice, contacts also occur through informal encounters of members. It may be a law of human nature that some informal relations regularly emerge in formal organizations. Authoritarian leaders are usually annoyed and suspicious of this. They, and their staff, readily develop a culture of paranoia; Stalin's Kremlin is an extreme example.

## Lasting Organizations

To the naked eye, it seems that organizations are stable and lasting, while networks are unstable and short-lived. Media fall somewhere in-between. In reality, there are many exceptions.

Émile Durkheim, in his first book, *De la division du travail social* (1893) observed that more specialized social structures can stand the test of time longer than less specialized ones. This apparently applies to organizations, markets, and perhaps to media.

Many have also noted that specialization into a hierarchy provides more lasting structures than specialization among equals. That the Roman Catholic Church has lasted for centuries is largely due to its hierarchy of popes, cardinals, bishops, priests, and laymen. Only in the fifteenth century, did the church expe-

rience a serious break up. Then, many offers of salvation had become corrupt, expensive, and often arbitrary.

After the Reformation, the rebelling Protestant churches that maintained bishops and priests stayed reasonably well intact. By contrast, other "evangelic" congregations, that gave laymen the authority to preach and officiate, split into a multitude of sects. The evangelical Salvation Army, however, was given a military structure with officers of different ranks, and it did not break up as easily as other evangelic congregations. Only at the height of European nationalism did a few national Salvation Armies break away from the world headquarter in London.

In all, we see two factors at work in lasting organizations:

8:2

Proposition 8:2. *Lasting Organizations:* Within limits set by transaction costs, (a) an organization with specialized roles is more lasting than one with unspecialized roles, and (b) an organization with positions of different distinctions (hierarchy) is more lasting than those without ranks.

A condition is attached to Proposition 8:2. If transaction costs become very high, the advantages of specialization and hierarchies may fade and turn into disadvantages.

The Proposition on Lasting Organizations should apply also to households to the extent they are organizations with leadership and division of labor. In most societies, households and families overlap each other. The latter are based on kinship (blood relations) and control of sexual activity, an entirely different social phenomenon than a household proper[9]. One should be suspicious with attempts to apply The Proposition on Lasting Organizations to the explanation of divorce rates of families, but it applies to households.

## The Staffs of Organizations

The staffs of modern organizations are of two kinds. 'Administrative bureaucrats' are the agents of the leadership's abiding desire to govern and keep control of an organization. They include civil servants in routine jobs, the ombudsmen of organiza-

tions, and the staff of corporations. These bureaucrats advance arguments that strictly follow the goals and rules set up by their superiors. In many countries, they may threaten refractory elements with recourse to the judiciary, the police, or the military. This bureaucracy is the "reptile brain" of organizations (Gouldner 1979, 50). It usually regards freedom of opinion as a disruptive element at the workplace.

'Technical bureaucrats' or 'professional technocrats' are different. In addition to the rule book of the organization, they have specialized knowledge relevant to their jobs, usually acquired at colleges or universities. In modern society, they administer production, health care, and communication. Technical bureaucrats characteristically make the organizations they administer more efficient and shape them so that they obtain a greater say in them than the purely administrative bureaucrats. They seldom own the organizations, but nonetheless, keep them under a kind of control. Inspectors of nuclear power plants or radiation experts do not own the plants, but by virtue of their professional competence, they can decide how the plants are to be run.

## Networks

Network is the second structure mentioned in Proposition 8:1 on page 2: 70. In a 'network' (some anthropologists say "grid") people maintain contact with one another in more or less informal manners, but a network lacks a common and defined leadership position. Networks, like organizations, are legion, and they exist in all corners of society. Table 8.3 lists networks in different societal realms. Read each row in the table as a sentence: Societal Realms have Networks promoting Cardinal Values.

The standard measure of a network is ‘size,’ that is the number of participants involved, and its ‘density,’ that is, the ratio between actual contacts and potential contacts existing between the participants. When everyone talks to everyone, the density of the network is total. Another useful measure is the degree of

network structuration, i.e. the extent to which a network consists of what Simmel called "webs of affiliations," i.e. positions of persons in different organizations.

T8.3

*Table 8.3. Networks in Different Societal Realms.*

| A | Societal Realm | K Networks | D Cardinal Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCIENCE | Learned societies | Knowledge |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Markets c2c,b2c, b2b | Wealth |
| 3 | POLITY | Electorates, civic publics | Order |
| 4 | ART | Bohemia, art schools (i.e. approaches to art) | Beauty |
| 5 | RELIGION | Sects, fellow believers | Sacredness |
| 6 | MORALITY | Charitable neighborhoods | Virtue |

The letters on top of the columns are those found in The Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224. We begin our review of cardinal values on page 172.

Networks do not have (or have to have) fixed borders like an organization. In other words, the number of participants in networks are not normally registered and counted, as members in the majority of organizations are.

In organizations, communications are linear, norms usually progressing straight, in steps, from leaders to followers, and information flowing from followers to leaders is restricted to approved channels. In networks, communication is non-linear and flows in any direction.

Networks are fluid parts of a society. They fill the space between organizations. Networks may mix members who are fa-

miliar with each other with individuals who are strangers, thus bridging the familiar people whom we find in Gemeinschafts and the strangers in Gesellschafts. Networks follow rules of sociability, not just the rules of authority.

Networks usually have foci. A bookstore or library may be a focus of several networks of learning buffs. Typical foci outside the market places are common issues, common experiences, and common identities. A common focus keeps a network together. However, even when a focus has faded, certain remnants of the network may remain in the shape of lasting friendships.

Networks may come into existence on the basis of people facing a common issue. For example, residents in a building complex, who have not previously known each other, join in a network to clean up their neighborhood after a storm.

A sophisticated observer does not take for granted that a network structure will have its day and then blow over. The century-old environmental movement has switched its concerns from issues of conservation and national parks to any recreation on lakes or in mountains and woods, to abatement of noise and congestion in cities, to air and water pollution, to abandon nuclear energy, to the cleaning-up of poisonous waste, to biological diversity, to an agriculture free from chemical fertilizers and pesticides, to global warming. A core of ecology has remained in all these changes. The shifting foci have given environmentalism a much longer life than a typical network-based movement. By such shifts, networks can compensate for the advantage in survival that organizations have according to our Proposition 8.2.

Networks also emerge amongst people with similar identities. There are coteries of all kinds for dance, theatre, visual arts, and other cultural pursuits. Directors of modern business corporations form networks, circles of power anointing each other with bonuses. Such "fortune creating circles" is an acquisitive network generating new family fortunes for their participants. The members of such networks become rich without starting or running businesses that they or their families own. More on this when we turn to the Economy in Volume 5.

Other networks form around people who have some similar experience of significance, such as having attended the same university, been through psychoanalysis, been born again as Christians, survived the Holocaust.

Political, moral, ecological demonstrations of protests or promotion usually have their roots in networks. If genuine, they are worthy of attention.

On television and on the Internet, demonstrations arranged by organizations such as public relations firms, mosques, party secretaries, union bosses, city mayors, or dictatorships might look like those emerging out of networks. In reality, they are expressions of power of an organized side in a struggle over public opinion. TV not only participates in this deception but is essential for its success. This was first revealed by Kurt Lang and Gladis Lang (1953) reporting their research on the 1951 demonstration in Chicago cheering General MacArthur and by implication slurring President Truman. The president had used his constitutional right to dismiss the general in their controversy over peace negations with North Korea involving China.

In these instances public opinion polls are a better gauge than TV's camera perspectives and the noise of the demonstrations.

Without networks, life would be less action-packed. Lifestyles develop in networks in city arcades and suburban shopping malls. In "bohemia," artists inspire one another by exchanges. Scientists inspire each other in exchange of findings and theories in "the invisible college of science." In the huge network we call "the general public" opinions are exchanged and public opinions emerge. In such ways, networks are growing grounds of social change.

## Public Opinion by Networks

Early writers about public opinion, such as Lawrence Lowell (1913), considered public opinion as an outcome of talk and arguments in a network. A common issue among ordinary citizens started discussions. Their network was dense enough so that

most everyone's view is known and can be influenced by everyone else's view. Then, a public opinion was the extent of post-discussion consensus of the network, and by extension, of a real community or any functioning group. The New England town meeting was a nearby inspiration, also to a Boston Brahmin as Lowell.

Lowell became president of Harvard University. He influenced his colleagues among political scientists and historians to study "public opinion" so defined. In journalism, Walter Lippmann (1922) pursued and developed Lowell's conception of public opinion. More than Lowell, he stressed the spontaneous formation of public opinion. It would not necessarily be unanimous, but in its formation, all sides had an opportunity to participate.

Lowell's writing was a stimulus to scholars of the Chicago School of Sociology – dominant in its field between the World Wars – to incorporate this conception of public opinion in their teaching, research, and theorizing. It fitted well with the conceptions developed by their founding father, Ezra Park. The recording of public opinion in those days was restricted to the analysis of speeches and deliberations open to the public, and to any material – pamphlets, columns, editorials, et cetera – published to the public.

Prior to the advent of opinion measurements by surveys, newspapers and history books had stories about opinions on Wall Street, opinions in the military, in the church, the Washington establishment, university campuses, et cetera. Many journalists continue to write in this vein to this very day, as do historians and some social scientists concerned with the study of total societies.

Interviews in statistical samples were an innovation that took over as the main method to study opinion. Randomly selected people replied to questions, and their answers, condensed as a statistic, counted as public opinion of sorts. There was no requirement that these respondents had ever participated in any network that had discussed the polling issue. There is no sem-

blance of the statistical opinion of polls to the voting after a debate at a town gathering, or at a meeting of a voluntary association, or a parliamentary session, except that results include a number and, not only, words. A yawning aberration of "public opinion" in Lowell's and Lippmann's meaning became popular as news or a feature in media. George Gallup and Elmo Roper took the lead. The sample research of opinions seeped into "social research" at universities; University of Michigan took that lead.

## Public Opinion by Demography

When national opinion surveys started in the 1930s in the United States, the pollsters could not present their results in the manner used by a Lowell and a Lippmann. Instead, they took a clue from another nationwide enterprise, the census. United States census counted sex, age, race, and national origin of people. At the same time, many universities embraced demography as a social science, no longer merely a part of mathematical statistics. In the introductory courses in social science, students learned that the base of society is the numbers of men and women, young and old, and their division into races.

To the first generation of pollsters, the categories of age, sex, and (in the United States) race became what latitude and longitude are to geographers: stable references into which researcher place new discoveries. These categories became the backbone of so-called quota sampling, which dominated opinion research for many years. In the more sophisticated so-called probability sampling, the quotas of age, sex, and race were retained and formed the grid for routine so-called "post-stratification," a weighting procedure to make an achieved sample more like its population. The writers of polling questionnaires call the same categories "background questions." In a statistical analysis of public opinion, the same categories became standard table heads. In the reporting of opinions, they were sometimes imbued with causal meanings; differences in opinions were "ex-

plained" by age and sex and other demographics. Demographics trapped the whole field of opinion research in its categories.

The pollsters' use of statistical samples of discrete individuals and demographic units of analysis, rather than real communities, publics, and groups, was the most serious criticism leveled at the young polling enterprise in the middle of the twentieth century. This critique, most effectively advanced by Chicago sociologist Herbert Blumer (1948), is still valid. It gives opinion research in national samples limited relevance for a serious study of actual social and political opinion processes. A few demographic "background variables," such as age, sex, education and residence, do not point to necessary links to relevant publics in society engaged in discussions. To talk of demographic variables as causes that can explain public opinions resulting from informal, discussions in networks are clearly misleading.

To some extent, Robert K Merton redeemed the use of demographics in opinion research in his concepts of status-sequences, status-sets, and role-sets. Look again at Figure 7.1. The past and present positions and the current role-set may have drawn an individual into contacts with special opinions. The following approximation is familiar to pollsters:

> Proposition 8:3. *Opinion Demographics:* Persons with similar status-sets, status sequences, and role-sets tend to have similar opinions.

The notion of a status-set gives some theoretical relevance to the demographics included in every opinion poll. A rule of thumb in opinion research is that people with the same status-set (age, sex, occupation, education, marital status, urban-rural residence, et cetera) have similar opinions. Pollsters can add union membership, religion, and ethnicity to this list. If some of them, nevertheless, do have different opinions, we use a second rule of thumb, namely that they have gone through different status-sequences. Here, among other factors, parent's class, ethnicity, religious affiliation, military service, show an impact on current opinions.

In the study of opinion by demographic categories, *education* stands out as the main correlative to most opinions. Hyman and Wright (1979) were first to convincingly document this. According to some analysts, this finding shows the importance of *class* on opinion formation, thinking that education is a class variable. However, when survey researchers use individual income (or household income), a basic indication of class position, the correlations with a great variety of opinions are among the most subdued of all so-called background factors. A likely explanation is, that education, including its very milieu of high school and campus, enhances our ability to use symbols in thinking and acting. With this ability, our opinions depart from those with lower education.

If people with similar status-sets and status-sequences have, still, widely different opinions, pollsters may apply a third rule of thumb that says it is likely that they have different role-sets, that is, associates representing different views of the world influence them. In an election period, for example, they may ask questions of their respondents about opinion climates among friends and workmates.

While these steps go a bit on the way to account for variations in public opinion, they do not go all the way. Large variations of public opinions are not explained by the status and role theory, as expressed in our Proposition 8.2 on Opinion Demographics. This residual may actually represent a most dynamic aspect of human living (Cicourel 1974). Here we deal with a remarkable quality of homo sapiens: an active person's constant search for clues, defining and redefining situations, justifications of actions taken, all in an effort to elaborate his or her lifestyle and realize his or her cardinal and cultural values.

Old-fashioned network opinions recur as central in most modern theories of state, legitimacy, and democracy. They appear under various tags, for example, "participatory democracy" in several versions from de Tocqueville (1864-1866/1998-2001), "participatory principles" (Rawls 1971, 36-37), "deliberate democracy" (Benhabib 1996), and above all in so called "discourse

theory." The latter is a model of democracy presented by Habermas (1965). It assumes that communication flows through both in the parliamentary bodies and in the informal networks of the public sphere, arenas in which rational opinion formation and democratic decision-making can take place.

For all of these conceptions of democracy, the pollsters' "public opinion by demography" is ignorable, while "public opinion by networks" is highly relevant. For the latter sophisticated theories of democracy, the success since the 1930s of George Gallup's and Elmo Roper's public opinion by demography appears as a problematic departure, with no or few arrivals at the current frontiers of knowledge. [10]

## Overcoming Distances by Networking

Networks make the world smaller. A characteristic element of the network is that any individuals who don't know one another may be connected through common others, whom they know. To show that people can be reached through a short chain of acquaintances, the Yale psychologist Stanley Milgram sent packages to random people, asking them to forward the package, by mail, to someone specific. "If you do not know the target person on a personal basis, do not try to contact him directly. Instead, mail this folder to a personal acquaintance who is more likely than you to know the target person." In the completed mailing chains – only minorities of the attempted mailings were completed – it was found that any two U.S. citizens in the 1960s who were not acquainted with each other needed an average of six others to form the connecting chain (Milgram 1967). Since the lion's share of the packages never reached their chosen targets in Massachusetts and Nebraska, the popular conclusion that we all live with "Six degrees of separation from anyone" is mistaken. But, nevertheless, there is some truth to the notion of "a small world:"

Proposition 8:4. *Milgram's Small World Experiment*: Within a network comprising a large number of participants any two

randomly chosen participants are separated by an average of a considerably smaller number of other participants.

Informal networks almost always also arise within organizations. You obtain only a limited understanding of how an organization works by studying its formal plan of positions, departments, division of responsibility and accountability. Knowledge of its informal organization, its internal networks, is necessary for a full understanding of how things operate. A new, externally recruited executive needs time to get a good grasp of his new organization.

Networking may range from unscheduled and chancy encounters to milling in public places constructed for routine mingling. City planning enhances or restricts networking. Changes in technologies from snail mail to email and from stationary voice phones to mobile video phones have recently enhanced networking.

A giant step to promote networking was taken with the advent of the World Wide Web. The technology of the Internet has opened large, low-density "virtual networks," some embracing millions of people. Manuel Castells gave this emerging world a name, "network society." It received an incisive documentation in three volumes by Castells: *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. 1, The Rise of the Network Society* (1996), *Vol. 2, The Power of Identity* (1997) and *Vol. 3, End of Millennium* (1998). "Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in the processes of production, experience, power and culture." (Castells 1996, 469).

By the end of the twentieth century, there was no end to the great aspirations that came with the arrival of the network technology of the Internet. John Perry Barlow formulated a Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, where stale, old organizations would be replaced by new creative networks:

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of

> Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. --- You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. --- We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made before (Barlow 1996).

Nation states and their intergovernmental organizations, however, do not fade away. Governments can easily find and close web hotels, censure email providers, control Internet nodes on its territory, and they can restrict search engines. Thus, the United States monitors the Internet for terrorists, China monitors it for promoters of democracy, and Muslim countries monitor it for alien religious teachings and for disapproved sexual preferences. The freedom of the Internet is an important public controversy worldwide at the time of this writing.

Military or police power can destroy the nodes that manage Internet addresses. The traffic then takes other routes until all nodes in the world are destroyed. Nevertheless, networks cannot rule the world alone as Barlow holds; organizations, particularly states, are also there, and so far, they have the upper hand.

## Markets

Market is an essential concept in the study of humanity. It is well to remember that markets of all kinds – for goods, services, raw materials, money, patents, songs, book clubs, marriages, employments, et cetera – have the structure of networks. We define a 'market' as any network in which participants, be they persons or organizations, enter contracts with one another.

We have already dealt with contracts – the presentation began on page 31 – and know that they require great latent sophistication in the use of language. Markets, likewise, are more common in advanced societies than in primordial ones. One should not think that those who abhor markets ride in the forefront of history. In primordial societies, there may be more full-fledged markets for brides than in modern societies, but in other respects markets rule in the latter. Capitalism, for example, is defined as a system in which most necessities come from markets.

Harrison White is a scholar who has explored the networking aspects of markets (2002). His models depend, not on changing tastes and attitudes of consumers, as is the case with most commercial market research, nor on shifting interests and perceptions among entrepreneurs. His research keys open doors to the complex structural relations of networks.

We start with a notion that markets are nothing but the entering of contracts between parties in networks. The complexity of full-fledged markets, in my view, lies more in the contracts than in the networks. We shall encounter some of these predicaments in Volume 5 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Wealth and Sacredness*.

## The Sect: Part Network, Part Organization

A 'sect' has an internal social structure in which networks and organizations overlap. They have the boundaries of organizations that separate insiders from outsiders, and like networks they lack the common leadership. One usually speaks of sects in a religious context, but a sect need not be a religious community. It can be a gathering of visitors to a marketplace for vegetarian food, a political movement, an aesthetic coterie, and proponents of a scientific theory. The word 'sect' means followers, and they are legion in humankind.

A sect is a community of equals or near-equals, held together by a firm, common standpoint. Its leader is a spokesperson for its followers, not a leader giving orders, or a head of a staff, as in

an organization. The internal life of a sect can be very fulfilling for its members. Here one can find an abundance of emotional warmth and involvement. Here one finds like-minded fellowship. Here one finds egalitarianism. Here is no bureaucracy.

Whether its ideological standpoints concern religion, politics, the environment, or the art of living, a typical sect professes to support goodness, equality, and purity. The enemy of goodness is the evil in the world: sin, capitalism, industry, the decadent lifestyles of the big city, or the like. The enemies of equality are hierarchy and centralization. The sects usually see a consistent equality as being more important than strong leadership.

Purity keeps the sect from living closely with non-members, the non-believers. This is an aspect of sects that resembles that of an organization. The vocabulary of inclusion and exclusion is central to both organizations and sects. The opposite of purity is worldliness. The sect's warning bells ring when a socialist has mixed with capitalists, the believer with heathens, environmentalists with those who are destructive to the natural milieu. Within the sect, one protects one's genuine faith and guards against the seduction of outsiders. If a good sect member goes out into the evil world it is as a missionary, not as a cosmopolitan.

A major problem for sects is the maintenance of their followers, keeping them together. You can understand a sect only if you realize that one of their overarching needs is to keep their network intact. This priority infiltrates almost all of the sect's activities, even those that are apparently unrelated to it. Putting a priority on internal cohesion usually means an avoidance of very concrete answers to practical questions. It is enough to be against sin, apartheid, the atom bomb, gene manipulation, the ozone hole, pollution, et cetera A detailed program and constructive compromises with adversaries might only lead to disagreement and schisms within the sect.

Many sects become missionary, and strive to spread their views and fellowship to others. A missionary position obliges everyone who wishes to remain in the community to

acknowledge that they desire to convert outsiders. Of course, it benefits the sect to convert heathens, which is the manifest function of its missionary efforts. However, it also benefits the sect to reinforce the sense of solidarity among its members, which is the latent function of its missionary activities.

## Media

Media is the third structure mentioned in Proposition 8:1 on page 2: 70. You may have to argue that media are as important as organizations and networks.

Max Weber (1864–1920) thought that the bureaucracies and the markets, more than other structures, shaped the advanced societies of his time. Organizations in the Body Politic and Networks for exchange of property rights were the "demons" that run the life of men and women in the Western world in the first half of the twentieth century. He did not include mass media as one of these demons. He was right in this. Some twenty years after his death, Adolf Hitler came to power without any significant support from the German newspapers.

The situation changed after World War II. Television entered as the dominant media in the second half of the century. Then, like never before (and probable also never later), have *the one-way mass media* called the tunes of ordinary people. Mass media entered as a third handler of the life of modern man, in competition or symbioses with bureaucracies (organizations) and markets (networks). In Figure 8.2 we have illustrated the predicament of modern man in that period. Note that the figure illustrates the situation prior to the breakthroughs of so call "social media," which are not controlled by journalists and not one-way communications.

Mass-media influence has long been a favored topic of discussion. At the birth of any new medium, be it the press, radio, or television, most people seem to assume that it will exert an immense and direct influence on citizens' opinions and conduct.

The early Protestants called book printing the "heavenly art," since it had enabled Luther to spread his doctrines and print a German Bible. But printing – that is, duplicating text – is an instrument that may also be used by the opponent in a dispute. It was not long before Ignatius Loyola used printing just as effectively as did the followers of Martin Luther.

F8.2

*Figure 8.2. "Demons" that Run the Life of the Western Man in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century.*




A 'mass medium' is a communications structure with a common source (pulpit, stage, editorial board, web master) whose communication is one-way. Sermons, sacred books, literature, annual reports, scholarly journals, art exhibits, theaters, lectures, newspapers, radio, and TV are examples.

People served by mass media are their 'audience.' The standard measures of a medium are 'reach,' that is, how many persons are in its audience, and 'frequency,' that is, the regularity with which the individuals are in contact with the medium. An

entire industry financed by advertisers and publishers has emerged to record the shifting reach and frequency of popular media. This functions as a means to stabilize prices for advertising in the media.

T8.4

*Table 8.4. Mass Media in Different Societal Realms.*

| | A<br>Societal Realm | L<br>Mass media | D<br>Cardinal Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCIENCE | Science journals, monographs | Knowledge |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Advertising media | Wealth |
| 3 | POLITY | Tribunes, Political sections in media | Order |
| 4 | ART | Stages, exhibits, novels, literary magazines | Beauty |
| 5 | RELIGION | Holy texts, cults, religious services | Sacredness |
| 6 | MORALITY | Heralds | Virtue |

The letters on top of the columns are those found in The Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224. We begin a review of cardinal values on page 172.

Each societal realm has its variety of mass medium as shown in Table 8.4. Read the rows in the table like this: Societal Realms have Mass Media promoting Cardinal Values.

Authors, journalists, film producers, webmasters, et cetera, are the sources of communication emanating from a medium. If we call some of them 'editors,' we can learn some of their common tasks, and some general media dynamics. Each of these individuals selects contents, i.e. edits media content.

The print media and early ether media – books, newspapers, radio, TV – are straight, one-way communications. Broad audi-

ences are familiar with how to use their technologies. The recipients consume them without any direct influence on their content. The power of the audience then lies in the choice to stop reading, listening, and viewing, thus changing the figures of reach and frequency on which their place on the market depend.

The last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century saw a tremendous increase in the number of newspapers, in their circulation and advertising revenues. G.K. Chesterton's observation that "journalism is the writing on the back side of ads" is a key to the expansive development. The journalistic contents of the papers changed from dealing with news to an increasing involvement with features. Features in American newspapers had begun as comic strips, special pages for sports and entertainment, fashion, holiday travel, religious sermons, serialized novels, and the like.

> Proposition 5:4 recalled. *Emotive and Rational Choice:* (a) In scanning a symbolic environment or part thereof, man initially reacts to the symbols, if any, that have emotive charges and then to the executive symbols. (b) In this reaction, negative emotive symbols receive greater attention than positive emotive symbols (Volume 1, p. 157).

European newspapermen long thought that a large number of features degraded journalism, and diverted it from the task of delivering the news. However, the readers wanted features; circulation increased, advertising space and revenue increased, and increased income allowed the papers to undertake a more far-reaching and cavernous journalistic job. The advent of radio and television did not kill the papers. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, the Internet had taken over much of the mainstay of their local advertising, i.e. housing and employment ads, putting papers under noticeable financial strain.

The news media thrive on the need of human beings to scan their environment. "News" is caught by what we call selective

scanning. The negative emotive news turns up first when readers and viewers scan their media. In his book about the New York Times — *The Kingdom and the Power* — Gay Talese (1969) writes that most journalists grow into restless people. They focus on the warts of life, on the imperfections in mankind, institutions, and places. "Gloom is their game, the spectacle their passion, normality their nemesis," says Talese about his fellow reporters. More specifically media publics follow what we know as the rules of Emotive and Rational Choice (Proposition 5:4 in Volume 1 reproduced in this book on page 2: 230).

There is an irresistible temptation in mass media to create attention and large editions by focusing on negative emotive symbols in big headlines, giving readers and viewers an emotive choice rather than a rational analysis of news. Another means of biasing a presentation toward emotive choice, is to tell stories more with images than with mere words. The increased dominance of television and video media (such as YouTube) in the flow of news makes John Stuart Mill's optimistic prediction of increased rational choice in democratic publics an unfulfilled hope.

## Journalism: Tracks, Frames, and Traditions

The art of journalism is to make sure that life and reality remain when the journalistic process comes to an end at the moment of publication.

Editors cannot report everything. The journalistic process is one of never ending selection. The wire services, other media, and informants present long menus. Editorial meetings are held to decide which stories to pursue. The reporters who are given assignments to pursue stories must sift and sort facts and views in the raw material that they can muster. The subeditors select among the stories available that which is to be published, what shall be rejected outright, what shall be reworked, shortened or strengthened, and what shall remain in store for another day. The board of directors has sifted and selected a candidate to be

editor-in-chief, who, together with colleagues, has sifted and selected and appointed various subeditors. Editorial policies have been hammered out from many alternatives; options have been rejected and adopted.

In this long chain of picking and choosing lie also the details and colors and presence that make a news story come alive. This can best be achieved by writing with Meadian rather than Saussurian symbols. On the difference between Meadian and Saussurian symbols, see volume 1, pages 1: 51-57. Note especially the application to journalism on page 1: 58.

Unfortunately, a Saussurian use of symbols is basic to the theory that professors of journalism depend on when they put on their post-structural hats to claim that all truths are relative and depend on who has power. In fact, Meadian symbols are needed to make a story come alive, and this is what the good senior coaches of journalism rely on. Deans of journalism schools ought to take notice. I also wish that God will help the students to learn the difference, and put faith in George Herbert Mead, and not only in Michel Foucault. (See my appeal on pages 1: 93-94.)

Journalism constantly adjusts itself to be helpful in informing mankind. It strives to minimize the efforts required of the receivers of its messages. Thus, it tells one story at a time and tells it under one heading. What experienced editors know, and media research confirms, is that multiple tracks in a story tend to distract and confuse the readers of a paper, and particularly radio listeners and television viewers. They receive less of the information. Many times I wish editors would overestimate rather than underestimate their audiences and allow more tracks in stories. But I am not a typical reader or viewer.

A story dubbed "Climategate" by skeptics to global warming emerged at the time of my preparing of this text for publication. Hackers had found about ten years of research data with long-term temperature measurements at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia. They put a set of the researchers' emails and data on the Internet for all to see. It was confirmed as genuine.

The emails revealed CRU's routine treatment of raw data from time series of temperature. They told about excluding reports from stations judged as less relevant, and the use of proxy data such as annual tree rings in lieu of lacking thermometer readings. Such procedures are accepted in science, but require consistency and full transparence. Needless to say, one should not have to wait for hackers to provide the latter.

The emails also contained belittling remarks about colleagues who had reached different conclusions from their climate research than had the CRU. This is not unusual in any conversation among scientists. The emails revealed attempts to prevent from reaching print in peer review journals what the CRU leadership considered as misleading conclusions by opponents. Such is the nature of peer reviewing, as we will discuss in the chapter on science in Volume 4. There were also emails calling for the erase of past emails, perhaps so that they would be unavailable to journalists or adversaries under the British Freedom of Information Act. An effort to clean out from the Wikipedia some conclusions about the warming of Europe in medieval time was also mentioned in the hacked documents.

The flow of news at the time was full of stories about global warming caused by emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels. A UN conference in Copenhagen on climate change was to take place a few weeks later. The CRU had had a big hand in the so called IPCC reports, documenting for the United Nations that a man-made global warming was under way, and that its main cause was human emission of carbon dioxide. On these reports, the UN conference should base far-reaching and expensive decisions for the world community. It was impossible for mass media to ignore Climategate.

Some tracks available to editors to tell about Cimategate are listed here. They make up a long menu.

1. Editors of mass media are accustomed to report law-breaking, and one of their first impulses in presenting Climategate was to take the crime-track and tell about a

crime of hacking. HACKERS STEAL DATA ON CLIMATE. Media accustomed to support claims of the UN climate panel apparently continued the mention of *stolen* data also in their further reporting on Climategate.

2. Cheating in research is not necessarily a statutory crime; in most instances it is a matter for the discipline of an academic community that is fully capable of closing careers of cheaters. But media also report this wrong-doing. Some announcers about Climategate on a television channel said SCIENCE FRAUD? – with a barely audible question mark. Hints of *research fraud* were subsequently used as a track among climate skeptics, the underdogs in climate debate at that time.

3. Some mass media have special editors for science news. They could take an intra-science track of self-correction. SCIENTISTS CALLED TO REANALYZE CLIMATE DATA. The British *Guardian* was one of the few dailies with this track.

4. Many media took the Climategate story as a partisan attack in the ongoing debate over the extent of and response to man-made global warming. Editors know that swords crossed are more interesting to readers and viewers than brotherly consensus. While it had been known over several years that Western journalists (more than the public) favored CO2-reductions to cope with global warming, their professional journalistic instinct remained that controversies should be publicized. Their track then became THE SKEPTICS HIT BACK.

5. Many media took a track to focus on the political consequences of Climategate. Would it affect the outcome of the big United Nations summit on climate? CONTROVERSY HITS COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE. As it turned out, only the spokesman from Saudi Arabia cited the hacked data to deny global warming. But it remains likely that several other delegates came away from Climategate with a dose of disbelief in the UN reports.

6. Finally, it is always an attractive track for editors to personalize a news story. CLIMATE PROFESSOR TAKES TIME OUT. There were calls for Professor Phil Jones, the head of CRU, to resign. He did step aside during the official inquiry.

7. The whole set of stories on Climategate generated numerous comments, news analyses, and editorials attempting to assess the consequences of the event for the scientific status of climate research, the veracity of IPCC reports, the competence of United Nations to cope with climate change, and the future relations between rich and poor nations. My own hope is that the rhetoric of man-made global warming may have taken a good step away from the influence of the false fourth principle of magic (page 1: 72 in Volume 1) that makes us believe that behind everything that happens in the world is a *being,* and not a force of nature.

Media researchers will undoubtedly analyze Climategate both for the content and the statistics of these and other tracks of reporting. Media editors are not unfamiliar with battles for recognition among large research organizations; such battles become news and the parties are usually eager to tell their sides to the media. However, the availability of multiple tracks to present the Climategate story made it possible for a majority of editors to brush over a serious case of misleading research reporting and research publicity. In a section in Volume 4 on "Comparisons of Scientists and Journalists" we will discuss the differences between scientific and journalistic work, and how they may corrupt each other.

To the insiders in an editorial office, the chosen track, "the angle" signaled by a heading, is a conscious device to help the audience to get a grip on a story. At the same time, the chosen perspective greatly influences how the media audience perceives reported events.

The choice of a track is an important source of editorial power. It structures the public's conversations about events. PR-agents hijack this power when they spread stories in the media with

tracks that put the (wrong)doings of their clients in a most favorable light possible.

The many tracks in media can be sorted in a smaller number so called "frames." They are recurrent models for presenting news. Using the code books of Pew Foundation researchers, we can label the seven tracks we illustrated about Climategate. Tracks 1 and 2 are so-called Wrong-Doer Stories, 3 is a Straight Story[11], 4 is a Conflict Story, 5 is a Conjecture Story, 6 is a Profile Story of a Newsmaker, and 7 are several so-called Reality Check Stories.

Other frames used in journalism are plots deeply embedded in symbolic environments; they resemble the 31 plots that make up the total of Russian fairytales that Vladimir Propp analyzed. (See page 1: 152.)

There is a German tradition of journalism that regards the ultimate task of the journalist to be to convey a *Weltanschauung* — a philosophy of life. Karl Marx, of course, worked in this tradition. There is a British tradition of seeing the mission of journalism as providing a good story – that is, news or a report with intrigue, drama and a sense of immediacy. There is an American journalistic tradition whereby the primary task is the exposé, or "muckraking" – divulging evils, misuse of power and the like. Journalism is not immune to the fickleness of fashion: for example, after the Watergate scandal, the muckraking tradition was held in high regard.

## Role Expectations in Journalism

Journalism lights the way for the stars and heroes, the successful in all societal realms and for life areas, such as sports and entertainment. Publicity is part of the reward system of the stars. They exploit journalists. And journalists, in turn, exploit their contacts who have the stellar names and have the high ambitions, usually without mercy. Journalists are exploited and they exploit. This may push them to a life in the margins of society.

This tough life and marginalization is compensated by a strong collegial spirit. To obtain the appreciation they need, journalists do not normally turn to their readership or audience, or to their board of directors, nor to the objects of their interviews. They turn to each other – they often even marry within journalistic circles. In other words, they usually produce with an eye to their colleagues. It is satisfying to journalists that their stories get into print or on the air immediately. It matters less that surveys show that readers and viewers just as quickly forget most of what is published.

Reporters and their editors always have to find something new to write about. They would like to be the first to report an emerging issue or crisis. They are expected to contribute something to a feature or article every day, or every issue or every broadcast. They have a ravenously hungry monster to satisfy with new events, new faces, new conflicts, and new trends. Most journalists do not have an enviable work situation. They cannot be satisfied with the usual and the stable, as this does not make news. The latter is essential stuff for scientists, but not for journalists.

Through their professionalization, journalists have acquired a monopoly that gives them the power to decide how space in mass media is to be used. However, there are restrictions that professional journalists accept for handling their monopoly-type control of space in news media. As professionals, journalists are expected to respect certain rules, for example:

In serious news media, reporters cannot present a story simply because they like it; their stories should normally have a so called "news peg," "trigger" an actual and recent event of relevance or interest to the audience. Many media nowadays, however, allow a personal experience of a reporter as a trigger.

Reporters cannot base their stories merely on their opinions; reporters must have a source for what they present.

Editors must separate news from editorials, and, of course, from advertisements. Furthermore, hard news must be split

from news analysis, and also from what are uncertain assumptions. In photo journalism, the latter distinction has not (yet) emerged. A photograph is not truer than a thousand words. But a picture is generally more expressive, it conveys emotions better than words do. A photographer in his news work conveys his emotions without the same restrictions as a writing journalist.

Editors must separate day-to-day news events from staged events, i.e. events arranged by the media themselves, for example, when they host debates or when they sponsor sport galas.

Four norms rule the daily work of a professional journalist: (1) "Be as objective as you can!" It is difficult to stem all your biases and your own philosophy of life, but you can approximate this goal. (2) "Be balanced!" Let all sides of a controversial issue be heard, not only one. (3) "Be fair!" Be honest and not misleading about ideas, persons, and practices with which you (or the opinion climate in your editorial office) tend to disagree. (4) "Accept corrections" from those in the know.

The second norm presents news media with almost unsolvable problems. This norm tends to give lay views on an event or an issue the same voice as expert views, and minority views the same attention as majority views. Moreover, it runs counter to the dictum of effective mass communication, i.e. to tell one story at a time under one heading and to stick to this chosen editorial angle.

In one of Tom Stoppard's plays about the newspaper world, there is a woman who irritates a journalist by talking about a reporter as a mechanical doll that one can give away as a Christmas present: "Wind it up and it will get it wrong." A modest amount of news in the papers or broadcasts on the radio or TV is, strictly speaking, inaccurate in some minor way. Those, who have been present when news does break, know that there is usually something omitted or, much less often, something mistaken in the presentation in the media. The chosen “angle” or “frame” requires some omissions, i.e. exclusion of certain circumstances.

The inclusion of something incorrect in a news story is usually due to the fact that news media is an industry with short series. A new *New York Times* is born every day, said an advertisement. This is, in a nutshell, the background of most inaccuracies in news journalism. If a manufacturer were to produce a new model of a vacuum cleaner every day, there would be more complaints about its faults as there are complaints now about shortcomings in the media. Errors are, in a way, built into the mechanics of the daily mass media, and they are not an expression of the journalist's incompetence or ill will, as affected parties are apt to think. One can simply take a statistical view of media errors and try to keep them at a reasonable level and then, as the New York Times does, correct them in the next issue.



An internal public opinion makes itself felt in the editorial offices and the studios of the mass media. It reverberates easily through the typically open landscape of news desks. It affects the process of news selection and presentation. The amount of self-censorship is considerable (Zetterberg 1992). More than anything else that I can imagine, research into the opinion climate of editorial offices would illuminate the mechanisms of media power. What we have so far of penetrating insights into this milieu comes, not from research, but from thorough American court proceedings in connection with libel trials, such as Westmoreland versus the Columbia Broadcasting System and Sharon versus Time (R. Adler 1988). The title of Renata Adler's book is *Reckless Disregard,* an apt summary of the opinion climate in the editorial offices at the time of these events.

## Gate-keeping

The editorial office is actually an organization coupled to a larger media structure. So is the media business office, with its managers and owners of the medium. The fact that "journalism is the writing on the back side of ads" indicates the importance of the latter. The Frankfurt School of social scientists developed a critical theory of this situation. They held that the owners set

the tone of the media content (Adorno 1991). In the main, however, these scholars ignored the fact that media studies need to deal with so called autopoiesis[12]. Media owners may disturb editors, but they cannot run the editors' daily tasks.

A medium, such as an established newspaper, magazine, or TV-network, provides a monopoly area for its functionaries. An ever so qualified MD cannot write about health issues in his morning paper; at best, a medical reporter interviews him. The same is the fate of a most cited environmental scientist. Not only are the elites in the realm of science kept out of the monopoly space of journalists, but also the elites from other realms. A powerful business executive is not allowed to write about his or her branch in a major paper. A business journalist does the writing. The latter may, if luck prevails, interview the most knowledgeable executives. The most knowledgeable military officers do not present the war news, a war reporter does. The public may write to the editorial dustbin of opinions called "Letters to the editor." Here readers can take the initiative to bring matters that are close to their hearts to public attention. However, also at this page, a journalist keeps the gate and admits some letters and keeps others out. The same is true for oped pages; journalists, not outside experts, are the gate keepers.

[TECH] The new media today and of the future have access to technologies of two-way communications. The monopoly of power by journalism over media space is at the time of this writing threatened by the "social media" in which non-journalists can post their videos and texts. The era in which the one-way mass media is a demon running the life of ordinary people, as shown in Figure 8.2, is apparently coming to an end. I think it is unlikely that one-way mass media of print and television ever again get the same power that they and their journalists had around the end of the twentieth century. At the time of this writing in 2010, we see journalists escape the old outlets of their editorial offices and studios to instead use the World Wide Net, at least for some of their products.

The lone bloggers on the Internet have become a force to reckon with. A few of them have obtained very large audiences at a very modest expense. However, if and when a blogger closes his blog to comments from others or debates with others, he or she too has created a little monopoly.

## Masses

All of the above discussed communication structures of organizations, networks, and media presuppose a common symbolic environment. For a 'mass' this condition need not apply. However, the term "mass" has been used in so many ways in social science that it is virtually useless (Bell 1956). Park applied it to what we nowadays call media and their audiences. Ortega y Gasset used it about people who have incompetent judgments about the efforts required to have a rich modern life. Others have used it to characterize modern society. For example, the followers of Lewis Mumford or Jacques Ellul use the term to designate a dehumanized society based more on machines and attendants of machines than on free people. And Karl Mannheim applied it to the overly bureaucratic society.

'Mass' can perhaps still be a useful concept if we stick to the idea that it means undifferentiated encounters of many atomized persons with awareness of one another but without symbol-based communication with one another, without any common issues to focus on, without a leadership to guide and coordinate actions. One example would be milling travelers at a big international airport, a scene that is repeated day after day in a lasting structure but with different participants. Another example would be travelers in underground trains who see each other but do not speak with each other. However, a mass may give those involved common experiences, such as the discomfort of crowding, or it may generate common reactions, such as bursts of laughter or panics.

[BIO] The mass is a more essential concept to the epidemiologist than to the social scientist. Avian flues are diseases spread

by birds that may mutate and spread contagiously from human to human. However, once a flue is in a locality where masses mill, such as in an airport, it spreads from there to all parts of the globe on airplanes, and thus the disease disseminates rapidly among new milling masses in faraway cities.

## Some Interplays of Organizations, Networks, and Media

Organizations, networks, and media impinge on the individual in different ways. In an organization, your position, and what is expected of you in this position, is defined by the organization. In a tight network of neighbors, this may also be true, but in a less dense network of relative strangers, you can define your identity with considerable discretion, and more easily present yourself in terms of past and present positions of your own choosing.

More important is the fact that the effect of communication on the individual is greatly dependent on the combinations of their organizations, networks, and media. Only some of these combinations have, to date, been the topic of penetrating research.

### Crossing Organizations and Networks

Max Weber lectured and wrote that the bureaucracies and the markets, more than other structures, shaped European society of his day. He called them "forces of destiny," thus hard to change. They were not unknown in America where tradesman had the sayings: "You cannot fight city hall" and "The customer is always right." Mary Douglas, the British anthropologist, found such observations universally relevant for all societies.

The long-standing difference between the British chartered corporation (organization) and the market economy of the Manchester School (network) inspired Mary Douglas to formulate a general cultural theory. This theory shows that the structural difference between an organization and a network results in

different cultures. Her cross-classification of "group and grid" (i.e. organization and network) has been tested on societies studied by anthropologists on several continents, and has gone through several modifications. Table 8.5 from Fardon (1999) shows some of the labels and synonyms used by Douglas in her writings between 1978 and 1996.

T8.5

*Table 8.5. Cultures in the Group-Grid according to Mary Douglas. From Fardon (1999).*

| | Organization (Group)→ | |
|---|---|---|
| Network (Grid) ↓ | **Isolate**<br>=<br>Atomized subordination<br>Insulated<br>Backwater isolation | **Hierarchist**<br>=<br>Strong group<br>Bureaucracy<br>Central community<br>Ascribed hierarchy<br>Conservative hierarchy<br>Collectivism with structure |
| | **Individualist**<br>=<br>Competitive individualism<br>Active individualism<br>Market | **Enclavist**<br>=<br>Dissident enclave<br>Egalitarian enclave<br>Sect<br>Factionalism<br>Egalitarian collectivism |

Many consequences arise from the typology in Table 8.5, which has made it useful in social science. Manuel Castells (1997) compiled significant evidence showing how individuals in weak organizations but able to exchange information over the growing Internet, have acquired the kind of personalities and culture that Douglas called "enclavists." They have formed the protest movements of their time, centered on localism, environmentalism, feminism, and sexual identity.

In his subsequent work, Castells (1998) makes a dramatic comparison between the collapse of the Soviet Union, with its preference for organizations over networks, and the rise of the

Pacific Rim, with its scarcity of organizations but growing presence of networks. This is a profound lesson for mankind, one of the most important ones from the twentieth century.

## Crossing Media and Networks

The recipients of media communications can have reciprocal contacts with only a few other recipients or none at all. An important form of social influence moves from a person with frequent and multiple media consumption to his networks of persons with much fewer contacts with the same media (Katz and Lazarsfeldt 1955).

People who are well integrated into their networks, be they composed of colleagues, neighbors, friends, relatives, et cetera, are, in all likelihoods, adept at rapidly picking up what others think. This enables them to give candid expression to their version of public opinion and perhaps to a few odd aberrant personal opinions as well, without disturbing the others in the network. They know public opinion, whether or not they have been exposed to it in the media.

Those who are poorly integrated into their network and, therefore, lack knowledge of what comprises serviceable opinions in conversation with relative strangers, run more of a risk of "putting their foot in it." Newspapers, radio and TV, rather than personal contacts, become their principal source of information on what others believe and think. For them, the media, alone, defines the nature of current conventional wisdom and teaches them the public opinion. From this perspective, the media teach the public, not so much what to believe and think, but rather the opinions which are acceptable in public intercourse. Media have their greatest impact where networks are weak.

The opinions we think that others hold to comprise the 'climate of opinion', an important concept as systematically used by the pioneering German opinion researcher, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. When the public reach for their newspapers or other mass media, seeking news, entertainment, and potential subjects

of conversation for the day, support for their own interests and views is not always forthcoming. Instead, they find the journalists' selection of subjects and views. Failing to find their own opinions in the newspaper gives pause to many readers. They may even lose their self-confidence and withhold their own views in everyday conversations. What they really believe, then, falls into a "spiral of silence" (Noelle-Neumann 1980). Media are not at all omnipotent in creating public opinions, but in the struggle for survival among public opinions, the mass media play a decisive role.

In all communication structures – encounters, social relations, organizations, networks, media – people are subject to the pressures of convergence that we will discuss in the next volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*. However, in the real world hardly anyone lives with exactly the same communication structures as someone else. We are, therefore, likely to be socially unique, not only biologically unique. An individual's knowledge, attitudes, and values are never a direct replica of those of his/her primary group or organization, nor of what the media convey, nor of discussions within his/her networks. Everyone process, more or less actively, the information they receive from their communication structures. The more one processes one's convictions by working through them, reflecting upon them, deliberating about them, discussing them, comparing them with one's own experiences, the more they become truly one's own.

## Networks of Organizations ('Netorgs')

There is, as we have seen, a great deal of emphasis in the scholarly debate on the conflicts between organizations and networks. We have learned that networks are often contentious of the organizations, not least the powerful ones. We have also learned that small networks emerge inside organizations that upset the flow of communication and play havoc with the regular organizational channels.

Organizations and networks also live in symbiosis, creating major arenas of a society. Networks, not of individuals but of organizations, were a much-neglected topic in the Chicago School of Sociology. Networking organizations became more of a concern among economists at Chicago, particularly as seen in R. H. Coase's papers. (1988). In addition, the teaching in business schools around the world has come to emphasize that the consumer-to-consumer (individual-to-individual) market of the old textbooks, a pure network, is far from everything. The netorgs of the business-to-business market and the business-to-household market are the huge ones.

Networking organizations are probably one of the most sophisticated social structures that humankind has invented. This social structure deserves a name of its own, for example 'netorg.' Without a name of its own, there is an easy slip into a common belief that a networking organization is either a network or an organization, when it actually is both a full-fledged network and a full-fledged organization. See Figure 8.3.

We recognize this symbiosis of organization and network in the economy as corporations in a capitalist market, and in democratic politics as corporatism. We will find this symbiosis also in the realm of religion; Islam, for one, has a structure of netorgs of mosques. In science, competitive research programs among universities are netorgs. In our Periodic Table of Societal Realms (on pages 223-224 below) examples of netorgs are to be placed in Row M. I trust that we will learn more about them in our Volumes 4 to 6 on societal realms. At this point, it seems that relative changes in transaction costs between firms and markets (organizations and networks) cannot fully account for their emergence and success.

F8.3

*Figure 8.3. Networking Organizations ('Netorgs').*



The power of netorgs on the societal scene is drawn from the Proposition about Realm Expansion, which we shall present in the next chapter.

## Social Capital: Assets Acquired in Organizations, Networks, and Media

In the 1960s, Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concept "social capital" in social science. Social assets are by-products of peoples' membership and participation in organizations, networks and families. Most of these social assets are immaterial. The bonds that people form with one another are a social resource, a

by-product of membership in families, organizations, and networks and of their consumption of mass media. However, our presence with a mass of people does not produce any such by-product.

For a more precise analysis, we divide social capital into organization-based assets, network-based assets, and media-based assets.

The mapping of people's status-sequences (page 2: 50) provides a precise start to the study of social assets acquired in groups in the past. The majority of people acquire their basic social resources in the primary groups of their childhood and youth. It is often easier to acquire friends when younger than to form bonds of a friendship in one's adult years.

Schooldays provide us not only with knowledge, but also with certain bonds from friendships that usually include the give-and-take of favors and services. These bonds may extend well into adult life. The amount of social capital that you can bring from old schooldays may play a crucial role for your successes or failures in adulthood. Prestigious schools and ordinary schools do not differ much in the knowledge they impart. What differs is the network of schoolmates from prestigious schools, who can open more doors for you in adulthood, and this is less available to graduates from ordinary schools. This has been well documented in France by Bourdieu (1989) and in the United States by Coleman (1990, ch 10). By mapping a person's past positions (status sequences as shown on page 49 above), we can make a first partial and approximate summary of his social assets.

Coleman also observed that the networks of parents that commonly arise around a local school become part of the parents' own social capital, an indirect result of the school their children attend. Such social assets derive from present group or network memberships. The mapping of people's current commitments (status-sets, page 53 above), thus, gives the social researcher a second partial summary of social assets.

The consumption of mass-media also provides a person with assets. Gossip in the media gives the lonely a sense of having social assets. However, knowledge gathered from media gives certain persons genuine social assets as opinion leaders to whom others turn for information and orientation. Books and papers, and the enormous expansion of electronic communications technology, have allowed people to acquire another kind of social capital, a media resource. This would include their access to printed matter, the radio, record player, TV, the Internet, and so forth. Their media consumption becomes a third partial summary of social assets.

Acquiring large amounts of these three forms of social assets creates a person who has more actual clout in modern society than is signaled by his or her income, academic degree, or occupation.

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[8] See the section "Conversations with the Self" in Volume 3.

[9] Households and families are analyzed in Volume 7 of The Many-Splendored Society: Life and the Good Life.

[10] We will deal more with democratic theories in Volume 6. There we will also discuss ways to bring media polls more in line with definitions of public opinion in political theory.

[11] The Straight Story conforms to Kenneth Burke's discovery that we mentioned on page 56 in Volume 1. It is worth repeating in the context of journalism that the question openers − what? who? how? where? when? and why? − prompts us to describe a separate aspect of an event: the acts, the actors, the means, the scene, the time, the motivation. Burke discovered that together they provide a full account; none of these six questions can be omitted if the description shall be exhaustive, and to add more questions adds confusion rather than illumination (K. Burke 1945, xvii).

[12] A living system has "autopoiesis," meaning that its whole and subgroups are maintained while their constituent elements are periodically consumed and reproduced, disassembled and reconstructed, discarded and invented in new forms.

# 9. A Road from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft

## Encounters

When there is a high likelihood of awareness (cognitions) about another person's words or actions, we speak of a 'social encounter,' or in context of this book 'encounter' for short. You may have a physical book by Plato in your bookshelf, or you may notice one in a book store, but you do not have a socially significant encounter with Plato until you start reading him. Social encounters provide us with simple and easy structures of communication Erving Goffman, a master explorer of human encounters, sees them as any focused interaction (1961, 8-11).

Persons involved in a social encounter share, at least in some part, the same symbolic environment. The possibility of having encounters ceases (or is reduced to an exchange of gestures) when symbolic environments change into a different and incomprehensible language and no translation is available. It is striking, however, that ordinary transactions in a moneyed economy can take place over language barriers with a minimum of words. This is an advantage for the realm of economy, with no counterpart in the other societal realms. This also helps explain the failure of political globalization in the form of colonialism and the successes of globalization in the form of market economy.

Simple social arrangements emerge when people begin to talk to one another. Georg Simmel, in his exposition of sociology, (1908/1923) included many non-trivial insights about such forms. The plainest provide insight into numbers, distances, and distinctions among the participants in encounters. He noted, for example, as regards the *number* of people involved in interaction that there is a great difference between being two and being three. Very different outcomes are possible when two may be

joined in cooperation or hostility against a third. About the *distance* between the people involved, he noted how a conflict actually brings people in closer contact while, for example, keeping secrets from one another, keeps people apart. The *high or low distinction* of the interacting people has many ramifications. For example, an uncorrected concern over vertical distances (rank differences) results in a spread of horizontal equality among the low. This is one mechanism (of several) behind working-class solidarity.

## Numbers in Face-to-Face Encounters

How many acquaintances can you have without confusing them? How many persons from face-to-face encounters do you remember and recognize over time when you meet them again?

[BIO] We can certainly agree that there is a "cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom any one person can maintain stable relationships" (Dunbar 1992). This personal circle of stable in person relations is popularly known as the Monkey-sphere, and in social science circles it is known as Dunbar's number. It correlates with brain size. It is smaller in monkeys than in humans because the former have smaller brains. Various methods point at a value around 150 as an upper limit for average adult humans. For example, 150 was the usual unit size of armies in the Roman Empire, and it remained the size of infantry companies in World War II. It also seems to be around that number at which rural village compounds and zadrugas divide. My impression is that artistic and scientific coteries also tend to break up into fractions when they reach this limit.

Another number that has fascinated observers of social life reveals the limit of individuals whose movements and/or speech a person can *simultaneously* observe. Jesus selected twelve disciples, making a circle of 13 persons, including him. Was that one too many since one, unbeknownst to the others, plotted to betray the group? In discussing such problems in other settings, we usually land on a range of seven to fifteen persons, the latter

being a common number in a platoon in the military, i.e. a tenth of a company. In this range, we find the sizes of teams in ice hockey, soccer, and some other sports. The number of children in a functioning unstructured nursery group, the size of a genuinely interacting seminar or dinner table is in this range. This may also be the maximum size at which typical work groups in industry, construction, or research can function without formal hierarchy.

Let us, with this background, specify four constants in social science. This sounds like natural science, but any dramatist is familiar with them. The first one stands for the maximum size of an encounter in which each one knows the *identity* of the others. Those on the outside are strangers. The second one stands for the maximum size of an encounter in which each one knows not only the identity but also the *actions* of the others. The constants can only be approximated, which we signal by using the sign ≈ rather than = .

T9.1

*Table 9.1. Constants in Face-to-face Human Encounters.*

- 150 persons ≈ Maximum size of encounters in which ordinary people know the identity of all others, this is the 'socially large world,' (Dunbar's number). There are probably some 1000 languages that are used by so few people that their total falls below Dunbar's number (Ostler 2005).
- 15 persons ≈ Maximum size of encounters in which ordinary people know the actions of the others, this is the 'socially small world.'
- 3 persons. Three individuals (Simmel's triad) are the smallest number that can represent certain major social mechanisms, such as inclusion and exclusion, cooperation and competition, outsourcing. A triad is also implicitly necessary in most uses of game theory, for example, in "the prisoners' dilemma" that tests the trust between two individuals. The third party is here required to administer the rewards and sanctions. A sim-

ilar third party is needed to enforce a contract between two persons.

- 2 persons. Two individuals (Simmel's dyad) are sufficient to represent relations such as love and hate, and superior and inferior.

Considering the third and fourth categories, it is remarkable what difference one person makes in the nature of encounters when dyads become triads and vice versa.

The above numbers refer to encounters unaided by any technology. Encounters on the Internet are at times different, just when and how is still subject to research.

## The Socially Small World

Durable and close socially small worlds usually show strong resilience. American soldiers in World War II were asked: "Generally, in your combat experience, what was most important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well as you did." The common answers dealt not with war aims, patriotism and democracy, nor to get the war over with and to go home, but "not to let your buddies down" (Stouffer, et al. 1949). Similar results were found in interviewing veterans of the German Wehrmacht, who fought on in 1945 even as Berlin fell (Shils and Janowitz 1948). The soldiers on both sides had been subject to *conscription* to their armies, which meant that they had a relatively durable relation with their buddies. In a relation based on *ascription*, i.e. a relation that goes on whatever you do, such as a functioning family of origin where you are forever daughter or son, the resiliency may be even stronger.

So-called positive feedback processes tend to emerge in socially small groups of some duration. The more the participants are together, the more they like each other and the more they like each other, the more they are together. The best liked become informal leaders and interact and initiate contacts with others. George Homans (1950) described this in his book *The Human*

*Group*, and Kadushin (2005) further documented and explicated this and many of its consequences. Let's keep it simple here:

9:1

> Proposition 9:1. *Feedbacks in Durable Socially Small Worlds:* In a durable, socially small world, the more any two participants interact with one another, the more favorable evaluation they give each other, and the more favorable evaluation they hold about one another, the more they interact.

Edmund Burke celebrates what he calls "the little platoons" as the origin of any larger solidarity in society and warns, as conservatives ever since have done, against any attempts to destroy them:

> To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind. The interests of that portion of social arrangement is a trust in the hands of all those who compose it; and as none but bad men would justify it in abuse, none but traitors would barter it away for their own personal advantage (E. Burke 1790/1986, para 2.1.75, 227-28).

The cohesion and solidarity of small groups do not necessarily and always work for the good. Their members may work as Boy Scouts or as Hells Angels.

Families and households are socially small worlds. They have many qualities apart from small size. We shall deal with them in Volume 7 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Life and the Good Life.*

During almost two centuries, Sweden has been engaged in a large-scale experiment to prove Burke wrong. This is described by Berggren and Trädgårdh (2006). A common theme in Swedish living is to foster people to become more independent of small encounters, such as marriage and family, as well as more independent of traditional encounters in local communities. The advent of the advanced Swedish welfare state in the second half of the twentieth century formally organized such tendencies. The service bureaucracies and the payouts of the welfare state

are attempts to take the place of the small platoons of cozy numbers; on a large scale they promise a good life for the lonely as well as the needy.

It is too early to tell whether this Swedish project will succeed. At the time of this writing (in the first decade of the twenty-first century) this project tilts toward failure. Encounters with government bureaucracies working nine to five according to rules of law cannot replace small worlds of kin, friends and neighbors accessible around the clock and working for love. A good society needs both government and civil society working in consort, and also a functioning welfare market (Zetterberg and Ljungberg 1997, ch 21). So called public welfare in our days is a stool on three legs; you need all these three to sustain it: government, market, and civil society.

## Scanning in Encounters

A participant in an encounter is never totally idle but cognizant of others. Its participants get responsive "social skins," to use a concept from the German scholar Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1980). They scan the others to find out who they are, and if they wear or express anything that is familiar or new or different from their own.

[BIO] We can add the phenomenon of selective perception to the notion of scanning. In biology this means that we retain from a scan only, or primarily, what is relevant for the functioning and survival of an animal's body. In social reality, it means that publics scan primarily for news presenting opportunities or threats for them, for whatever or whoever is highly or lowly evaluated (consumer items, celebrities), and they scan for crimes and other deviations from norms.

Selective scanning in encounters, including those communicated by the mass media, can be expressed in a general proposition using our tripartite division of language:

Proposition 9:2. *Selective Scanning in Encounters:* In any social encounters, the participants (a) scan each other for the descriptive language in use, particularly utterances that present opportunities or threats for them, (b) scan others for the evaluative language in use, particularly opinions about individuals such as themselves, and (c) scan others for the prescriptive language in use, particularly for any norms that may apply to themselves.

This selective scanning occurs in all types of encounters. They may be direct encounters, that is, face-to-face. Or, they may be indirect, that is, without the visible presence of others, such as in telephone contacts or radio or television. Indirect encounters may be contemporary or historical. Some may be present only in a participant's fantasies about the future, and about the people he will then meet.

### Hi tech, Hi Touch? [TECH]

The modus vivendi of any face-to-face encounter is so-called "small talk." Many encounters through new technologies seem to consist of continued small talk with a party originally encountered face-to-face. Other encounters that originate in electronically concluded deals with strangers generate an urge to meet in person. At first look, it seems as if people do not have to live in cities any more to have low-cost contacts with one another!

In spite of the spread of indirect electronic encounters in the modern world, the in person meeting retains its standing. In the community of futurologists of the 1970s, Kristine Shannon coined the phrase “High tech, high touch.” By this, she meant that the increased use of high technology is actually matched by an increased need of a human touch or contact. Her phrase received a resounding, affirmative response when I used it in a speech to the Seventh Payment Systems International Conference, in September 1981 in Scottsdale, Arizona. Most participants were involved in SWIFT, the world's first computerized international payment system. They had left their high-tech

mainframe computers used for the transfer of huge volumes of currencies, and they had spent many hours cramped in high-technology jets to fly to Phoenix to meet face-to-face. "In order to be fully able to deal with the most sophisticated payment networks the world has ever seen, you need to meet, look at one another in the eye, and try out each other's nicknames from the nametags. It would be total horror, if we were only computer passwords to one another. Hi tech requires high touch." Later, John Naisbitt (1998) made the phrase "high tech/high touch" well known to numerous readers, as the label of one of the ten megatrends he thought would shape the future. It was one of the soon-to-be-forgotten fashionable notions of the chattering profiles of social science.

In fact, modern communication technology has not reduced our face-face meetings; it may even have fueled our appetite for face-to-face contacts. When someone turns up at a person's funeral who has known the deceased only in the electronic Facebook, we may glimpse something new.

The research in the area of electronic and indirect encounters, as far as I know it, has not yet settled on results that we can comfortably summarize among our numbered Propositions. The position of most experts in the first decade of the new millennium still seems to be: "Our empirical work suggests that telecommunications may be a complement or at least not a strong substitute for cities and face-to-face interactions" (Gaspar and Glaeser 1996).

## Indirect and Electronic Encounters

A social encounter does not have to be conceived as an actual physical meeting. Some encounters with contemporaries are indirect, i.e. with invisible associates. In traditional kingdoms, the subjects may never have met or seen the king in whose name they were regulated and taxed. In contemporary society, indirect encounters abound (Giddens 1990, 21-29). We do not meet the police officer who signed a parking ticket and affixed it to the

windshield of our car. A person can rent an apartment without an appointment with the proprietor who signed his lease. You can get a credit card without ever seeing the person providing its authorization. You buy things by telephone, mail order, or the Internet without meeting a salesperson.

In a meeting room, "the whisper" is a means to convey something confidentially to a chosen neighbor. With sms (Short Message Service over cell phones), a new generation of humans can do that voicelessly. To send sms across a big living room or to someone in another part of a restaurant or gym has the advantage of being able to see the receiver in the eyes, the traditional way of assessing trust. And trust we need, in order to enter more serious exchanges by indirect encounters.

We encounter Socrates by reading Plato's dialogues, centuries later and in translation. Christians encounter Jesus by listening to a sermon and understanding the Gospel. Such encounters become social when the words of Plato or the Evangelists are translated so that a shared symbolic environment is at hand. If we have any liberal education at all, we have had many encounters with the great intellectuals of the past through their written words.

[TECH] A new volume of encounters by letter writing opened up at the time when a mail service developed and postmen on their appointed rounds, rather than private servants, carried letters between the participants in encounters. Telegraph for script and telephone for voice brought new opportunities to keep in touch.

Encounters in Internet communities are as old as the net itself. After the millennium, encountering expanded enormously as the Internet became populated with the inventions of electronic social networks, such as My Space, Facebook and Twitter. After connecting to them, users start "friending", i.e. inviting others to the network. Even before they have become regular users, they may help to expand the circle of contacts by recommending others. In most cases, this can be done simply by one click on their computer to export their own mailing list to the social network.

The persons on the list then receive automatic invitations to join. This means that the constants of 15 and 150 from face-to-face contacts (Table 9.1 page 116 above) do not apply any more. This has uncharted implications for humanity.

As nonprofessionals, we usually generalize experiences from our face-to-face-encounters to the historical and indirect contacts. Is all what we can learn from in person encounters about human rights, labeling, likes and dislikes, identities, inclusion and exclusion, jurisprudence, ostracism, redemption applicable also in the new electronic social networks? We think so, but await more evidence. As scholars of social science, we ought to proceed at arm's length, and test whether technologically mediated encounters actually do have the same consequences as face-to-face encounters. The contents of the journals of communication research after the Millennium tell that this is a fertile field of scholarship; the "current position of science" is still being formulated at the time of this writing.

The social encounter can, thus, span time and space, the visible associates and the invisible ones; it is the broadest of all terms of interpersonal contact. A high volume of encounters that used to be available only to city dwellers and restricted to city agoras is now available anywhere. This killing of distance by electronic communication is clearly changing the conditions of man. An apostle of this change is the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells, who is also a specialist on urban structuration.

## Truth in Descriptive Discourse

When the participants in encounters reach beyond Dunbar's number, a human being lacks knowledge of the personal identities and motivations of all the others, and what happens to them. The participants in encounters with more members than Dunbar's number are not only self-interested and community-oriented in varying degrees, but have private information and private ambitions unknown to some of the others. The full facts required for arranging, scheduling, and forecasting are not

known. In a paper from 1945 entitled "The Use of Knowledge in Society," that has become a minor classic, we read:

> The economic problem of society is not merely a problem of how to allocate 'given' resources...It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. ...it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality (Hayek 1945).

So wrote a young Friedrich Hayek, later in life, a Nobel laureate in economy. The only addition we need to make to the core of his thesis concerning our limit of knowledge about others is that it begins to apply when Dunbar's number is reached:

9:3

> Proposition 9:3. *The Limit of Knowledge about Others*: If Dunbar's number is surpassed in encounters and the members' relations to one another have a low degree of familiarity, then (a) actions of the members, particularly speech acts, tend to occur which are, not only unknown to, but unpredictable by other participants; and (b) the members' accounts and presentations of themselves and their situation have low barriers to dishonest editing.

A low degree of familiarity referred to in this proposition is typical among specialists working in a bureaucracy, and particularly by people who are active in a big market. It is an attribute of modern city living.

The Hayek thesis is the clause (a) of the proposition of The Limit of Knowledge about Others. More concretely, it implies that the price system in a market can aggregate vast amounts of information much more efficiently than a centralized bureaucracy can do.

It is often said with reference to Hayek's work, that unplanned consequences of large-scale planned actions are a predictable curse of all social engineering of large systems. This unpredictability is enhanced by clause (b) in our proposition.

Oskar Lange, a socialist economist, had argued that there were no reasons to believe that anonymous market forces would

make better allocations of investment capital than would highly trained central planners (Lange 1938). He became one of Hayek's adversaries. When he was a chief economic planner in Communist Poland, Lange discovered, however, that he regularly received beautified and doctored reports from the field that contained higher production figures and fewer problems with disturbances and inequalities than there were, in reality. He started a vain search for mechanisms that could overcome dishonest reporting in national planning.

Clause (b) of the proposition on The Limit of Knowledge says, in effect, that deceits are endemic in large organizations and networks. This can be read between the lines in some of Hayek's writings, but became more explicit in the work of Leonid Hurwicz, also a Nobel laureate, when he proposed "design mechanisms" to make the economy more efficient. He had escaped from Hitler by moving from Poland to the United States. Here the Lange-type of problems of dishonesty was also familiar, but as reporting a problem in capitalist corporations with many subsidiaries, such as General Electric, and in public administrations such as the FBI with many local branches. Local units of a central organization may not be in the habit of outright lying in their reporting to the top, but they may withhold relevant information and overly emphasize information favorable to their budgets, promotion, and remunerations.

Hurwicz' (1973) first postulate is that participants have direct information only about themselves, not about other persons. It is worth noting that he studied designs for decentralization and honesty prior to the discovery of Dunbar's number. Several of his cases rest on an analysis of transactions between only two parties. Designs that overcome unpredictability and dishonesty might work well in durable small settings with few participants, what we called the small social worlds ($N \lessapprox 15$). Parents know that when two children are bickering over how to divide a cake you should rule that one child cuts, and the second child chooses. Only if the first child cuts as evenly as possible will he get a maximum share. The rule works among siblings who are very

familiar with one another, and also with two children who are strangers to one another. This is a setting in a small social world, and the critical point is that both children have full information.

Problems of Lange's sort need something that would work in larger networks and groups ($15 \lessapprox N \gtrapprox 150$), and also in the great populations beyond Dunbar's number ($N \gtrapprox 150$). These three group sizes behave somewhat differently.

To be able to achieve designs for efficiency in complex and decentralized cases, Hurwicz must introduce restrictions on the number of messages to be exchanged, on the degree of diversity of the environment of the participants, and on the compatibility of the incentives of the participants. The construction of designs to improve the efficiency of imperfect markets can, then, be systematic and scientific. As these restrictions are applied, however, the success of the designs in terms of human honesty remains questionable. The shortcut conclusion is pessimistic: in large decentralized organizations and networks, no incentive scheme, no matter how intelligent, can assure that people always tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

There is much evidence supporting this pessimism about the problem of dishonesty outside the equations of the economists, as well.

An American, who will never cheat at cards played in the socially small world, will without much ado accept unearned money to which he is not entitled from a public crib known as the "Gover'ment" and located in the large world.

A giant case of abuse in the United States affected the pension system introduced after the Civil War. It was originally designed for crippled soldiers and for orphaned children. In 1890, a revision in the Federal pension law removed the link between pensions and service-related injuries, allowing any veteran who had served honorably to qualify for a pension, if at some time he had become too disabled to perform manual labor. By 1906, old age alone became a sufficient justification to receive a pension. Shrewd work by pension lawyers could make virtually any male

citizen eligible who had been a teenager or older during the war. Numerous still younger persons were found to claim fathers who had fought in the Civil War. Fortunately, the abuse had a natural end in that the abusing generations died out. The United States, in the meantime, had received a vaccination against copying the big European government-run welfare systems (Skocpol 1992).

The vaccination lasted with lowering effects until the Obama presidency in 2009. Except for war veterans, the United States got very little of what Bismarck started in Germany in the 1890s and Lord Beaverbrook designed for Britain, which was enacted after World War II.

Gunnar Myrdal (1978), another Nobel laureate, observed early a dishonesty phenomenon in the tax system in Sweden. The large-scale Swedish welfare systems were paid for by exceptionally high taxes, and he concluded that this system had created "a nation of small crooks" who cheated on taxes. Later we have learned that the Swedes also cheat a great deal to get welfare benefits.

The Swedish response consisted in a large measure to extend the legal benefits in order to lower the need to cheat. The openings in Scandinavia toward governmental payments for non-work are probably beyond the horizon of the imagination of most Americans. They became common prior to the millennium in Sweden, providing work-free income to a substantial proportion of the population of working age by pre-pensions, long-term sick benefits, and other welfare devices. This phenomenon was legal, promoted by social democracy, and might be called "the gestation of a citizen's wage." Legislation to stop this process was introduced by a non-socialist government that came to power in 2006.

At best, we can follow Hurwicz, and find or create situations in which everyone has a main strategy to tell the truth. For example, in the realm of science, truth will emerge if research is conducted according to the scientific method in a field where all findings are checked and confirmed by other researchers. Truth

telling in science is also supported by the knowledge that cheating in research is a sure way to end a career. Prior to the advent of science as a full-fledged realm of society, the beliefs within some religions in an almighty God who sees and knows everything and keeps track of it, could also promote strategies of truth-telling — but one could never be quite sure that some people had not been seduced by the devil to lie.

An ingenious design to cope with the problem of honesty in large systems is to test possible dishonest individuals in a socially small system. A great invention of Roman justice was the right to face your accuser in front of a judge. A court of justice may be a bureaucracy, but the courtroom is a socially small world of personally present persons. A court of law assesses the truth by asking questions, listening, and watching answers face-to-face. Of course, courts also have sanctions to apply against those who commit perjury. Deceits that are endemic in larger organizations and networks are minimized in courts.

## Honest Knowledge about Large Populations

You know that your neighbor will soon buy a new car. In the cold mornings, you hear that his old car takes a long time to start. You know from talking to him that he is fond of a car of this make, and he usually keeps his models as long as he can. So you assume that his new car will be of the same make.

This you know, but how many people in the country are like your neighbor? You have no idea of how many will become repeat buyers of this make during the coming year. However, the car manufacturer has a marketing department that has a good estimate of how many new cars will be sold and how many of them will be sold to repeat customers. They have market surveys and calculations that forecast the future annual sale. They have overcome Dunbar's limit and Hayek's restricted knowledge, but not necessarily the problem of dishonesty.

The father of quantitative social science and the standard setter for census bureaus, the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet

(1796–1874), found his safety in large numbers. Among 100,000 young Frenchmen appearing in front of draft boards, the individual measurements of their height grouped themselves in a bell-shaped curve, symmetrically around a stable mean. Armed with his mathematical curve, Quetelet could conclude that about 2,000 men had escaped service by somehow shortening themselves just below the minimum height required for a soldier.

In this instance, we needed large numbers to reach a reliable conclusion about the dishonesty in the presentations made by the recruits of their own height. However, in other contexts, such as in the number of interviews in a public opinion poll, there is no self-evident safety in very large numbers.

The sample survey is a modern method to cope with the limit of knowledge a decision-maker has as regards a number of people beyond Dunbar's number. The survey is used in a variety of fields, production controls in engineering, symptom diversion in medicine, satisfaction with government services, images of corporation, political public opinion polling, et cetera.

In the 1930s, a well-established magazine in the United States, *Literary Digest* used to inform its readers how elections were going by mailing millions of questionnaires to subscribers and people in the phone books and automobile registry. (United States has never had a total population registry, and its civil servants and researchers depend on other registers.) In the 1936 election, the *Digest* had reported that Roosevelt would lose, 56 percent to 44. Many pundits agreed: Roosevelt seemed helpless to stop the Great Depression, too free spending, too controversial, not only in the business community, but in the broad middle classes.

George Gallup’s data in 1936 included questionnaires from 3000 adults. Gallup's sample was not statistically ideal; he did not start using probability sampling until after the failure to forecast the 1948 election, when Truman unexpectedly beat Dewey. However, his 1936 sample was more representative of the electorate as a whole than the one used by the *Literary Digest*. He had selected a small number of voting areas with names and

addresses of voters drawn from election rolls when available, and otherwise from telephone directories. Similar to the *Digest* he mailed them questionnaires. Like the Digest he asked the sample how they had voted in the election 1932 as well as how they would vote in the election 1936. More important, and unlike the Digest, he used the information of past voting. His sample was hand counted in his small Princeton office by six employees; the first IBM card sorter did not arrive in the office until the following year. The questionnaires were sorted into piles to reflect the 1932 election outcome. This made the big difference between the two elections visible. The procedure was called "adjustment of the sample," and it eventually became subsumed under the heading "post-stratification" in the vocabulary of statisticians, a procedure that, under some assumptions, can improve results from samples. The Gallup Poll correctly published the winner of the election, and became nationally known.

The *Digest* did not reach all the prospective voters, nor a good sample of them. However, the gap between the presidential candidates was considerable, and the *Literary Digest* might have been able to call the right winner in the 1936 election, if they had made a similar adjustment of their sample as Gallup had done. On Election Day, Roosevelt's Republican opponent, Al Landon, won a total of two states. Roosevelt swept the rest of the nation, the greatest landslide, to that date, in presidential history. *Literary Digest* stopped publishing election forecasts; eventually, it stopped publishing altogether.

A branch of mathematics, the theory of sampling, has become an intellectual basis to overcome the limitation set by Dunbar's number and Hayek's theorem. The general tenet of statistical sampling is simple. By studying the responses in a randomly selected sample of the population we can, with known probability, estimate the responses of the entire population. We often use a similar approach in daily life. A cook does not need to consume an entire pan of sauce in order to know how it tastes. He needs to stir the sauce (randomize) and taste a spoonful (sample) of it. If the sample has too little spice, the entire sauce has too

little spice. We can conclude this with a known degree of conviction, expressed as statistical confidence limits or margins of error.

The statistical "margins of error" do not mean that researchers have done something in error, but rather that the readers or users of the findings would be wrong in assuming that the reported numbers are exact representations of reality, rather than indications of likely intervals. The measures obtained from correctly constructed samples apply to the entire population, with the allowance of the "margin of error." The deviations from the true value form the same kind of bell-shaped distribution that Quetelet had worked with. The correct answer most probably lies within calculable margins.

We choose these margins somewhat differently, depending on the topic at hand, and on the use to be made of the research. An advertising agency testing the recall of copy about a brand may be satisfied with a lower margin of error than a court of law that is to rule on an alleged infringement of someone's established brand name. In a great deal of medical and social research, a tolerable minimum for a "statistically significant" component is a probability of 95 percent. In other words, if the survey samples were to be repeated over and over again until the entire population had been measured, 95 out of 100 results would lie within these margins. In the language of the experts, you then have a "statistical significance“ at the 5 percent level. At the level of 1 percent, they may say "high statistical significance."

One must never forget that the figures based on samples represent approximate values, not exact numbers, but the beauty of correct sampling is that we can calculate the likely limits of the deviations. The proper use of these calculations is restricted to samples that do not deviate from the sampling plan of random, or known, selection in each step. If this deviation is large, the statistics no longer represent the population we want to study. The discrepancy between the planned sample and the achieved sample is, therefore, necessary information. It is usually called

"completion rate" (or “response rate” in interview surveys) and can be expressed as a percentage.

The widespread use of the sample survey instrument in market research has led to an increasing reluctance to respond to questionnaires by the public. In the second half of the twentieth century, the response rate for opinion surveys in the advanced countries declined from 80-90 percent to 50-60 percent. In this way, surveys become ineffective as a provider of reliable statistics about the entire population. This means that public opinion polling cannot count on support from mathematical statistics. Unless the researcher knows in advance the correlation between non-responses and the topic studied, which is very rare, the present models for calculating confidence intervals require high response rates. Larger samples, or so called "poll of polls," cannot compensate for errors caused by the public's lack of cooperation in answering the pollsters' questions. It is a way of being wrong with confidence.

The calculations of margins of error in samples with poor response rates do not reveal the range in which the true value is found with 95 percent probability, as is often claimed in press releases of opinion polls. It does tell us, that replications of the samples with the same inadequate response rate in 95 cases of 100 would render results within this range. In this way, we may understand why different polls differ slightly from *one another* in their results, but not how they differ from the true value in the population studied.

## Public Opinion Polls as a Social Innovation

A critical task in all public opinion polling on issues is the choice of topics for the questioning. It is important to ask questions revealing the public’s concerns, and not only questions that interest the pollsters or their editors or sponsors. Gallup solved this problem in the late 1930s by regularly asking: “What is the most important problem facing the country today?” He did not want to define all issues by himself, or to have his editors take

all the initiatives. In the ideal issue poll, his respondents, the public, should have the main say in defining the issues! Without any filters or restrictions, mass media should, then, publish the views of the public to the public and to the leaders of the public. The full measure of Gallup's contribution is not only a scientific application of sampling, interviewing, and calculation of percentages of responses into majorities and minorities. He also achieved a social innovation: polling of the public, on the issues defined by the public, for the benefit of the public (Gallup and Rae 1940).

Gallup, himself, and other serious pollsters discovered, the hard way, the power of Hurwicz's thesis: that people's accounts of themselves and their achievements may be dishonest. This applies also to nationwide interviewing. No scheme can induce respondents in a short encounter with an interviewer to tell the truth at all times. Post-stratification based on party choice in a previous election is a tricky procedure that can easily result in wrong pre-election polls (Zetterberg and Busch 1976). There are times when people are not motivated to truthfully disclose how they voted in an election some years ago. Political trends, events, and scandals may make them embarrassed to tell how they voted. Or, if they recently have converted to a another party, they may, on the day the pollster calls, be tempted to present themselves as clever in the past as they are today, and say that voted for their new party in the previous election as well.

Errors in interview surveys are not all sampling errors, nonresponse, or deficient memory recall from the interviewees. Incompetent question wordings cause faults in the measurement. Administrative failures in the recruitment and training of interviewers may leave room for bias or cheating. Mistakes may also occur in entering data to computers and in their processing. The reporting of polls in media often suffers from bias revealed in the chosen slant and headings by editors. Interactions occur among multiple error sources. The "total survey error" is difficult to grasp. One thing is certain: it is larger than the sampling

error, i.e. the plus-minus number that sometimes is mentioned in poll releases.

This ends our review of the truth in descriptive discourse in organizations, networks, and markets. We will return to the problem of truthfulness when we deal with the societal realm of science in Volume 4 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Knowledge and Beauty.*

## Two Propositions from Biology [BIO]

In this book project on The Many-Splendored Society we pursue, not the total society, but its social reality. Our idea is that social reality comes from the use of language to build a social edifice (structure) and other language to motivate us to live in this edifice. When our reasoning depends on a non-language biological base, we have promised in our opening pages xvii of this volume, to flag the occasion by a special sign, [BIO], in the margin of the text or after a heading. It is time now for two instances where the [BIO] flag applies.

Certain biologically given upper limit or ceiling exists in the endeavors in which a human being can embark. It is clear from the complaining we do about the lack of time or energy, that everybody has had some personal experience with this limit. During one single day, a person may be able to produce more speech acts than purely manual acts. I wish I could reproduce here the constants that measure these two, the maximum number of physical acts and the maximum number of symbolic acts per actor and time unit. We can only talk intuitively about this, as there is no agreement when one action ends and another begins.

The language brain seems to be constructed with more excess capacity than the pre-language brain. Orthodox Darwinists have had some difficulty in explaining why such excess capacity of the language brain could emerge in the early environments of

Homo sapiens. A human brain that developed its biology to adapt to life millennia ago in a rustic, migratory tribe of ancestors can, after a few years of training, cope with cosmopolitan life, and with a vocabulary in a metropolitan area. Perhaps this is another sign of the enormous freedom that we have received with the language brain. (We discussed this freedom on pages 1: 152-155).

Yet, there is also a ceiling to the language capacity. Modern people know too well that one cannot be completely involved in a profession, and also in politics, business, art, and in the raising of a big family. That requires too many considerations and words.

Normally, we live at levels far under the ceiling of action. However, there may be long-term changes. Most sleep researchers in Europe and North America agree that we spend less time sleeping than we did a century ago, a fact which signals that the customary average of actions per day has been elevated. [TECH] Edison, who invented of the light bulb, is sometimes blamed for this change.

There are obviously individual variations in the ceiling of action. Young babies spend most of their time sleeping, and the very old are capable of fewer actions, particularly physical actions, than are adults in their prime. It is also obvious that the healthy are capable of more than the sick, at any age. The concern with the physical and mental fitness and wellbeing of a population — what we now call "public health" — has been a serious issue among rulers and social thinkers of all eras because, as a determinant of the ceiling of actions, it affects the degree of action their society can and cannot undertake.

The greater the physical and mental stamina of a population, the higher is the limit of actions per person. Such biological factors have consequences in history. The earliest (and best) forecasters of the collapse of the Soviet Union were not the military and political strategists, but demographers who early discovered the declining life expectancy among Russian males, and public

health researchers who paid attention to the spread of alcoholism.

## Mobilization [BIO]

There is, normally, a discrepancy between the actual number of actions and the potential limit and capacity of actions. The usefulness of the principle of the limit of action in predictions depends on our knowledge of this discrepancy. Let us define 'mobilization' as the ratio of actual to potential actions among a set of persons. It would be zero under conditions of complete idleness, e.g., during sleep, and approach unity when the individuals concerned are pressing themselves to the utmost of their resources. The ceiling of action is, thus, identical with capacity mobilization.

Most men at most times operate at a rather modest degree of mobilization. It takes a crisis to give us the startling demonstration that we can do a great deal more than we actually do. William James (1936, 7) is not merely a Puritan moralist when he says with some disapproval "as a rule men habitually use only a small part of the powers which they actually possess and which they might use under appropriate conditions." He backs up his statement by a string of samples and by reference to many common-sense experiences which indicate that extra energy, "a second wind," is a reality, and can be put to use when needed.

The common sense approach taken by William James, suggests that everyone has an accustomed or usual level of human energy expenditure. From clinical literature, one obtains a vivid impression of a high rate in the manic. The depressed have a low rate, at least in physical activity. In addition, in cases that are not pathological, one can assume a certain degree of intra-individual consistency in the level of energy expenditure. Our biological heritage of heart and lung capacity can only, in part, account for this; it is also affected by training and by environmental circumstances, such as tropical or temperate climate.

Our concern here is limited to the interplay between social structures and the levels of mobilization. We will summarize in the form of Figure 9.2 on page 2: 146 and Proposition 9:4 below.

The accustomed level of mobilization of individuals can, of course, be aggregated to a collective level. Where is the mobilization highest: in Houston or New Orleans? Is it true that the mobilization of the Chinese population is higher than that of India? We know stereotyped answers to such a question but lack reliable answers, as firm measurements are missing. We may fill out the lack of data on such issues with hypotheses from social theory.

In specifying what we may mean by an accustomed level of human mobilization of human energy, we should distinguish between long-term processes counted in months or years and short-term processes counted in days or weeks. A graph (see the middle part of Figure 9.1) might illustrate the simplest possible relation between the two. The long-term ratio of actions per person might be represented by a moving average, say, the average of the past hundred days. Around this the short-term weekly averages fluctuate around their average, and the still shorter daily activities and nightly rests on swing around their average.

When the short-range curve is higher than the long-range moving average we speak of "mobilization above par," and when it falls lower than the moving average we speak of "mobilization below par." From the values of the long-range curve and the limit of actions we can calculate the "accustomed level of mobilization." The latter is simply the percentage of capacity mobilization that is represented by the individual or collectivity we study. Periods of high and low mobilization oscillate, as indicated in an amateurish physiological regularity seen as the curves in Figure 9.1, and expressed in words as Proposition 9:4.

F9.1

*Figure 9.1. Daily, Short- and Long-term Shifts in Mobilization of Actions with Accustomed Mobilization Increasing, Stationary, and Decreasing.*



Proposition 9:4. *Accustomed Mobilization:* All humans have a limit or ceiling of actions. Below this ceiling, an accustomed level of mobilization is established. Periods of mobilization above par of the accustomed level tend to be followed by mobilization below par, and vice versa.

It follows from the way we have defined our terms that a long-run increase in the number of actions per person leads to a higher accustomed level of mobilization. A long-run decrease has the opposite effect, i.e. leads to a lower accustomed level. This is the story of the lower graph in Figure 9.1. There is a built-in laziness in humanity, as well as a built-in exuberance; one is found above the accustomed level of mobilization and the other below it. The guardians of the social order must deal with both tendencies, because laziness is a potential danger, since it may keep essential tasks from being done, and exuberance is potentially dangerous, as it generates activity that may not fit into the established social fabric and may, consequently, cause physical strain to the organism.

Social rewards for diligence and workmanship counteract laziness. These measures are not always undertaken successfully. Parkinson (1955) aptly suggests that among civil servants "work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion," because the social incentives in a government bureaucracy are allied, rather than countervailing, forces to laziness. A bureaucrat gets prestige and rank in proportion to the number of subordinates he can get to share his fixed volume of work.

By keeping ways open for legitimate activity, communities cope with excessive exuberance. Our experience in modern cities suggests a failure in providing enough channels for the exuberance of teenagers, with the resulting amount of non-social or anti-social behavior. No one who has talked extensively with juvenile delinquents can fail to observe how often they interpolate phrases, such as "we had nothing to do," when discussing the reasons they may have got into difficulty.

An interesting paradox emerges when the accustomed level of mobilization declines: one does not get more done although one has more time. An Austrian worker in the Great Depression of the 1930s, who had been unemployed during a long period of time, compared what he did in the days when he was employed with the idle days of unemployment and said: "Ich habe früher weniger Zeit für mich gehabt, aber mehr für mich getan" (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel 1933, 63). This paradox of "having more time, but accomplishing less" occurred because the accustomed level of mobilization of the workers had decreased during his prolonged unemployment. Commanders of armies must always attempt to keep everyone busy in peacetime, so that they shall retain an appropriate level of mobilization when called to battle. Contrariwise, in periods of an increase of the accustomed level of mobilization, one may have less time for a task but accomplish more of it. In assigning tasks, leaders are, thus, likely to find that it pays to estimate correctly, rather than underestimate, the energies of men.

## Coping with the Large World: Vocabularies of Labeling

Faced with a limit on persons with whom we can have stable, familiar, and direct encounters, human beings tend to make a simple adjustment as regards all other persons. We cut down on the richness of our responses and behave, instead, in conventionalized fashion. In effect, we tend to substitute one stereotyped response for what, otherwise, would have been a variety of individualized responses.

The stereotyped patterning of a set of actions is the extent to which a smaller number of actions are repeatedly used in place of a larger variety of actions. As stereotyped actions take less of our time and energy than the ones adjusted to the details of the situation, they offer us means of economizing our limited encounter potential. Walter Lippmann, who brought the issue of stereotypes to general attention, says: "There is economy in this. For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail, rather than

as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs practically out of question" (Lippmann 1922, Ch.6, sec.3).

9:5

Proposition 9:5. *Theorem of Stereotypy:* There is a tendency to invoke stereotype patterning when the number of persons in encounters reaches or exceeds Dunbar's number.

We call this our Theorem of Stereotypy. Again, turning to Lippmann's description of busy men with too many encounters for illustrations:

> There is neither time nor opportunity for intimate acquaintance. Instead we notice a trait which marks a well-known type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the stereotypes we carry about in our heads. He is an agitator . . . . He is an intellectual. He is a plutocrat. He is a foreigner. He is a 'South European.' He is from Back Bay. He is a Harvard man. How different from the statement: He is a Yale man. He is a regular fellow. He is a West Pointer. He is an old army sergeant. He is a Greenwich Villager: what don't we know about him then, and about her? He is an international banker. He is from Main Street *(ibid)*.

A life of "idle curiosity," to borrow Veblen's phrase, is conducive to fewer stereotypes than the life of busy affairs with its many encounters. People who cut through our existing web of stereotypes — be they artists, scientists, or leaders of nations — are more likely to do so during periods of seeming leisurely retreat: alone in the wilderness, during sabbatical years, on weekends away from it all. Likewise, new stereotypes are least likely to develop in our more leisurely social relations. We tend to hold few stereotypes about our friends and their doings, but many about those we do not associate with in leisure.

## Satiation [BIO]

The process of satiation is a second idea that we shall borrow from (amateur) physiology of animals and move into a theory of human society that we otherwise base only on language. Satiation is a physiological regularity. If we repeat the same state-

ment all the time, i.e. continually keep nagging about something, people pay less and less attention. Persistent asking the same thing with no variation gets people tired. Even glory may fail from sheer repetition. To keep listeners interested you must vary your message, vary your messengers, and vary your emotive tone. To get the listeners more and more interested, you yourself must be more and more excited about the topic. The following proposition is an approximation that we learn from physiology:

9:6

Proposition 9:6. *Satiation in Encounters:* The longer a continuous string of the very same stimulations (e.g. sentences) occurs in an encounter, the less attention the latter gets, and vice versa, the longer a string of continuously novel stimulations (e.g. sentences), the more attention they get.

Johan Asplund (1967) has worked this out mathematically with several corroborative empirical research references. He has also explored many of the implications of this physiological regularity.

One of his important conclusions is that repetition is the cause, not the result, of the processes of satiation. Charisma, we recall from page 2: 63 et seq., is the followers' view of a leader imbued with extraordinary abilities, or "grace." The charismatic leader — and a good follower of the charismatic leader — should never be boring, but remains passionate about his or her ideas and tries to see new vistas for them. Charisma does not automatically fade into routines, as was the conclusion drawn by Max Weber (1922/1968, 246-251). It is the unchanging routines that make charisma fade (Asplund 1967, 88-90).

## Stimulation to Mobilization in Networks

The causes behind the changes in level of mobilization may be medical, technological, demographic, or social. In an organization, the approved communications between members are "the regular channels," same today as yesterday and the same tomorrow – unless it is a rare day when you are promoted or reassigned to another part of the organization. Networks and their

participants provide unrivalled opportunities for varied exchanges. In other words, given the same density of contacts, there are more chances for repeated stimulations in organizations and more chances for novel stimulations in networks.

Let us stay with a social cause. The Proposition of Satiation in Encounters implies that a string of novel stimulations increases the level of activity in an encounter, while a string of repeated, same stimulations decreases activity in the encounter. Apply this insight on encounters in organizations compared to encounters in networks. Since novel stimulations are likelier to occur in networks (see page 81 above) than in organizations, a conclusion is close at hand that the diverse stimulation of a network raises mobilization more than the repeated stimulations inside an organization. Or in propositional form:

9:7

> Proposition 9:7. *Network Effects on Mobilization:* If the ratio of networking activities to organizational activities increases, then the accustomed level of mobilization tends to increase, and vice versa.

Similar increases of accustomed mobilization (but attenuated from the derivation by probabilities) occur with changes of the ratio of contracts to laws, and the ratio of market places to legislatures. Count on increased mobilization with any lift in phenomena based on networks, for example, contracts, and markets. Bureaucratization tends to bring order, but at the price of a lower mobilization of efforts.

## Rationality and Mobilization

The European way of structuring a society expanded successfully westwards from the Iberian Peninsula starting with the Columbus' ship "Santa Maria." At that time, two swords jointly ruled in Europe, a political one and a religious one. A second westwards expansion started from the British Isles and the Netherlands with the ship Mayflower. European society had then experienced a renaissance of ancient art and science, and a reformation had created religious diversity. Those on board

"The Mayflower" were dissidents from the system of European rule by the joint political-religious swords. The Americas eventually became divided at the Rio Grande by the followers of these two streams of immigrants and colonizers.

In the section "Exporting European Differentiation" (1: 23-28) in the opening chapter of the first volume of *The Many-Splendored Society* we have sketched this development. We have had little to say so far about any eastward move of European structuration, except that the East Rome was more stable than the West Rome. We also noted in passing (1: 102-104) that the Sung Dynasty in China in most every aspect was superior to its European counterparts of the time.

Europe's contacts with the eastern part of the Eurasian landmass were long only over land. Trade, in the beginning mostly exports of silk and other luxuries from China, connected India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Egypt and Europe by caravan grids of pack animals taking different routes that collectively became known as the Silk Road. It took many local political agreements and much reloading to keep the goods flowing. The routes were designed for goods. They could spread diseases, but were not designed for streams of migrants, except slaves who were sometimes parts of the bargains. A significant effect was that the routes spread Buddhist scriptures from India to China.

In the thirteenth century, The Mongol Empire of Genghis Kahn and his sons reached to the border of Europe at Moscow. It was born on horse-backs. In the following century, Tamerlane's similarly borne counter-empire of Mongol-Persian origin was built on the wealth generated by the Silk Road. On the European front, it reached Georgia, Armenia, and southern Russia. It conquered India. The empire started to establish its capital in Samarkand, near the birthplace of Tamerlane. He died on a carefully planned mission to conquer China. (History books call him also Timur.)

The European reach into Asia is often said to start with the arrival of Vasco da Gama's ship "São Gabriel" to India in 1498, a sort of eastward parallel to the westward endeavors with "Sanc-

ta Maria" and "Mayflower." But this, says John Darwin (2007, 13) is "a travesty of the facts."

> A dense mercantile network already linked ports and producers between the coast of East Africa and the South China Sea. Asian merchants were not passive victims of a European takeover. Whatever their shortcomings, Asian governments were more than the predatory despots of European mythology who crushed trade and agriculture by penal taxation and arbitrary seizure. In different parts of Asia, there were market economies where the division of labour, specialized trades and urban development (the hallmarks of growth as Adam Smith had described it) looked very similar to those found in Europe. In China, especially, the scale of commercial exchange, the sophistication of credit, the use of technology, and the volume of production (in textiles particularly) revealed a pre-industrial economy at least as dynamic as contemporary Europe's. Indeed, before 1800 what really stood out was not the sharp economic contrast between Europe and Asia, but, on the contrary, a Eurasian world of 'surprising resemblances' in which a number of regions, European and Asian, were at least theoretically capable of the great leap forward into the industrial age. (Darwin 2007, 13).

With this background, we can enter a great intellectual debate that explores why the industrialization leaped forward in Europe but not in Asia. We know from our first volume of The Many-Splendored Society about The Master Trends of general bursts of language-based culture and rationality in the axial civilizations (1: 79-84). Looking at the reach of the trend toward rationality and the achieved customary level of mobilization at the dawn of the industrial age we get an impressionistic picture captured in Figure 9.2.

We see that Protestant Europe has both strong rationality and strong mobilization. Islam has good mobilization but not much rationality, trapped as it is by the idea that all the essential reasoning ended with the Prophets revelations in medieval Mecca and Medina. Hinduism has a much more impressive rationality

but lacks in mobilization. The caste system allowed you to do well in your own caste, but you could not by your efforts enter higher castes, an effective ceiling to achieving mobilization. Buddhism sees salvation in mobilizing for religious contemplation rather than worldly achievements. Confucianism in China leaves a great heritage of rationality and meritocracy in the elites, but also room given to rituals and ancestor worship. Varieties of Buddhism are the mass religion in China.

F9.2

*Figure 9.2. Mobilization and Rationality in Different Religious Symbolic Environments according to Hans L Zetterberg's impressions after reading Max Weber (1920), Robert Bellah (1957), and John Darwin (2007).*




Toward the end of the Tokugawa dynasty in Japan in the first half of the nineteenth century, Japanese religion was a mixture of influences from Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto. Robert N. Bellah (1957) has shown that it brought both rationality and a

mobilizing work ethic to Japan. In all, it resembled what Max Weber had found in his classical study of the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (Weber 1904-1905). In a "Coda" to Volume 5 subtitled Wealth and Sacredness we return to Weber's original thesis on the Protestant religion as a co-creator of modern capitalism.

It is no coincidence that Japan became the first modern nation in Asia with a BNP that surpassed any European nation. Its economy then became the second largest in the world after the United States. This lasted until 2010 when it was bypassed by China.

## The Familiar versus the Unfamiliar

Relatively few of the actions we undertake fail to become part of exchanges in social relations. Even my lonely pre-occupation in writing this will eventually be part of an author-reader relation. However, we will remain unfamiliar to each other. Let us look closer at the various ways of adding or subtracting actions in a social relation.

If we divide our actions into two parts: those that enter social relations and those that do not, we will find that the latter number is small. This is a simple meaning of Aristotle's much cited observation that "man is a social animal."

The number of actions per person is not quite the same as the number of actions in social relations per associate, but there is a considerable overlap between the two. This overlap is basic to our further reasoning about the attributes of positions and roles. It makes it possible to rewrite our principle of mobilization to take into account our overlap. Since the overlap is not total, such a rewrite attenuates the probability of the Proposition, but enough will remain to make it interesting.

Let us scan our list of attributes of social relations and identify those that contain many and few actions. What, then, emerges is a proposition that the level of mobilization correlates with two distinctive clusters of social roles. One of these we shall call roles

between 'strangers'. The other roles take place between the opposites of strangers, that is, 'familiar persons.'

Proposition 9:8. *Mobilizing for a Life with Strangers and Demobilizing for Life with Familiar Persons:* During mobilization above par, social relations tend to become those of 'strangers,' that is, a) more specialized, b) less familiar, c) less durable, and d) more sporadic. During mobilization below par, social relations tend to become those of 'familiar persons' that is to say, a) less specialized, b) more familiar, c) more durable, and d) less sporadic.

9:8

## Folk Life and City Life

Life with familiar persons has different meanings for the individual and for society. For the individual, life with the closest, i.e. the near and dear, is the comfort of the familiar, but also conformity and constant supervision. In a society, life with familiar persons requires fewer formal law enforcements. Small communities with close relations often punish a stranger harder for a crime than they punish one of their own.

Unless the community is very self-sufficient, it needs strangers to provide the essentials, such as salt, knives, and other wares of traveling tradesmen. Contacts with such strangers are frightening, at least initially. However, they also provide exciting openings to a personal freedom not available for the closest. American anthropologist Robert Redfield (1940) used the concept "Folk society" to describe these small communities of life with familiar persons, a very apt choice of words.

Folk society is not necessarily based on agriculture, as is the common image. Societies based on farming have their own complexities that are different from the more well-known complexities of urban life. The agricultural life along the valleys of the big rivers such as the Yellow River, the Ganges, the Indus, the Nile, the Euphrates and Tigris and the many short rivers of the Andean society that cross the costal plane of present-day

Peru is the cradle of great and complex civilizations (Coulborn 1959, Chap. 2 and 3). This agricultural life resembles city life more than folk life.

A 'city' is a concentration of people beyond Dunbar's number living or working within walking (or quick commuting) distance from all points. The basic condition is that they are mostly strangers to one another (Jacobs 1962, 143-238), (Asplund 1991, 50-56).

Visible, walking strangers populate the streets of a city at long hours of the day, a fact facilitated by small blocks so that pedestrian traffic is not restricted to a few high streets. If you can walk a whole day from a randomly chosen point without meeting anyone of your closest, then, by definition, you are in a big city. If you meet and greet some people on your day's walk, then you live in a small city or small town. Big cities may consist of adjacent small towns. Such cities do not have a single center, but have many mini-centers.

Cities differ. A student of urban communities does well to look, not only to contemporary cities, but also at cities in antiquity and in Indian and Chinese civilizations. The first to take a broader view, Max Weber in 1913, published posthumously (1921), found a few more common characteristics of cities. There is intense competition for land and real estate in the city. Cities have marketplaces with traders from inside and outside the city. Caravans and ships from far away may arrive in cities, nearby tradesmen are legion. In this way, cities concentrate riches. The nearby trade also makes surrounding areas rich. Weber stressed particularly that all cities have at least a partial political autonomy (what he later called *Eigengesetzlichkeit*). Cities may become "states within a state," run by patricians in a republican manner, independent of kings and landed gentry. They have a court of law of their own, a police force that usually extends to a full military self-defense.

Beyond the market and real estate, city government, courts and marshals, we must stress that cities may be very different. For example, they can specialize in housing temples, universi-

ties, banking services, or factories. Factories require considerable manpower at all times of the year in one and the same place, something that cities easily can provide. The remarkable thing is that a city can be all these things, and yet have a majority of strangers in its population, strangers who interact rationally.

[NAT BIO] In every past generation of humanity, the city has been a somewhat odd phenomenon, used only by a minority. The majority of people have lived in the countryside. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, we got a unique situation: more than half of mankind lives in cites! The city has, thus, become the ecological setting for most living human beings, a remarkable change.

There are great deals of speculations about the long-term consequences of this shift for the conditions of the human race. Traditionally, the fertility rate is higher in rural than in urban areas. Urbanization implies lower fertility and a more stationary, total population. In an urban-style future, people with genes and brain functions conducive to city life may have a reproductive advantage. Thus, the biological make-up of Homo Sapiens will change, a process that will be observable by brain researchers in the same way that they have been able to observe changes in the brain occurring since literacy and reading became common in the symbolic environment.

The city is a natural setting for a many-splendored society. "It is the place where the diffused rays of many separate beams of life fall into focus, with gains in both social effectiveness and significance," wrote Lewis Mumford in a celebrated book (1938, 3). Not that all cities at all times are many-splendored societies — some have periodically been awful tyrannies — but a many-splendored status is easier to achieve in cities.

## Two Societal Master Clusters: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

It is time to pull together the string of some disparate but related observations and concepts which we have already reviewed in this or the previous volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*. Let us do so in Table 9.2. What emerges here is a version of Ferdinand Tönnies' classical distinction between two types of society which he presented as *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). If you do not like the German words that summarize the two clusters you may say "Folk life" instead of Gemeinschaft. Instead of Gesellschaft you could say "City life."

More detailed revisits to Tönnies' classification have been made by sociologists and anthropologists, for example, Samples (1988) and Asplund (1991, in Swedish). Our table is open-ended. More attributes can easily be added to each cluster.

For over a hundred years, the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (or their close synonyms) have been used by social scientists. As Asplund says, if they had not been available to us, we would have had to invent them. The various attributes listed in Table 9.2 are correlated to these two clusters.

To be sure, the clusters of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft overlap in many concrete situations. However, on balance, their attributes group together more than not. This is very useful knowledge that condenses many discrete pieces of information into two very informative categories.

For those of us who focus on the language-based aspects of society, it is essential to emphasize that the symbolic environments of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are as different as day and night. Admittedly, however, there is a sea of correlations, and social scientists have not been able to find consistent leaders and laggards in transitions between Gemeinschafts and Gesellschafts.

T9.2

*Table 9.2. Attributes of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.*

| Source | Gemeinschaft | Gesellschaft |
|---|---|---|
| Habermas distinguished the life world, in which the symbols have a stable and well understood meaning for everyone, from the system world in which special vocabularies are used, and which lack general understanding of meaning. | Life world | Systems world |
| | See pp 63 et seq | |
| Earlier, Sir Henry Sumner Maine distinguished a society in which the members' positions were based on ascribed qualities from one in which positions were achieved by contracts. | Ascribed positions | Contracted positions |
| | See pp 51 et seq | |
| Based on the dichotomy inspired by Stevenson — also explored by Parsons as "affectivity" — we separate language with emotive and executive loadings. | Emotively charged language | Executive language |
| | See pp 145 et seq | |
| Durkheim distinguished communities of low differentiation where mechanical solidarity and strict conformity prevails, from differentiated communities bound together by organic solidarity, a mutual dependence on each other's specialized functions. | Mechanical solidarity | Organic solidarity |
| | See pp 19 et seq | |
| Based on dimensions from Pareto, Weber, and Sorokin we distinguish cultural values that are marked by tradition ("being"), faithfulness, and humanism, from cultural values that are modern ("becoming"), flexible, and materialistic. | Tradition<br>Faithfulness<br>Humanism | Modernity<br>Flexibility<br>Materialism |
| | See pp 115 et seq | |
| Based on classifications of social roles by Parsons and others, we have separated the socially closest persons with whom we have more lasting, continuous, familiar, inclusive, and personal relations, from strangers, that is, persons with whom we have short, sporadic, unfamiliar, specialized, and impersonal relations. | Lasting, continuous, familiar, inclusive, personal roles | Short, sporadic, unfamiliar, specialized, impersonal roles |
| | See pp 55 et seq. | |
| | 'Folk life' | 'City life' |

## Gemeinschaft *versus* Gesellschaft in Civil Wars

We may pick an illustration of the contrast between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft from seventeenth century England prior to the Glorious Revolution. In those days, poets and preachers and authors of gossipy newsletters about the goings-on at the Court and in the big City contrasted these high society values with those of the healthy Country. This is an essential background to the English Revolution, a civil war. No one has described this context better than Lawrence Stone, and let us cite him in full:

> The Country is firstly an ideal. It is that vision of rustic arcadia that goes back to the Roman classics and which fell on the highly receptive ears of the newly educated gentlemen of England who had studied Virgil's Georgics at Oxford or Cambridge. It was a vision of environmental superiority over the City; the Country was peaceful and clean, a place of grass and trees and birds, the City was ugly and dirty and noisy, a place of clattering carts and coaches, coal dust and smog, and piles of human excrement. It was also a vision of moral superiority over the Court; the Country was virtuous, the Court wicked; the Country was thrifty, the Court extravagant; the Country was honest, the Court corrupt; the Country was chaste and heterosexual, the Court promiscuous and homosexual; the Country was sober, the Court drunken; the Country was nationalist, the Court xenophile; the Country was healthy, the Court diseased; the Country was outspoken, the Court sycophantic; the Country was the defender of old ways and old liberties, the Court the promoter of administrative novelties and new tyrannical practices; the Country was solidly Protestant, even Puritan, the Court was deeply tainted by popish leanings.
>
> Secondly, the Country is a culture and a style of life, again defined and much by what it is not as by what it is. As its name implies, it stood for rural residence in a country house, as opposed to living in rented lodgings in London; for the assump-

> tion by the owner of paternalist and patriarchal responsibilities as employer of domestic labour, dispenser of charity, landlord of tenants, and member of the bench of justices. All this was contrasted with the egocentric, hedonist, carefree existence of the man-about-town. The Country also stood for an experience of the world confined to the shires of England, as opposed to the sophistication bred of the Grand Tour through France and Italy; for the maintenance of open hospitality for all, as opposed to the offering of luxurious private dinner parties in the City; for a highly conservative taste in Jacobethan architecture, as opposed the new-fangled classicism of Inigo Jones; for a highly conservative taste in portrait-painting, as opposed to the courtly continental innovations of Van Dyke; for a highly conservative taste in clothes, as opposed to the dizzily changing fashions of the beau monde at Court. By the early seventeenth century England was experiencing all the tensions created by the development within a single society of two distinct cultures, cultures that were reflected in ideals, religion, art, literature, the theatre, dress, deportment and way of life (Stone 1986, 105-106).

In the case of England, there was a genuine religious struggle between Catholics, favored by the King who plotted with Catholic continental powers, and the activist Protestants, who were dead set against a return to the regiment of the Pope. There was also an economic divide between food producers and consumers. There was a divide between an established landed aristocracy and a nouveau riche bourgeoisie whose wealth depended on trade and manufacture. All these divisions overlapped with folk life and city life. A civil war has many causes; the cleavage between a rural Gemeinschaft and an urban Gesellschaft is not normally by itself a sufficient cause to take to arms, but it usually sets the battle line.

What is billed as a straight class struggle is often also a struggle between a rural Gemeinschaft and an urban Gesellschaft. Even an explicit Communist revolution may have elements of Tönnies, in addition to the influences of Marx (1: 109). Chairman

Mao's Long March and Revolution in China were a revolt by farmers, not primarily driven by industrial workers.

At the time of this writing, those who insist on democratic elections with majority rule in China are, in effect, asking for the farmers to come back to govern, as they did in Mao's days. It is true that the urban population of China in the first decade of the twenty-first century had risen to be of the same size as the rural one, but it takes some time before non-farmers constitutes a comfortable majority in China with political preferences of city life. After another decade or two, however, the modern Gesellschaft of China may comfortably face a multi-party election that gives the power to the majority.

With a historical perspective, wars were rare at in the first decade of the new millennium. A war in Afghanistan is one of the most publicized and a complex one. As far as I can tell, at bottom this conflict is a civil war between clans living in Gemeinschafts and clans living in Gesellschafts. The former, the Taliban, had provided training bases for the Islamic terrorist network, al Qaeda, that destroyed The World Trade Center in New York. The operation to destroy the al Qaeda bases for terrorists was given the dimensions of a full scale war by President George W. Bush. If the British Prime Minister Tony Blair had remembered the history of the English civil war, Britain might not have joined the Afghan civil war, but been content to assist the CIA in the destruction of the al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan.

The Security Council of the United Nations endorsed military intervention against al Qaeda and their hosts the Taliban. According to the UN charter, this is to call all member states to join in the war effort against the Taliban. I am not sure that the Council would have voted this way if it had realized that the entire United Nation thus became allied with one side in one of the numerous small civil wars in the world between a rural Gemeinschaft and an urban Gesellschaft.

The Security Council apparently did not see the many signs that the Afghan events were part of a larger pattern of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft conflicts, well known in social science and

history. On the Asian scene, a memorable rural-urban confrontation had taken place in Vietnam leading to the defeat of the US backed cosmopolitan Saigon. Cambodia still lived in the aftermath of the Pol Pot regime that emptied the cities and sent the urban population in forced marches to carry out rural projects. In Thailand a rural-urban confrontation had battle lines of demonstrators in Bangkok at the same time that the Council deliberated about Afghanistan.

## Gemeinschaft *versus* Gesellschaft in Social Movements

Let us repeat that a cleavage between a rural Gemeinschaft and an urban Gesellschaft is not normally a sufficient one to take to arms. The contention can take other forms as social movements.

For centuries, feudal families and households of kings and aristocracies represented the pinnacle of the European life with impulses from cosmopolitan Gesellschafts, while the great masses practiced rural folk life. The Europeans experienced opportunities to live richer and fuller lives when transitions from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft took place. Forceful old-fashioned *liberal* movements in the past two and a half centuries broke up old arrangements and opened up a new life for everyone, regardless of station. In Europe these transitions included the rough and tumble early industrialization process. These transitions caused great dislocations and sorrows over lost forms of living (Polanyi 1944). They are not altogether different from the stress that many contemporary Muslim youths experience in the Gesellschafts of Europe to which their parents have migrated from the Gemeinschafts of their native lands.

Those at a loss at such a turn of events had several options. They could join *conservative* or *reactionary* movements supporting the families, altars, and thrones and values of the old order. Or, they could form and join social movements to overturn, or to reform, the new Gesellschaft. Some such movements emerged as compromises between the new and the old. For example, *social-*

*ism* promised the political and economic benefits of Gesellschaft but with the solidarity of Gemeinschaft. Or, fascism, a Gemeinschaft supported by secret police and married to a war-prone nationalism that accepted the technological advantages and the high standards of living that had come with Gesellschaft.

Rudolf Heberle, a student and son-in-law of Tönnies, focused his pioneering research (Heberle 1951) on the social movements that emerged during the transition: liberalism, communism, socialism, anarchism, conservatism, and fascism. Only in passing does he note that many other movements emerged in the same expanding period of Gesellschaft that were non-political. They were neighborhood clubs, temperance movements, religious revivals, free masons, and similar orders. Their members could enjoy a Gemeinschaft in the midst of city life.

To sum up the underlying process, we have this proposition:

9:9

Proposition 9:9. *Social Movements*: Persons experiencing a rapid change from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft tend to develop and/or join social movements that are (a) wholly contentious of their Gesellschaft, or (b) organized as compromises between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or (c) organized as smaller Gemeinschafts inside the larger Gesellschaft.

An expert in historical sociology, Charles Tilly, has collected and analyzed examples of these contentions in France (Tilly 1986) and Great Britain (Tilly 1995). The by far strongest movement in terms of ideology and organization in European history is the labor movement. By the last quarter of the twentieth century it had lost much of its strength. The French sociologist Alan Touraine (1981) made a close attempt (at times with participatory research) to find among the new social movement emerging after World War II anything that could succeed an ever more tired and bureaucratic labor movement. He found no successor. Much fragmentation and dead ends came out of the 1968 revolts.

The typical pattern is that numbers of smaller social movements develop in harmful situations at the local level (not necessarily related to city life and folk life). Issues create a concern in

local networks that spreads to media and organizations. In an article by Downs (1972) and a book by Spector and Kitsuse (1977) we can identify six stages in this process.

1. Pre-problem stage. A harmful situation exists and is observed in some encounters but has not yet attracted the attention of lawmakers, journalists, or the public. Small networks and groups make initial claims and begin to recruit support.
2. Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm. A dramatic event with media coverage creates larger public support to solve the problem. There is a mobilizing effect from circular emotive reactions in demonstrations and manifestations.
3. Official recognition of the problem. Leadership in established organizations gets involved: there may be legislation or a creation of agencies to deal with the harmful situation.
4. Gradual decline in public interest. Recognizing the costs of significant progress and becoming bored with the problem, media attention fades, and the public loses interest. At this stage, the movements will survive only if they find new issues.
5. Active dissatisfaction in original groups. The groups who made initial claims reemerge and express dissatisfaction with how the harmful situation is being handled. Some, who have lost confidence in how the problem is being handled, try to create revivals with broader or more radical agendas.
6. Post-problem stage. In spite of the fact that only limited improvement has been achieved, the issue at hand is replaced by new problems.

These stages are useful benchmarks in assessing public reaction in modern societies to potentially harmful problems. Knowledge of these stages is also useful in assessing the impact

on social change of various movements, or on efforts to lengthen the life of a movement.

Lofland (1996, 116) makes the point that the beliefs held by social movements should be characterized not only by organizational attributes, but also "in terms of the institutional realm to which they may primarily refer. Such institutional realm classification assumes, though, that the beliefs are framed so that they apply only, or primarily, to a specific realm." Most movements can be classified in this manner, but fascism and liberalism, which started in the political realm, became hegemonies, thus encompassing all realms. We will take up to such issues in the next chapter where we deal with societal realms and their values.

## Invisible Job Contracts

The Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are usually seen as opposites. This should be qualified. In the Gesellschaft of the international medieval university of Paris the students developed Gemeinschafts called "nations." In American colleges in the twentieth century with a meritocracy so typical of a Gesellschaft, they did the same, and their Gemeinschafts are called fraternities and sororities. A closer look at any modern city reveals neighborhood groups, ethnic groups, and other voluntary associations of different kinds with Gemeinschaft-type social relations and values interspersed in a Gesellschaft. In fact, all communities of city life contain pockets of folk life, mostly in the form of domestic arrangements of households and families.

In the beginning of the 1980s, I participated in a multi-country survey of workplaces. It was headed by Daniel Yankelovich (Yankelovich, et al. 1985). We learned that co-workers in a Gemeinschaft are not competitors. In a Gesellschaft-type society, every work team does not share the Gesellschaft values of management by individual competition. Many work teams are emerging as Gemeinschafts and competing with other work teams that are similarly organized.

We found that thirty to forty percent of the working population in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Sweden and Israel reported that, during the previous five years, their jobs had been redesigned, changed through the introduction of new technology, or replaced with entirely new jobs that did not exist five years before. (In Japan this was so common that the researchers forgot to include this phenomenon in the questionnaire.) These new or newly restructured jobs were generally reported to be experienced as better than the former jobs. They allowed the worker more freedom and discretion in carrying out his or her work, and they encouraged the development of individual potential. In the main, research findings on this score run contrary to the common assumption of Marxist scholars that jobs are getting more controlled from above, more subdivided, and void of human content (Baverman 1974). The contrary was usually true with the newly designed jobs. The worker's discretion on the job was increasing. Also, in an era and in places when economic performance was bleak and there were too few jobs to go around, much effort was put into reforming existing jobs, with the result that they became more interesting to the people in those jobs.

The most interesting finding, however, was unanticipated. Nearly everywhere we interviewed, we found bits and pieces of what we came to call "the invisible contract." Here, we did not have a case that willingness to work occurred because the jobs allowed you to live out your interests and values, nor are we talking about an ethical commitment to work hard irrespective of the reward. We are talking about a motivation to work due to give-and-take of a non-economic kind that we found more or less developed at nearly every place of work in a modern industrialized and urbanized society.

The usual visible employment contract stipulates in writing that you are to put in so-and-so many hours for so-and-so many dollars. The invisible contract says that I help you on the job because I know that you will, in turn, help me. I care about my fellow workers, and my fellow workers care about me. I am loy-

al to my employer and my employer is loyal to me. These are Gemeinschaft values and relations that have survived or have emerged anew in workplaces with Gesellschaft values and organizations.

The extent of invisible contracts of Gemeinschaft life in Gesellschaft organizations varied between the countries studied in the 1980s. In Britain, the invisible contracts were less production-friendly and workers were more often prepared to withhold their efforts above the minimum required by the formal contract. In Germany, more workers felt exploited and did not want to give much of themselves. In Japan, there were growing signs that the strong, invisible contracts were abused, and that workers felt cheated. Production-friendly invisible contracts were commonly found in the United States and in Sweden. Such contracts were more frequent at small work-places than at large ones, more common for white-collar than blue-collar workers, and more common in the private sector than in the public sector.

A small workplace can develop a good invisible contract almost automatically. As with a hockey or soccer team, or fishing and hunting teams of olden days, there should be no more than seven to fifteen members to a work group, that is, "a socially small world." But good invisible contracts can develop also in large organizations, provided, they have a leadership sensitive to the connections between staff values, interpersonal relations, and performance. When the representatives of economic or political rationality in a Gesellschaft ask for staff reductions, the invisible contracts are jeopardized, unless the management acts with exceptional sensitivity and is given the time and resources to do so.

# 10. Cardinal Values and Their Societal Realms

## Enter the Realms

One of humanity's persistent misunderstandings is that in an ideal world all people live with the same beliefs, same values, and under the same rules. Rather, the fact is that many European, Asian, and American generations have learned to live a full life in societal realms that have different beliefs, values, and norms.

The French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard has contemplated the profound consequences of the absence of a common language in modern differentiated societies. Nowadays, no person needs to understand very much about the various areas within society, other than his or her own areas. Our words and meanings are determined by the contexts of different life situations, and cannot be adequately understood outside of them. Research reports, politics, economics, sports, art, and literature, all have their own symbols and languages. No realm in life commands a pan-language. A modern man must maintain "incredulity towards meta-narratives" (Lyotard 1993).

A brief experience I had as editor-in-chief of a metropolitan newspaper confirmed his view. A many-splendored society is like a newspaper. In its different pages or sections, a big daily paper mirrors and helps define and redefine a changing society. Here are pages about politics, economy, medicine, sport, entertainment, art, drama and literature, religion, and a page recording births, marriages, and deaths. These pages or sections have different sub-editors; to a far from sovereign editor-in-chief they are colloquially known as his "space barons." Each section of the paper has its own criteria and makes its own evaluations about what is worth publishing. No space baron possesses criteria that are applicable to all of the others. One sub-editor cannot readily

take the job of another without some retraining, not only in terms of the new content, but also in terms of a different way of evaluating and justifying content for publishing. In short, I learned that each baron had a realm of his or her own. Moreover, they have, or should have, considerable autonomy.

## Weber Revised

To learn about society's realms, let us turn to Max Weber, the German social scientist and historian. During World War I he became involved in the war effort as a manager of military hospitals. He rushed into print with studies on world religions and economy that had long been in preparation. He published them in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, a journal that he himself edited, and in which he could include long papers of his own, to the envy of his colleagues.

A 1915 essay called "Zwischenbetrachtung" (Intermediate Reflections) appears between two sections on Asian religions. The essay deals with much more than religion and economy, but does not include any subtitles or any other terms of identification. This paper contains Weber's reflections on total societies, their constituent orders and value spheres, each with their own internal autonomy.

This essay on societal realms had not been completed to Weber's satisfaction at the time. He kept revising it up to his death in the summer of 1920. In his posthumously published collected writings on the sociology of religion (Weber, 1920, pp. 542–567/2004, pp. 220–241) we have his last version, still without descriptive title and without subtitles. This is one of the pearls of Weberian social science. It provides a new conceptual clarity to the main subjects, religion and economy, in young Weber's breakthrough work from 1904–05 on the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. It opens for similar studies on how events in any one realm of society have consequences in other realms. In other words, the work breaks the academic mold of the separate

sciences of economics, political science, anthropology, and sociology.

Max Weber specified six societal spheres for advanced societies. He called them "life orders" (*Lebensordnungen*). They are the economic, political, religious, intellectual, erotic, and the family order. A value sphere (*Wertssphär*) of particular priorities matches each of these orders. The orders and spheres tend to become relatively autonomous and develop their own structures with considerable independence from one another. This Weber called *Eigengesetzlichkeit der Wertsphären,* "the bounded autonomy of spheres of value." In a couple of brilliant lectures on politics and science as professions, Weber elucidated the competition of the life orders as a perpetual "struggle of demons" (Weber 1921), (1922).

Let us now update these insights.

Scholars have argued about the number of life orders and their value spheres, as does, for example, Scaff (1989, 94-96). He stays in the Weberian tradition but suggests that Weber considered his list of six spheres as open. The British-American sociologist and historian Michael Mann (1986) in his bold IEMP-model is satisfied with four spheres: *I*deology, *E*conomy, *M*ilitary, and *P*olitics. His model is an inspiration to our definition of 'society' on page 2: 212 below.

The American social philosopher Michael Walzer (1983) has presented a pioneering work with a dozen "spheres of justice." They are memberships, security and welfare, money and commodities, office, work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, political power, tyrannies and just societies. The French social scientists Bolanski and Thévanot (1991) have made a division into the "worlds of justifications," specifying market, industrial, inspired (sacred), celebrity, domestic, civic justifications.

The many insights of Mann, Waltzer, Bolanski and Thévanot in the spheres they define are remarkable. However, with the possible exception of Mann, their spheres appear ad hoc and, in

the main, they are related to a contemporary phase of Western history. They do not relate to, nor constitute, any systematic theory of society. The same can also be said about Max Weber's original delineations. Weber's inclusion of the erotic value sphere in his schema is unconnected to his somewhat related term 'charisma' in the same publication – both include elements of infatuation with another person. It is also unconnected to his previous taxonomy, the *Kategorienlehre*. His biographer has linked it up to a particular period of his love life (Radkau 2009).

The Weberian familial life order and erotic life order are part of the socially small world (see page 2: 117 above) and are more based on wants than aspirations. For the moment, we may leave out the two micro-sociological spheres, the familial and erotic value spheres, from our list. We shall return to them in Volume 7, where we deal with interpenetrations of the biological and the social. The other life orders – the economic, political, religious, intellectual spheres are macro-concepts, and the values they comprise are aspirations unique to language-using humankind.

Weber's political sphere is larger than what we normally call "politics." In English we refer to this sphere as 'polity' or 'body politic' or 'statecraft.' It includes, for example, executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government and their bureaucracies, as well as political parties and other movements and organizations with a political agenda.

More important, we need to add a *moral realm* to Weber's list. A moral realm's emotively grounded prescriptions cannot be reduced to political or religious expressions. This sphere of morality may be underdeveloped in the post-Athenian and post-Roman Western world, but is, nevertheless, an independent area of life with *Eigengesetzlichkeit.* I do not think Weber would have objections to the inclusion of a moral sphere. In several places in his writings, he appears critical of a modern tendency to push moral statements into the esthetic realm by saying that something "is in bad taste" rather than admitting that it "is morally deplorable."

We propose this revision of Weber. We still envisage six spheres. They are the economy providing riches, the polity providing order, science providing knowledge, religion providing sacredness, morality providing virtue, and art providing beauty. We hope for consensus about these six value spheres. They are societal realms with cardinal values of their own.

A basic reason for our choice of the six is that they emerge from our Bi- and Tri-sections of language, i.e. descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions, each of which can appear in an executive or more emotive version. We dealt with this remarkable set of words in the previous volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*. In the last few pages of the same volume, we found these parts of language to be *a minimum vocabulary* for the study of social reality. These six communicative acts provide a potential for the six societal realms found in our social reality.

T10.1

*Table 10.1. Dominant Types of Communication in Societal Realms Accumulating to Different Cardinal Values.*

| | B<br>Dominant Communications | A<br>Societal Realms | D<br>Cardinal Values |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Executive Descriptions | SCIENCE | Knowledge |
| 2 | Executive Evaluations | ECONOMY | Wealth |
| 3 | Executive Prescriptions | POLITY | Order |
| 4 | Emotive Descriptions | ART | Beauty |
| 5 | Emotive Evaluations | RELIGION | Sacredness |
| 6 | Emotive Prescriptions | MORALITY | Virtue |

The letters and numbers in the margins are those found in The Periodic Table of Societal Realms on pages 223-224 below.

We present this argument also as Table 10.1. Six words of minimum vocabulary produce the realms of Science, Economy, Polity, Art, Religion, and Morality, each in turn produce a cardinal value, i.e. knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue. All these terms have technical definitions, but happily the latter have approximately the same meaning as in ordinary language. The main exception is 'Beauty,' which includes a great deal more than prettiness.

The sphere for which we apply the term 'science' (line 1 in Table 10.1) is full of executive descriptions, for example, facts and generalizations and accounts of methods used in investigations. This does not mean that any and all of the world's descriptive instrumental discourses belong in this sphere. Such discourse is scattered throughout society; it is only where it is the most common and concentrated form of discourse that we enter the scientific realm. Folk knowledge, summarized in proverbs or in a Farmer's Almanac, is also executive descriptive discourse and represents a science of that time and place, often sprinkled with some form of magic. In due course, we shall deal with the special rationality that is represented in and defines "modern science."

When descriptions are emotive – or "expressive" as some prefer to say – rather than executive and abound in communications, we reach the sphere of 'art' (Row 4). Art's tales, pictures, and dance can be loaded with both positive and negative emotions; they can be pretty, as well as scary, beautiful, as well as ugly. But art can never be a dull, flat account without emotive accents. The cardinal value of 'beauty' is nowadays much more than mere harmony; it is also other congruencies with existence.

Economy and business (Row 2) connect with executive evaluations, for example, prices and costs as well as other practical executive evaluations in monetary forms. Executive evaluations may go beyond dollars and cents and may include any form of estimating and exchanging honors, and any forms of barter with brides, emblems, titles, and what have you.

In religion (Row 5), we find an abundance of expressive evaluations. Here are solemn ideas about the fundamental value of man and mankind and the meaning of life. The religious discourse may range from values of more worldly traditions in Confucianism to the transcendent values of Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam.

Politics and administration, i.e. 'polity' (line 3), are connected with executive prescriptions, for example, laws and regulations. Such prescriptions are also found outside government, for ex-

ample, in the by-laws of voluntary associations, corporations, churches.

Morality (Row 6) contains expressive prescriptions, ethical rules of conduct, such as "Honor thy father and mother!" A curse such as "Go to hell!" is also an emotive prescription and could be a part of a moral discourse. However, it is not particularly pristine.

A general tendency in all symbolic environments produces a differentiation into six societal realms about which: economy, polity, science, religion, morality, and art, as stated below in our Proposition "Grand Structuration." This tells the story (or myth, some would probably say) of the birth of a many-splendored society.

10:1

Proposition 10:1. *Grand Structuration*: In the history of living symbolic environments, there is a tendency to develop separate and independent realms of morality, religion, art, polity, economy, and science.

In our opening chapter of this work and in its Figure 1.2 we presented a sketchy history of Europe and summarized it by a tree with roots in ancient Greece, Rome, and Jerusalem (1: 24). We can now move up a level of abstraction and summarize the emergence of a social reality differentiated into societal realms from our Bi- and Tri-sections of language. See the tilted tree in Figure 10.1.

The fact that societal realms emerge from mankind's use of language means that they have no developed counterparts in the animal kingdom, at best only rudimentary attempts. The order in which these realms develop may differ. However, we hold that their *potential* differentiation is found in any symbolic environment not only in European history and in Indo-European languages where we easily observed differentiation into societal realms, but also anywhere else where language is used.

F10.1

*Figure 10.1. The Differentiation of Society Emanating from the Tri- and Bisection of Language.*




## Utopia and Ideology

We know that Grand Structuration is not an iron-clad law of nature as it does not appear with brilliance in all historical societies. It seems infrequent in societies ruled by kings or aristocrats. It appears to be rarer in societies ruled by priests, or plutocrats, or generals, or by supreme judges. Apparently, there are social designs that easily overrule the natural tendency to a grand structuration. The vision of a society in which its different societal realms are independent and in balance – what we call a many-splendored society – may seem like a Garden of Eden before the Fall of Man, or like a Utopia that is out of reach.

Yet, there is a singular force inherent in Grand Structuration. Looking closer, we may find that even in a Hobbesian primordial society where the law of the jungle prevails and life is nasty, brutish and short, a form of ethics embracing caring for one's neighbors seems to appear at a grassroots level. In an economy so dominated by money that almost everything has a price, cer-

tain products can elude the mercenary imperative and become priceless treasures, and certain services become actions the meaning of which is priceless love. The strictest planned economy usually contains an underground economy with free price setting. Attempts to suppress art have consistently failed. Attempts to ban religions have never met with complete success.

However, let no one believe that the Grand Structuration automatically wins. It exists more as a destructible seedling in societal life. It needs effort and care if it is to be cultivated, and it needs a latticework of tradition to brace it. Of course, Grand Structuration could be laid down in the constitution of a nation, but whether it is included in a constitution or not, it must be safeguarded with constant vigilance. My belief is that only with the support of social designs, faithfully implemented, can this important spontaneous tendency in mankind be certain to prevail.

All contemporary great ideologies – liberalism, conservatism, socialism – have touched upon some aspects of the Grand Structuration. At one time, European conservatism wished to recreate the balanced cultural synthesis that it believed had existed during the high Middle Ages when church and state kept one another in balance. At one time, socialism desired to free production and human beings from the frigid wind of capitalist markets that was believed to penetrate into every cranny of societal life. At one point in time, liberalism wanted to free religious and political opinion formation from the authority of the church, and from the arbitrariness of government, as well as to free industry and commerce from letters of royal privilege and overburdening taxes.

Socialist states contain a blatant rejection of a fundament of a many-splendored society, namely, the autonomy of the economy from the body politic.

A liberal order seems to be the nearest one we have to a many-splendored society. However, the advanced liberal order we see in the United States does not seem to vigilantly guard its institutions of government, higher learning, and art from undue

influences by the business community. A liberal belief in market economies fits perfectly the realm of economy, but is not particularly well suited as an ideology of judicial administration, science, art, or religion and morality. In recent years, the United States has also lowered the barrier between politics and religion. Churches are encouraged rather than discouraged to engage in politics and some politicians turn religious views of abortion and stem cell research into legislation.

Conservatism has a more complex relation to the many-splendored society than socialism and liberalism. It has been a strong force in opposing the creation of a many-splendored society. For example, conservatives in most European countries have been staunch supporters of the system of a state church, an arrangement that does not grant the realms of religion and polity the independence of a many-splendored society.

But conservatism also protects many-splendored differentiations of society *once they are established*. Pre-democratic conservatism had a tradition of protecting public officials from the corrupting influences of money on government. Public officials were not to be subjected to temptation, and with conservatives in power, they were, therefore, paid high salaries, relatively higher than those that were paid after the breakthrough of democracy. When the party system and democratic elections appeared on the scene, the conservatives in Europe wished to shield judges and public officials, not only from the pecuniary temptations of the business realm, but also from partisan politics. The conservatives were suspicious of the claims of democracy. As late as the early twentieth century, many of Europe's conservatives believed that royal power would protect government from popular misrule. They were particularly hopeful that a monarchy would protect the nation's defense from dependence on the stingy appropriations accorded to the military by popular vote.

The European conservatives have usually opposed policies to place science and art in the hands of the market. For a long time they trusted that royal academies would set other and, in their

view, "higher," criteria for knowledge and beauty than the "vulgar" criteria of popular taste and the marketplace. And conservatism's views of the forms for religion and morality have usually differed from those of the marketplace.

In the latter half of the twentieth century conservatism's ties to the altar and the crown loosened. The major republics on the European Continent, France, Germany, and Italy paved the way. In these countries, the heroes of the post-war period, de Gaulle, Adenauer, and de Gasperi, were conservatives. They made way not only for a European Union, which they established by means of diplomacy, not popular voting, but they also stood for a revised conservatism. They wholeheartedly admitted democracy in the internal affairs of their countries. Furthermore, their European conservatism was solidly republican: there is no longer a canon that European conservatives support monarchies.

All major ideologies – socialism, liberalism, and conservatism – thus, lift their hats to some parts of the Grand Structuration. These ideologies have, at one time or another, in one way or another, manifested a desire to assure that society's different spheres are more autonomous or, at least, to cast off the yoke of the realm that was dominant at that time. But no ideology has the defense of the entire Grand Structuration as its top priority. And, what is worse, when trying to be comprehensive, the ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism have, in practice, become destructively one-sided, and have often ignored or suppressed certain realms and lifestyles.

## Cardinal Values

Let us now begin to review the long list of elements entering a societal realm. The scope of a 'societal realm' shall be understood as all social phenomena (positions, roles, organizations, networks, media, functions, stratifications et cetera) sharing in one and the same cardinal value. We can learn about these realms and their cardinal values by studying economic, political, and juridical history, the history of ideas and learning, the history of

religion, of customs, and of art. To put it bluntly: you will not acquire this knowledge of social reality by studying only political science and/or economics.

The various societal realms of society — science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality — have different goals for their activities. It is not just a matter of different sets of rules for, for example, politics and business, as Plato already envisaged. Realms, such as science, art, religion, and ethics do not require political ideals or the ideals of the business economy in order to flourish. They have their own ideals.

Most people in modern democracies have poorly understood the fact that different realms of society have their own ideals. The political parties of the left regularly seek to impose the rules of democracy (voting, majority rule, et cetera) not only on the body politic but on business, cultural and religious life, on education and research, all in the mistaken belief that this will lead to a better society. Nor have neoliberal intellectuals, and the political parties they inspire or serve, grasped the need to protect the distinctive character of the different realms. In the Reagan-Thatcher era, the neoliberals mistakenly thought that they had done a good deed when they let loose the rules of the market economy in jurisprudence, in cultural and religious life, in education and the welfare system, in the universities and research. Both left and right show an amazing lack of insight into the workings of a total society. The rising tide of jihads (holy warriors) in Europe represents an ultimate stupidity and ignorance of this kind in Muslim attempts to introduce medieval religious laws, *sharia*, into all realms of a modern society.

In the societal realms important products, which we call their 'cardinal values,' are created and accumulated. They have at least a modicum of pristine symbolizations. These values originate from the six basic usages of language that we have delineated as Tri- and Bisections of Language Usages, and we have pointed to their separate discourses. They are knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue.

A general theory of cardinal values reads:

Proposition 10:2. *Six Cardinal Values*: In a living symbolic environment six cardinal values develop out of the six constituent forms of communication. (a) The executive pristine descriptions cumulate into the cardinal value of *knowledge*. (b) The executive pristine evaluations cumulate into the cardinal value of *wealth*. (c) The executive pristine prescriptions cumulate into the cardinal value of *order*. (d) The emotive pristine descriptions cumulate into the cardinal value of *beauty* (in a broad new sense, not in the sense of pretty). (e) The emotive pristine evaluations cumulate into the cardinal value of *sacredness*. (f) The emotive pristine prescriptions cumulate into the cardinal value of *virtue.*

Students of society long believed that riches consisted of things, (or real estate, cattle, servants, or gold), but nowadays one accepts that wealth is the *evaluation* that society puts on such goods and services. The idea that knowledge, beauty, and the sacred are yields of society was also hard to absorb for many early students of society. Émile Durkheim's work *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912) paved the way for a new view, which grounded both knowledge and sacredness in structuration by society and its collective representations. Knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness and virtue have emerged in social processes of interaction, such as conversations and exchanges that have resulted in a measure of general consensus. We have reason to believe that they are created in accordance with the rules of compelling vocabularies and that they are confirmed by specialized justifications that will be our topic in Volume 3 subtitled *Fuelled by Symbols*.

Mankind's cardinal values are built on the achievements of predecessors. The accumulation of cardinal values — knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue — began in earnest with mankind's use of language. Each generation stands on the shoulders of an earlier one and each generation has the opportunity to reach the same amount of accumulated cardinal values as the previous one, and also the opportunity to drop and/or add elements to the accumulation. Each generation

can, thus, contribute to the cardinal values, but they never need to contribute from scratch. Each generation can also discard aspects of the accumulated cardinal values: knowledge becomes forgotten, riches are misappropriated, order turned into chaos, beauty destroyed, sacredness desecrated, virtues corrupted. Sometimes this may be a "creative destruction" to make room for advancements in the cardinal values, but most losses of cardinal values seem far from creative, at least from the perspective of the individuals involved.

In the economy, double entry bookkeeping sums up to riches: the total of assets according to the balance sheet, and the total of income during a period according to the operating statement. The notion "cumulate" in the proposition on Six Cardinal Values is not normally an arithmetic addition as in the modern economy. The notion refers to a summation based on the rationality of the realm in question. These rationalities differ.

In science, for example, the rationality of the scientific method points to knowledge summarized as the most informative propositions in accordance with the evidence of the senses (not our inspirations, fantasies or prejudices), i.e. the laws of nature. "More informative" implies here that the notion encompasses more of what has earlier been discovered.

In a body politic with democratic rationality, order is revealed in the sums of legislation and treaties on which there is consensus among the governed. The majority bodies of governmental regulations tend to grow in number, rather than being reduced in number. In 2005 there were some 80,000 pages of European Union statutes on the books, the so called *acquis communautaire.*

## On Reward Systems

F10.2

The visible items of rewards may be fickle and subject to changing fashions, but they remain positively correlated to cardinal values. Consequently, men and women of competence, power, riches, taste, sacredness and rectitude are more likely

than others to receive favorable evaluations in various visible forms. Perhaps it is even likely that people are more apt to fall in love with the higher ranks on these ladders than with others. So, mankind copes relentlessly to uphold and/or enhance *all* of the cardinal values, not only with the pursuits of economic gain and political power that dominate contemporary public discussions.

*Figure 10.2. Cardinal Values and Visible Social Rewards.*




The strength of the correlation between possession of a cardinal value and its visible proxy of social rewards is a measure of 'the effectiveness of the reward system' of the realm. The present reward system of science is very effective; it is not likely that a published piece of research in a scientific journal that is broadly informative and contains new knowledge will pass unnoticed. The present reward system of art is less effective; a new vision or version of beauty may well be bypassed, perhaps to be rediscovered decades later. The Western reward system of morality seems very arbitrary and underdeveloped. Why was it self-evident that Mother Theresa was rewarded by both secular parties and by the Pope for charity among the sick and poor, but Bill Gates' vastly larger charity to fight curable diseases in Africa was often treated with suspicion on behalf of the media and the public? His enormous accumulation of richness by developing and selling computer programs was actually condemned as a sin by the Vatican. The fact that this condemnation was based on good theological reasons points to the necessity of the separation of religion from morality that is a hallmark of a many-splendored society. (In 2008 the Vatican revised its general stand on the sinfullness of profits.)

Most reward systems tend to enhance rewards to the already rewarded, another fact which lowers the correlation between social rewards and the possession of cardinal values. Those who already are known to be in rich possession of a cardinal value are given more attention and publicity than the others, even when they have made no more new achievements than have others. This is known as the Matthew effect (Merton and Zuckerman 1968). "For unto every one that hath shall be given" (Matthew 25:29). The rich get richer in a growing economy. This does not mean, as Marxists think, that the poor necessarily get poorer in absolute terms. On balance, the poor also get richer in a market economy, but not necessarily at the same rate as the rich get richer.

Many forms of positive and negative evaluation fly around in a symbolic environment. I want to stress that it is the control over a cardinal value, and nothing else that attributes an occupation with that significant, lasting, and genuine prestige. Two examples:

In parliamentary democracies, legislators may rightly feel honored because they are elected by voters. But a typical legislature on the European continent is elected by proportional voting. The parties receive the number of seats in Parliament mirrored by their share of the electorate. Parliamentarians have little genuine power to shape the social order beyond electing a prime minister and approving of his ministers. The minority members of parliament do not even have these powers. After this initial task is accomplished, the majority members of such a parliament mostly rubberstamp decisions made by the executive branch. Their own proposals for new legislation only rarely come up for full discussion, and most of them are politely ignored. So the control of the social order, and thus the level of prestige of an MP, is not as great as the democratic rhetoric assumes. American congressmen or senators, by contrast, work in a presidential system and have been elected by their constituencies under the rule that "the winner takes all." They are better empowered to initiate legislation with a chance to pass it in real life. Conse-

quently, they have much more prestige than their European colleagues.

A teacher may command certain respect because she or he has learned how to teach children, and has a license to do so. But unless she or he also has a cardinal value in the form of superior academic *knowledge* of subjects, prestige in the larger community will remain modest. No teachers' union can change this as long as too many teachers have no more knowledge than the readers of metropolitan newspapers.

To sum up: The social reward system of a realm receives its motivational significance from the associated level of its cardinal value and from the strength of the correlation of the latter with visible rewards.

10:3

Proposition 10:3. *Realm Rewards:* Social rewards in the form of positive evaluations and distinctions are given to persons and groups (a) to the extent they are holders of cardinal values (knowledge, power, wealth, taste, sacredness and virtue), and (b) to the extent the reward system of the realm involved is efficient (i.e. has high correlations between cardinal values and their visible proxies).

Changes in cardinal values carry with them changes in evaluations. This is a message in clause (a) of the proposition of Realm Rewards. This fact awards the clause a special position in a theory of society. All actions that are consequences of changes in evaluations can also be produced as consequences of changes in cardinal values. A change in the distribution of cardinal values in a society carries with it other changes, sometimes of revolutionary magnitude.

Many useful and interesting pieces of knowledge in social science flow from deductions from the Proposition on Realm Rewards.

The Realm Rewards provide counterparts on the grand level of societal realms to the motivations in small everyday encounters. We will soon see more specifically how compelling vocabularies have changing evaluations as a trick that is a welcome

treat. For example, the proposition on Socially Rewarded Convergence and Socially Induced Compliance in our third Volume, tells us that we converge to the views of others and the norms pronounced by others to the extent that we receive favorable evaluations from them. Now we can also say that humans converge and comply, to the extent they receive cardinal values. We converge and comply in return for knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and/or virtue. Everyone knows that you can obtain convergence and compliance by paying money. But you can also obtain it through use of the other cardinal values.

A conclusion, such as the one above, is achieved by operations of logic, not by empirical research in the field of human activities. Since our Propositions are stochastic (see page 1: 47-48), deductions from them become diluted with every step in the argument, however logical it is (Costner and Leik 1964). According to clause (b) of Realm Rewards, evaluative deductions become more accurate in their forecasts to the extent that the realm reward system is efficient. Of course, we trust a derived conclusion to a greater degree when it is also matched with confirming observations from the field. That is how theories in science normally become accepted, and this criterion is especially important in social science as its propositions are probabilities, not certainties.

Let us spell out three additional intellectually rewarding deductions.

## Monopolizing Tendencies

We noted above (Proposition 10:3) that the holders of cardinal values receive commensurate evaluations and distinctions. Roughly speaking, the more you know, show taste, have money, are pious, have power, and show virtues, the more appreciated you are. We have also learned that people are inclined to act to preserve the customary evaluations they receive, be they high or low, and they are inclined to act so that they avoid receiving more unfavorable evaluations than these evaluations. This was

our Proposition 5:5 on Evaluative Motives reproduced on page 2: 182. The joint consequence of these two ideas is that those who have a great degree of any cardinal value want to keep it that way, i.e. to monopolize the cardinal value.

10:4

Proposition 10:4. *Monopolization of Cardinal Values:* In any society, people who possess or control a large amount of a cardinal value (knowledge, wealth, power, beauty, sacredness, virtue) tend to act to preserve this situation.

This is a recurrent process of monopolizing realm rewards. It can only be counteracted by strong social designs, such as antitrust legislation for the economy.

## Mobilizing Societies

What happens when there is no increment in prosperity, order, knowledge, sacredness, beauty or virtue from generation to generation? Or, when the opposite occurs so that children, become more prosperous than their parents, know more than their parents, and have a more complex order to cope with than their parents?

The cardinal values are actions, albeit condensed actions. If so, an interesting deduction follows from the way we have defined mobilization:

10:5

*Proposition 10:5. Mobilizing by Changes in Cardinal Values:* When the ratio of cardinal values per person (knowledge per capita, income per capita, et cetera) is increasing in a society, its mobilization reaches above par; and when the ratio of cardinal values per person is decreasing, the society obtains mobilization below par.

The cardinal values represent the economic, political and cultural heritage, and we expect mobilization above par when it is increasing, and mobilization below par when it is declining, assuming the population is stable. If the population drops (through famine, war, disaster, epidemics, birth control, et cetera) and the cardinal values remain at the same level, we see mobilization above par; if the population increases but the level

of the cardinal values remains the same, we obtain mobilization below par.

In concrete cases, we have to deal with simultaneous charges in institutional values and population. When great empires are built, we observe an increase in population and an even faster increase in institutional values. If order, prosperity, knowledge, sacredness, beauty, and virtue grow at a faster pace than the population, then the number of actions per capita is increasing, and the level of mobilization is rather constantly squeezed above par. The Roman Empire, like the British, was built by highly mobilized men who drove themselves hard. Modern China curbed population growth and obtained untold levels of mobilization for work of all kinds.

If order, prosperity, knowledge, et cetera – in short, sum totals of actions – grow slower than the population, the reverse holds and mobilization slips below par. Many underdeveloped areas of the world face this situation today. In spite of the concerted efforts to the contrary, their populations expand at a faster rate than their order, prosperity and knowledge. The result is a low level of mobilization which travelers watching the idle crowds by the roadsides describe as "a spirit of mass apathy."

## Achieving Societies

It has been observed that the stories told or read to children vary greatly in achievement themes. If these stories stress achievement beyond age grading — such as *The Little Engine that Could* — a general achievement ambition is implanted into children that lasts through adult life and sets the tone of the entire society (McClelland 1961).

However, quite independent of child-rearing practices, there are processes in society that affect the mobilization of populations. People resist being degraded, a fact we recalled in the Proposition of Evaluative Motives in the previous volume, The Many-Splendored Society: Surrounded by Symbols (2009). This is a fact also as regards degradation from relative positions.

When relative changes occur, you may have to achieve more, simply to stay in the same place. You have to seek enhanced evaluations actively, keep up with the Joneses, as the saying goes.

Growth in a society in terms of riches or knowledge generates its own motivation among the population to seek more money and to secure more education. Otherwise, people lose their relative position on the economic or educational scales of evaluation. And the loss of relative position on any scale of evaluation generates efforts to compensate. When total societies stagnate in economic and academic growth the motivation among individuals to get rich and to study more also stagnates. Likewise, modest inflation in the units in any scale of evaluation (e.g. in currency) generates greater motivation than zero inflation or deflation. We speak here of a modest inflation, not of a wild-raging anomie.

Proposition 5:5 recalled. *Evaluative Motives:* Humans in a shared symbolic environment are (a) inclined to act to preserve the customary evaluations they receive in this environment, be these high or low, and (b) they are inclined to act so that they avoid receiving more unfavorable evaluations than these. (Volume 1, p 168)

Our thesis concerning the conditions for individual achievement motivation has a counterpart in total societies. When orderliness, riches, knowledge, beauty, sacredness, and virtue bloom in a society, then and only then, excesses become desirable, excesses of order, riches, knowledge, beauty, sacredness, and virtue. The general thesis is that growth and/or modest inflation in cardinal values in due course creates achieving populations:

10:6

Proposition 10:6. *Achieving When Cardinal Values Change:* The more growth and/or non-anomic inflation there is in cardinal values in a society, the stronger the achievement motives in the population of that society.

The theoretical deductions creating Propositions 10:5 and 10:6, however tenuous, are of relevance to developing countries that

want to mobilize and achieve. They are also a memento to stagnating areas.

At the time of this writing, economic growth rates and inflation rates in western parts of Europe are lower than those in the United States. China and India have higher rates of economic growth (and inflation) than the United States. What has begun to appear is that the actual strivings of the people follow suit with economic and knowledge expansion in these areas of the world, thus consolidating the lack of growth in all realms of Western Europe, and enhancing it in various realms in China and India. At any rate, the combination – or, the curse some say – of no growth and deflation of cardinal values results in a general lowering of motivation to achieve in the total society. This is an intellectually challenging deduction, awaiting further confirmation from the study of history.

## Expanding and Consolidating Societal Realms

The societal realms of science, art, economy, religion, polity and morality do not stay at the same size. Within a society some expand and other contract. In my lifetime in Sweden, the body politic has expanded enormously and religion has contracted to near insignificance. On the world scene of societies, the economy has expanded enormously, a feature of the current globalization. In the time of grandparents and great grandparents, it was the polity, mostly in the form of the British Empire, that expanded.

A guiding regularity we propose for the understanding of such processes focuses on the balance between organizations and networks in societal realms:

10:7

Proposition 10:7. *The Netorg System of Realm Expansion:* A cardinal value grows and its societal realm extends its reach (a) when networks dominate over organizations in the realm and, primarily, when networking organizations dominate, and (b) it consolidates and defends its reach when organizations dominate over its networks.

The symbiosis of organization and network that we have called networking organizations is a most efficient agent of expansion; provided that they allow the demands of the network to dominate over the demands of organization. Clause (b) in The Netorg System of Realm Expansion is a key to particularly dramatic history.

A variety of evidence of a netorg system of realm expansion will be presented in our separate chapters on societal realms. We will see it in operation in the societal realm of science when Humbolt-type universities were introduced, first in Germany and then in the entire rich world. We see it in the body politic, where federalized multi-party states are more successful than dictatorships and other centralized orders. We saw it in the realm of religion when decentralized Muslims conquer Christians organized centrally from Rome and Constantinople. We see it in the economy when capitalism beats mercantilism, and when the motor of industrialization became environments of "development blocks" like Silicon Valley. Anyone layman can actually sense the force of netorgs when the multinational corporations on the world market set many tunes and call many shots.

## Societal Realms and their Functions

### Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers

There are spurts and suppressions of human knowledge, booms and busts in riches, changing balances between order and chaos, shifting styles of art, religion and ethics. To cope with the dynamic flow of knowledge, wealth, orderliness, beauty, sacredness, and virtue through society we shall separate flows inside realms from flows between realms. The rest of this chapter is devoted to an elaboration of these two flows. A major conclusion is this proposition:

10:8

Proposition 10:8. *Grand Functions of Societal Realms:* Over time, any societal realm of society tends to receive (a) four *internal*

positions: those that create, preserve, distribute, and receive its cardinal value. These are manned by 'Makers,' 'Keepers,' 'Brokers,' and 'Takers,' respectively. Furthermore, any societal realm tends to receive (b) two *external* positions: those that export its cardinal value to other realms and those that import alien cardinal values from other realms. These are manned by 'Providers' and 'Procurers,' respectively.

Let us first elaborate the internal functions in realms, i.e. clause (a) of the Proposition.

Inside any realm of society the flow of cardinal values is handled by persons with four functions: to create, preserve, distribute, and receive the values.

Knowledge is generated by scholars and scientists. In learned publications and data bases it is conserved by librarians, and as much as possible, by all “educated” people (or persons with "culture générale" or “Bildung”, as we say in Europe). Knowledge is spread into the adult world by consultants, mediated by teachers and textbook writers, and is received by apprentices, pupils, students and adult learners.

Order is spawned by our legislators, is maintained by the judges and functionaries of the judiciary, and is mediated to the people by administrators (bureaucrats). We thus have the celebrated division of powers proposed by Montesquieu (1748, Book 11) between the legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of government. Without this division, an accused, nay any citizen is victim to the power of a single person or instance, and a rule of law cannot be guaranteed.

Wealth is created by entrepreneurs, conserved in banks and insurance companies are mediated by tradesmen to, reach consumers for use. We, thus, have the conventional division of business between industry, finance, and commerce. One of the early secrets of Western riches is the emergence of banking as separate from industry and trade; the latter can now require coins or bank notes on delivery.

T10.2

*Table 10.2. The Internal Functions of Realms and their Manning.*

| | D | N | O | P | Q |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cardinal values | Creating Makers | Preserving Keepers | Conveying Brokers | Receiving Takers |
| 1 | KNOWLEDGE | Scholars Inventors Researchers | Librarians Experts Professionals | Teachers Technocrats Consultants | Students Clients |
| 2 | WEALTH | Entre-preneurs | Currency guardians Bankers Insurers | Salesmen Marketers Advertisers | Consumers Customers |
| 3 | ORDER | Legislators Politicians Civic leaders | Judges Prosecutors Lawyers Police | Bureaucrats Officials Civic workers | Citizens Subjects |
| 4 | BEAUTY | Creative art-ists poets novelists dramatists | Critics | Performers Entertainers Actors Exhibitors | Fans of cul-ture and enter-tainments |
| 5 | SACRED-NESS | Prophets | Learned clerics Monks Nuns | Preachers Missionaries Miracle workers | Seekers |
| 6 | VIRTUE | Sources of high norms, charities etc. | Ethicists | Moralists Carers of children, the sick, elders, etc. | Decent people Aspirants to ethical living |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224 below.

Beauty is created by artists, conserved by, among others, museum curators and theatre directors, and beauty is interpreted by critics and by other artists, and is ultimately received by its public.

The sacredness in writings or teachings of the religions were formulated by prophets, conserved by priesthoods, mediated by

proselytizers and miracle workers, and received by believers. Here we have the actors and roles in Weber's (1920) classical analysis of religious development and struggles. The virtues were promoted in similar ways, but here the diversification into separate positions for those who create, preserve, distribute, and receive moral values is less pronounced.

The same person may perform all these functions and occupy all these positions. But we normally observe a certain structuration of these functions, a division of labor. Table 10.2 contains illustrations from modern societies.

This table gives a glimpse of the many-faceted nature of these societies. In this manner, we fill in the internal division of labor in the realms of society. When this is done we no longer talk about abstract functions of creating, conserving, mediating, and receiving cardinal values but about actual people doing the jobs of a many-splendored society. These people are the 'Makers,' 'Keepers,' 'Brokers,' and 'Takers.'

It is admittedly difficult to find concrete and general examples in dealing with virtue in Row 6 of Table 10.2, a fact indicating that modern Western societies are inadequately differentiated in the sphere of morality. This realm lacks an adequate terminology for the functions of creating and receiving virtue: it is as though Western societies have not yet discovered the elemental "particles" in this realm. Or, have we simply forgotten how one speaks of good and evil after we have ceased believing in angels and devils?

The flows of a cardinal value within particular realms have attracted the attention of brilliant social scientists and historians. It is particularly worthwhile to consider Montesquieu's contribution. Without the division of legislative, judiciary, and executive functions into separate institutions, the same person or group would enact a law, accuse you of violating the law, investigate if the accusation is true, and then mete out your punishment. The separation of these functions into different areas of responsibility of individuals is essential for the safety and freedom of citizens. This is a major contribution to civilized living, formulated

as an ideal in Europe and solidly enacted in the pioneering Constitution of the United States.

## Embedding

A close look at concrete parts of a realm – a corporation in the economy, a government agency in the polity, a research institute in science, a congregation in the religious sphere – often reveal that they contain minor elements from other spheres of life, a phenomenon we might call 'realm embedding'. They cannot function well without them. Much in modern society cannot work really well without some of the money from the economy, some regulations from the polity, certain commandments of morality, and some of the knowledge from science. To achieve an optimum, we may also need artistic enhancements in our living environment and of our designs. These may also add to any pursuit if they are a part of the meaningfulness that is offered by religion.

Consequently, each societal realm potentially contains sideshows of all the other realms. The organizations, networks and media in any of the realms of morality, religion, art, polity, economy, and science tend to embed smaller elements from the other realms.

10:9

Proposition 10:9. *Normal Side-show Intrusions:* Each societal realm tends to embed a few elements from the other societal realms.

In the main, business creates and manages wealth, not regulatory systems. Yet business needs political regulations that underpin its contracts of buying and selling, et cetera. Nowadays, business also welcomes an infusion of academic knowledge, which it buys just like any other service or product. Business locales, advertising and marketing presentations require an artistic hand. But this obviously does not mean that politics, academic knowledge, or art can be reduced to business. The student

of society must learn to separate what is the main show and what are side-shows.

In a modern society, a most appreciated embedded alien element in polity, science, art, and religion is money and riches from the economy. In the main, government institutions create and maintain order, not wealth. However, political activity requires money, and always needs to tax enterprises that generate money. Politicians also need information, and they commission inquiries in which experts and scientists participate. Their buildings and offices need architects and designers with a sense of esthetics. Political life also benefits in legitimacy when it receives the blessings of religious leaders. But all this obviously does not mean that business, science, art, and religion can be reduced to politics.

## Providers and Procurers

'Realm procurement' and 'realm provision' is what we call any standardized processes of embedding alien cardinal values into a realm. 'Procurers' import alien cardinal values for their life area, and 'providers' export them. This process can be an elaborate structure, such as The National Endowment for the Arts in Washington DC, or a simple affair such as taking a collection of money at a church service.

To our list of the intra-realm 'Makers,' 'Keepers,' 'Brokers,' and 'Takers' we can now add the inter-realm 'Procurers,' and 'Providers.' The former collects cardinal values from alien societal realms and the latter provides their shares of their own cardinal value to other realms. Perhaps there are also other differences between the two. According to The Acts 20:35 in King James Version of the Christian Bible we should "remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive."

T10.3

*Table 10.3. External Functions of Realms and their Manning*

| | D | A | C | R | S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Societal Realm | Lifestyle | Providers | Procurers |
| | | | | of cardinal values, i.e. knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue. (Illustrations.) | |
| 1 | KNOW-LEDGE | Science | Learning Buffs | Consultants | Persons on the outlook to other realms for something beneficial for the own realm e.g. tax receipts, grants, or for commissions, for relevant impelling vocabularies, justifications, for donations of time. |
| 2 | WEALTH | Economy | Money-centered | Investment advisors | |
| 3 | ORDER | Polity | Civic-Minded | Legal advisors | |
| 4 | BEAUTY | Art | Aesthetes | Esthetics advisors | |
| 5 | SACRED-NESS | Religion | Believers | Chaplains | |
| 6 | VIRTUE | Morality | Com-passionate | Ethics counse-lors | |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224 below.

The master Procurers in all times and places are the *tax collectors*. They collect a share of proceeds from other realms to their own realm. We will deal with taxation in other volumes of *The Many-Splendored Society* subtitled *Wealth and Sacredness.* The subtitle signals that the Procurers from the body politic and religion are in a class by themselves in matters of taxation; they tend to use laws rather than contracts to get their stuff.

We cannot, at this time, attribute all Procurers from other realms with proper labels. We simply say that they are persons constantly on the outlook to other realms for something beneficial for the own realm e.g. for alien cardinal values such as tax receipts, grants, or for commissions, for relevant impelling vocabularies, justifications, for donations of time, et cetera.

The master Provider of all times and places is *the teacher.* We will shortly (beginning on page 193) deal with those who educate the young.

The cells under the column heading Makers, Keepers, Brokers, Takers, Procurers, and Providers are prepared for a modern society. When they are given standardized job descriptions we say that they are 'occupations.' When people with occupations have contracts to regularly perform their functions in return for money they have what is called 'employment.' An overwhelming number of events in modern society hang on the nails of employment and the money it brings. The way this society is organized makes "unemployment" a handicap. In other times and places unemployment has been a condition for a full and rich life!

In a portion of Table 10.3 we have included the typical lifestyles found in the societal realms. This gives a hint of the activities involved. Practitioners of lifestyles simply do what they like most to do; this is how lifestyles were defined[13]. But modern lifestyles are often expensive and require income from employment. People with an occupation in one row may thus have a lifestyle in a different row. In both capitalist and planned economies many people work in functions that do not match their lifestyles, i.e. what they most want to do.

Realm procurers of alien cardinal values deserve special attention as they may help anyone occupied in a given realm to a richer and fuller life than the life which the pure home realm can offer. Their counterparts who supply messages loaded with cardinal values from one area of life in society to another are the realm providers. The individuals occupying positions of producers and providers have one leg in at least two different realms and must respect dual criteria in their decisions

A maximum of 60 different procurement and providing roles can link our six different societal realms. They are shown summarily by the arrows in Table 10.4 and they are represented there also by the lifestyles they combine. Competent procurers are essential to in all societies, and particularly in a many-splendored society.

T10.4

*Table 10.4. List of Possible Realm Procurers and Realm Providers. Each Arrow is a Different Role.*

| | Science Learnin Buffs | Art Aes thetes | Economy Business-Minded | Religion Be-lievers | Polity Civic-Minded | Morality Welfare-Minded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Science Learning Buffs | | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ |
| Art Aesthetes | ←↑ | | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ |
| Economy Business-Minded | ←↑ | ←↑ | | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ |
| Religion Believers | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | | ←↑ | ←↑ |
| Polity Civic-Minded | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | | ←↑ |
| Morality Welfare-Minded | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | ←↑ | |

In a totalitarian society, be it based on political or religious or other grounds, the independent procurement roles are few. Its procurers are a few commissaries of the insensitive kind. You can see the result of their activity in Soviet or Nazi art on display in public places, or in the Soviet economy in the form of *combinate* industry, and in Nazi production units integrated with slave-labor camps.

In democracies, public areas and factories are not run so high-handedly. There is, however, a general sense that democratically elected politicians are not normally particularly competent procurers. The results may not be the best when, on their own, they purchase sculptures for parks and acquire equipment for their police, sanitation departments, et cetera. Appointed functionaries, from outside the political class, but with the appropriate

expertise and lifestyle, do a better job. It certainly also has helped that City Councils have routines stipulating the involvement of aesthetic experts in planning their cityscapes.

The same problems are also apparent for realms other than the body politic. A scientific research laboratory does well to have a bookkeeper trained in business accounting. Business entrepreneurs are not normally the best providers of molds for their products. They turn to professional designers, to achieve the desired esthetic and marketing look. Also, they are best off to let copy writers and commercial artists present their products and services in advertisements. Nor are priests necessarily the best interior decorators of rooms for worship.

There is a great room for providers and procurers in an advanced society. Behind each arrow in our diagram you have a different one. Each one deserves a portrait by a novelist or anthropologist.

The normal side-show infusions that results in embedding between realms handled by Providers and procurers are generally beneficial. We have an entirely different story when the intrusions are total so that one societal realm absorbs another or that two realms attempt a full merger. This will be the topic of the last part of this chapter in the section "Mergers and De-Mergers of Societal Realms" beginning on page 2: 240.

## Providers of Cardinal Values to the Young

Parents and primary groups are, of course, essential providers for their children in many more senses than we have here referred to in our technical term "Provider." In a differentiated society their work is supplemented and continued by another category of adult providers who deserve special attention, the *educators*. They provide much of the transfer of the appreciation of cardinal values from one generation to another.

The society in which we live is more dependent on symbols and their transmission between generations than any historic

society. The importance of the providers of cardinal values to the young is overwhelming. The realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality are all language products. They share the need of training children in reading and writing. Certain realms such as science and economy are also dependent on mathematics. Thus, in anything approaching a many-splendored society there is firm backing of the three Rs on education; reading, writing, and arithmetic is mandatory learning for children. In addition, there is a commitment to civilized living, i.e. that children should learn to settle their conflicts by words, not fist fights or weapons. This is an agenda for the young that families and elementary schools may share.

## Forms of Instruction

In the 1980s a group of American humanists and liberals voluntarily took the time to ponder over some practical school issues. Among them were the philosopher Mortimer J. Adler, the former Provost of Columbia University, Jacques Barzun, and the former director of Chicago's schools, Ruth B. Love, who was well aware of the difficulties encountered daily in large city schools (M. J. Adler 1982). They agreed upon dividing teaching into three forms. To these we have added a forth, more recently promoted form:

1. a teacher explains to the children and checks to see if they have understood;

2. a teacher supervises the children's exercises;

3. a teacher asks questions and conducts discussions stimulating the children's creativity and curiosity;

4. a teacher asks the children what they want to learn and then helps them to research and find out what they want to know.

These first three forms – in which the teacher explains to the children and tests them to see if they have understood – presuppose that the teacher is the *leader*. All primary grades in schools use them. They have different goals and methods and concern different subjects. The fourth form of teaching is emerging as the

population of Takers with egalitarian values is growing in influence, and here the teacher is more of a *collaborator* than a leader.

The first form was usual in the schools of the past. The goal was the acquisition of organized knowledge through the teacher's lectures, schoolbooks, tests, and lessons. These "plenary sessions" are useful part of teaching, but is not the only form. They provide the basics in mathematics, languages, literature, and in natural and social sciences.

The second form follows John Dewey's postulate of "learning by doing." The goal is to develop one's ability to learn and one's judgment through exercises. The teacher supervises, either a small group such as a sports coach or a single pupil, as in a driving lesson, and demonstrates what to do. The subjects of their coaching are reading, writing, measuring and assessments, observation, computers – and the art of listening. Exercises and projects usually employ this form of pedagogy. Such working exercises have a different dynamic from plenary lessons.

The third form follows Socrates' art of teaching: freeing insights through questions and discussions. The goal is to understand ideas, values, morals, and art. This pedagogy can be found in day care centers when preschoolers sit in a ring on the floor and listen to a story or comment on it. It is found in the university in seminars, and has been rare in elementary schools but is more often employed when the schoolwork is organized in project form. This works best in premises where one sits around a table, preferably a round table.

The same school subject can be addressed by several teaching forms. The first form conveys knowledge about mathematics, languages, et cetera. The second conveys knowledge about how mathematics, language, et cetera is used. The third conveys an understanding of how one uses the symbols of mathematics and language creatively. My experience from teaching in universities is that students are less inhibited if the lecturer, the thesis supervisor, and the seminar leader are different people.

The forth form is known to supervisors of theses and has, until recently, been unknown in schools. Pupils stipulate what they want to learn, not the teachers or the parents or the composers of the curriculum. In Sweden where I am writing this, I have noted that references to "teachers" have become increasingly rare in the directives and instructions issued by central school authorities. Teachers are named "resource persons", not leaders, in the pupils' project groups. This is a new form of education, differing from the one we had earlier taken for granted.

However, much will be lost if the three classical forms of teaching are discouraged in schools while the new, fourth form of teaching with pupil-governed project groups becomes the norm. In a political democracy it is self-evident that you should vote in general elections for those whom you want to govern the country or municipality. But it is not self-evident that pupils in a school should vote about what they want to learn. Teaching in schools is not automatically helped by rules and ideals belonging to the societal realms of polity, for example, the regulations of parliament, the courts, and the social insurance system. No, no more than the classroom is helped as a teaching form by advertising and the buy-and-sell mentality of business life.

The fourth mode of teaching is a spice of motivation, to be used more sparingly as a complement, not a substitute, for the other three. In fact, a full-blown use of a system in which children decide the content of their curriculum will probably quickly erode civilization as we know it.

## Organic Collaboration

The embedding of alien realms is perhaps best expressed as 'organic collaboration,' a term akin to Durkheim's *solidarité organique* (1893). Our term stands for a process in which relatively autonomous parts of society grow in different directions, but they are nevertheless interdependent, and embed parts of one another to facilitate their core activities.

Organic collaboration does make several popular ideas — such as "money is everything," "all is politics," "religion is the only thing that counts" — into inadequate descriptions of a society. No one who really knows a society would make such remarks. They are not only wrong; they are intolerably pretentious.

The fact that organic collaboration between realms may take place does not change basic facts. A firm on High Street belongs in the economy, a central government agency belongs in the body politic, a research institute belongs in science, a church in religion, or a museum in the realm of art. All are classified as belonging to the realm that dominates their activity. A university belongs to the realm of knowledge even when it is a state university. A budget officer in the capital who treats the university as any another state agency cannot alter the fact that it is an institution of learning and research. In some instances, however, a particular organization may rightly be classified into more than one realm. For example, a university press uses scholarly criteria to select its titles and business criteria to sell them.

The problem of keeping a differentiated society together was addressed by the major twentieth century sociologists, such as Max Weber and Niklas Luhmann in Germany, Émile Durkheim in France, and Talcott Parsons in The United States. The division of labor between the realms does not raise walls between them, nor does it tear them apart. It rather makes them dependent on one another. The economy, for example, will prosper only if the body politic keeps the peace and enforces business contracts, *and* only if science and technology play a part in developing its products and services, *and* only if these products and services are designed and marketed with an aesthetic flair, *and* if they contribute to a meaningful life. What we called 'realm embedding' is, then, a cohesive force, not a divisive one. The destructive elements enter, as we shall soon see beginning on page 240, when full-fledged mergers between realms are attempted.

The fact that every realm always embeds alien elements from other societal realms sets limits to their self-creating and self-

organizing capacity, their "autopoiesis" in the jargon of system theorists. This is why Weber's *Eigengesetzlichkeit der Wertsphären* of societal realms is best translated as "*bounded* autonomy" rather than full autonomy (Swedberg 2005).

F10.3

*Figure 10.3. Organic Collaboration. Embedding a Combination of* Solidarité organique *and* Eigengesetzlichkeit der Wertsphären *that Serves the Growth of Cardinal Values and Societal Cohesion.*




A combination of the theories of the two greatest European sociologists, Durkheim and Weber, is now at hand. *Solidarité organique* and *Eigengesetzlichkeit der Wertsphären* merge into what we may call 'organic collaboration.' This combination is not yet fully formalized by social science. An illustration might help us grasp some of its problem intuitively.

Figure 10.3 shows again the six realms in social reality. The rings mark exchanges between realms, i.e. the exchanges arranged by the Procurers and Provides in respective realm. The rings only denote that contacts exist between the societal realms. The actual pathways of exchanges are much more complex, as shown in the Figure. The rings look like yearly rings on a tree, but their order here do not mark the historical emergence of organic collaboration. As far as I know, we do not have any research in historical anthropology that tells the time when vari-

ous exchanges between societal realms were first established and routinized.

## Stratification

### Traditional Views

Ranking in the animal kingdom has counterparts in mankind. Physical strength and sexual prowess count in both. Males are commonly stronger than females, and older brothers are stronger than younger brothers. Confucius and others have taken this to mean that society is harmonious when wives obey husbands, and sisters obey brothers. We will deal with such patriarchal powers when we deal with the family in Volume 7. Here we shall deal with stratification in social reality where symbols are the building blocks.

The societal realms in society are stratified according to the distribution of their cardinal values. Let us first review the prevailing views of stratification in social science, as they were formulated by Karl Marx and Max Weber. Both define class by one's sway in the markets.

Marx focused on the sway that gives some people the purchasing power to invest in and own technically efficient means of production, a fact with many ramifications for their future wealth and its accompanying political power. Political power, in his view, was a result of class position. Weber agreed that there was a correlation here, but in his discussions of class he gave more emphasis to people's purchasing ability as regards their own consumption, rather than as regards investments in production.

Marx on a grand scale and Weber on a smaller scale assumed that classes are antagonistic. They both described class relations as a struggle. Words such as "exploitation" and "oppression," have been used by social scientists thereafter, sometimes even when class is redefined (as in the present text) in ways that do not necessarily include antagonisms. If the cardinal values in

society – knowledge, wealth, power, et cetera – were fixed entities, their distribution would be a zero-sum game, and serious antagonisms would be at hand. However, they do not need to remain fixed but may grow, leading to milder struggles over the distribution of gains in societies with increasing riches, knowledge, and democratic power; there is then plenty to go around for everybody.

Social scientists nowadays usually measure class by a shortcut that records people's occupations.

Symbol-manipulating jobs normally require intelligence and special preparation in upbringing and schooling. In line with these changes in the labor market, social scientists have amended their definition and measurement of "class" by including, not only occupation, but also formal competence as measured by education, keeping persons with vocational schools separate from those who have professional education.

To be sure, a person's class position is still revealed through his sway in the labor market. Some have properties, such as farms or shops that provide them with their livelihood and a job. However, occupation and education do not always tell the entire story of personal income. Some people have interests from inherited estates, or they have sinecures from government or churches that make them less dependent on the labor market. The propertyless and unconnected can, in the main, offer only their physical labor. Here, then, is an "objective" working class. This occupational category is not necessarily an "organized" class engaged in an antagonistic class struggle in Marx' sense.

Weber separated class from power and status. Varying organizations, networks, et cetera, in the different realms provide contrasting visions of what the social order should look like. 'Power' is the likelihood that someone's particular version of order will prevail. Status to Weber is the honor and esteem in which persons, positions, and lifestyles are held, independent of class or power. He believed that status became particularly important in societies in which the acquisition and division of goods was sta-

ble. That is, when class is stable, status comes into the foreground.

Both Marx and Weber also applied the sway in the market that defines a person's class, not only to individuals but to organizations, networks, and media, and to anyone with the functions to create, preserve, distribute, and receive a cardinal value. In this way, class became a pervasive category in the classical social sciences, relating to a very large part of society. No other concepts in social science have claimed as much explanatory power as have class and class conflicts. This hegemony in explanation is not tenable. Corrections are under way. For example, class as the overwhelming determinant of political opinions and political party preferences is under discussion and revision (Clark and Lipset 2001).

There are other strata and other conflicts than those defined by class. These may be wars between nationalities, religions, civilizations. They can be conflicts between different merchant houses, different bureaucracies, different royal families, between ethnic groups, between invaders and settlers, between persons employed in the public sector and those in the private sector, between men of the cloth and men of science, et cetera. These conflicts can be as decisive to the course of history as class conflict. Therefore, social scientists have on empirical grounds tended to reject Marx' idea that the study of class conflicts would have more scientific merit than the study of all other kinds of conflict.

For us, this is a starting point to continue Weber's decomposition of stratification into further distinct dimensions.

## A New View: Language-based Stratification with Six Ladders

Social reality in our time is stratified in more complex ways than Marx and Weber described. *La Distinction* by Pierre Bourdieu (1979) brought other dimensions into view, such as taste and manners, albeit greatly related to bourgeois and working classes. Modern mass media play havoc with all usual stratifica-

tions by creating temporary publicity around certain distinctions, celebrities and persons without much distinction who are merely "known to be known."

A full multi-dimensional view of stratification sees separate stratifications in different realms, and stratifies according to the possession of their cardinal values. Stratification can, thus, be divided into competence in science, purchasing resources (class) in the economy, power in the body politic, taste in art, piety in religion, and rectitude in the realm of morality (Table 10.5). Each societal realm acquires its unique strata. This approach anchors the discussion of stratification in the language-based realms of society. If Weber had formulated his views on life and value spheres before he fixed his views on stratification, he might have reached the same conclusion.

T10.5

*Table 10.5. Cardinal Values and their Corresponding Stratifications.*

| | A<br>Societal Realms | D<br>Cardinal Values | E<br>Stratification |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCIENCE | Knowledge | Competence |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Riches | Class (purchasing clout) |
| 3 | POLITY | Order | Power |
| 4 | ART | Beauty | Taste |
| 5 | RELIGION | Sacredness | Piety |
| 6 | MORALITY | Virtue | Rectitude |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224 below.

In the feudal society, the main dimension of stratification was political power, mostly inherited. In industrial society, class emerged as a dominant aspect of stratification, and became emblematic of successful living. This aspect stands for clout in the marketplace in the form of capacity to invest in the means of production and the capacity to purchase the products produced. With the Enlightenment, competence in different spheres of knowledge had considerable impact, but usually not as great an impact as political power and economic class.

Taste, piety, moral rectitude, and physical vigor (the latter from a non-language based sector) also influence social rankings, but they have nowhere near the same effect in modern Western societies as class, power, and competence. However, one should not underestimate the importance of virtues, such as consistent politeness, a sense of the dignity of self and others, charity and courage. The visible signs of virtue are good manners and politeness. Genuine assets of these kinds cannot be commanded, or acquired by public relations, or purchased on the market. They emanate from what was called "good breeding." In smaller circles such rectitude can be more important for a person's social standing than her or his class, power, or competence.

The six ladders of stratification cannot be reduced to a single one. When the dinner guests from various elites include a professor at a top university, a business tycoon, a parliamentarian, a prima ballerina, a bishop, an international Red Cross official, the hostess has an impossible job if she tries to place them in rank order at the dining table. To have a good party at this dinner in a many-splendored society, she had better put those people whom she thinks will enjoy each other the most next to one another. She cannot construe a common hierarchy, but she can create exciting interaction in the central zone of her society. For her guests, in this example, represent elites that make up this central zone.

## Elites

Those who possess or control the largest shares of a cardinal value are the 'elite' of its realms. A hundred years ago the Italian social scientists Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto started to use the term elite in this purely descriptive way, and in no way to imply that we deal with people of superior personal makeup, as is usually the case when the word elite appears in ordinary conversations. To Mosca, elite meant those commanding political organizations. To Pareto it stood for those in command of any top positions, political, economic, academic, et cetera.

In the schema developed here there are six cardinal values and, thus, six language-based elites, one in each societal realm. A key theorem concerns the tendency of any elite to hang on to its position.

10:10

Proposition 10:10. *Elite Monopolization:* Elites command a top level of a cardinal value – be it knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, or virtue – and they take measures to defend their situation and to restrict access of others to it.

Proposition 10:10 above is a special case of the monopolizing the realm rewards. The theorem follows from two tendencies in a society that often occupied us in this writing. The first base is the general tendency of people to preserve their accustomed level of evaluation discussed in the previous volume (Proposition 5:5 reproduced here on page 2: 182). The second base of elite monopolization is the tendency to assign favorable evaluation to those who have a greater degree of a cardinal value (Proposition 10:4 on page 2: 180).

## Social Mobility

People enjoy social mobility between strata in four different ways. One way in which this mobility might occur is through a long-range re-evaluation of a position. The status of a printer used to be the highest among the working-class occupations as printing was a literate and intellectual activity. However, with the advent of mechanical type-setting processes making the task of printing resemble the copying of a text on a typewriter, the rank of the occupation declined. Thus, a downward mobility of printers took place.

Population changes also bring mobility. We know, for example, how increases in population tend to increase the proportion of the lower strata. The rapid population growth of certain developing countries swells the lower strata. The history of advanced countries illustrate such periods. The high quality historical population statistics of Sweden enabled the American de-

mographer, Dorothy Swain Thomas, to compile the diagram in Figure 10.4.

F10.4

*Figure 10.4. The Rural Class Structure in Sweden: the Number of Households in Four Strata 1750–1870. The Increase in Population is Channeled to the Lower Classes.*




Chart computed from Emigrationsutredningen. Bilaga IX. Stockholm, 1909, p. 26.

During the period 1750–1870 there was a marked increase in the rural population of Sweden. The chart shows that this increase was absorbed by the three lower rural classes, crofters, cottager, and the unpropertied "statare" (farmhands). The farmers differed from their counterparts on the Continent in that they had no history of bondage to a feudal lord. Farm households remained almost stationary in numbers during 120 years, while the total population doubled. When an increasing number of

persons must be absorbed into an unchanged number of strata, the lower strata take the bulk of the increase. This finding is in line with the monopoly utilization of top strata mentioned in Proposition 10:10. On the Scandinavian Peninsula, the lion's share of the expanding lower strata received some land, and could act as owners of small scale agricultural enterprises. Only the smaller group of farmhands remained without property. In the plantation economy of the Southern States in the US, in the Caribbean, and in parts of Latin America the overwhelming share of the population increase ended up in the bottom category without property. The latter areas have been much less conducive to market economy.

Preview of Proposition 11:2. *Motivations from Cardinal Values:* In lasting and differentiated symbolic environments there is a tendency to develop a preference for more, rather than less, of cardinal values, i.e. of more knowledge, more wealth, more order, more beauty, more sacredness, and more virtue. (From "Justification in Societal Realms by Cardinal Values." in vol 3.)

We have a large number of additional, recent illustrations evidencing that the population increase made possible through agricultural and/or industrial modernizations leaves behind a massive proletariat. You see this concentrated in shanty towns around the big cities of Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. China is a predictable exception. It imposed a limit of one child per family, and has not experienced the same level of population growth, and has not, at least to the same degree, been stuck with a rising urban proletariat.

A third avenue for mobility is found in changes in what has been called "the opportunity structure," that is, the number of positions of a given stratum. The expansion of the number of white-collar positions over recent decades has implied a surge of upward mobility. In the 1950s, S. M. Lipset and I published a review of upward social mobility in Western Europe and North America. The differences between the Continents, in terms of opportunity to enter the middle class, were much smaller, virtu-

ally none, than people at that time had thought. The main reason was that both Continents had a similar expansion of white-collar jobs (Lipset and Zetterberg 1956).

A fourth and most interesting avenue of social mobility is the individual's effort to improve one of his ranks, for example, his occupational or educational status. The length of the leap to improve one's position in the stratification system is generally high in the United States which, thus, remains a land of opportunity. A leap upward makes individuals eligible for other higher positions in other realms of society, for example, they may develop a good taste in matters of art, they can marry well and improve their kinship status, or they may join socially with important people and, thus, increase their social capital.

To restrict all outsiders from entering elites is, in the long run, counterproductive. Vilfredo Pareto's bias – which is loud and clear – is against people of all persuasions who prefer social ossification to social change, ascription to achievement, and softness to toughness. An elite, in Pareto's opinion, survives only if it provides opportunities for the best persons of other origins to join in its privileges and rewards, and if it does not hesitate to defend these privileges and rewards, if necessary, by force. Pareto's irony attacks the elite that become humanitarian, tenderhearted rather than tough-minded. He favors opportunity for all competent members of society to advance into the elite, but in this he is not motivated by feelings of pity for the underprivileged. To express and spread such humanitarian sentiments, he says, merely weakens the elite in the defense of its privileges. Moreover, such humanitarian "bilge" would easily be a platform for rallying the opposition. Pareto assumes that the opposition, if victorious, would let its humanitarian platform take second priority and allow the enjoyment of their new elite status to take first priority. Little or nothing of moral value may, thus, be gained by accepting the humanitarian argument to afford the masses a place in the circles of the elites. Only the best of them should be admitted, and, at peril to the survival of the elite, they

must not be excluded but, actually, encouraged to join. Thus spoke Pareto (1901).

## The Central Zone

Each society has a 'central zone' (Shils 1982, Chap. 4) where the top strata of the realms, the elites, meet and interact. This zone is a common term for the organizations, networks, and media in which the political order is welded, to which the wealth of business gravitates, the intellectual centers where research yields new knowledge, the islands of society where art and culture flourish. The central zone is where you find the Makers and Keepers of the greatest power, wealth, knowledge, culture, spiritual authority, moral rectitude, and where they can meet. The rest of society is more or less peripheral.

Life in its central zone has major consequences for the destiny of a society. From the central zone emanates "soft power," a concept popularized by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in the 1990s. He used it in his keen analyses of US foreign affairs (Nye 2004). The concept, as I see it, is equally suited in domestic affairs. It is based on a general tendency, namely the fact that others admire and aspire to the high levels of cardinal values concentrated in the central zone, and they emulate its example. We will elaborate this in Volume 3, Proposition 11.2, also reproduced above in the margin.

For at least four centuries, Paris has been the obvious central zone of France. Here are the major institutions of all societal realms and here their elite interact. The sons (and of late also daughters) and their *classmates* of most every one of the leading Paris families are represented in different societal realms. There is someone in politics, law, or the military, someone in banking or other economic pursuits, someone in teaching or in academe, someone in art, someone in the clergy or New Age, and someone in welfare work. These families and their social network constitute bits and pieces of the French central zone. This zone is

a magnet for the ambitious of the French countryside. One of them, the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1989), has brought insights into workings of the zone, but much more research is needed on the general structure and functioning of central zones. Needless to say, the trends and happenings in the French central zone in Paris are immensely exciting also for us foreigners.

The central zone has nothing to do with geometry, and does not have to lie in the geographic center of a nation. In the United States the business and financial communities are mostly located in New York, Chicago, and Huston, but the political scene is in Washington. In England, both politics and commerce are centered in the same city, London, while the seat of learning has traditionally been located in Oxford and Cambridge, and Canterbury has been the center for religion. In Spain, the economic motor in the past century has been Barcelona, the political center has been in Madrid, and the religious center has remained in Toledo. The advances of information technology may, in time, lessen the geographic concentration of central zones.

The central zone in a country may be extended by an international layer. The Vatican, thus, is (or has been) a part of the central zone of all Roman Catholic countries. The Washington-New York-Boston axis of carriers of values and knowledge is a mental part of central zone in many parts of the world in a period when the United States is the only superpower.

The actors in a central zone are helped by a modicum of outer-directedness so that they can overcome the impulse to reject those from other realms. A central zone in which the participants are "sensitized to the expectations and preferences of others" (Riesman 1980, 23) is probably more creative and influential than one in which everyone is restricted by the dictates of a gyroscope recording the standards once implanted by their primary groups in a particular realm.

Changes in the elites lead to changes in the central zone and the emergence of competing central zones. There are many ways this may happen, for example:

The elites forming the central zone use their powers to extract cardinal values from the periphery – usually their economic resources and their traditional rights and privileges. This is the economic and political "exploitation" that Karl Marx made fundamental in his analysis of the class struggle. It leads, in his view, to a revolutionary situation.

The elites that form the central zone restrict the access of the best and the brightest in the periphery to join the zone. This, we remember from Vilfredo Pareto, is a sure sign that an elite may eventually crumble.

The elites that form the central zone mismanage or corrupt the economy, the judicial system, or any other essential part of society.

The elites that form the central zone lose a war.

The elites that form the central zone lose their will and self-confidence to maintain their elite status.

The beliefs, norms, and values of the central zone were previously limited to neighboring regions. Greater mobility and developments in audiovisual, as well as print media have spread them much farther. The penetration of ideas in the central zone in the peripheral society has been aided by obligatory education and by the enlargement of the market and its effective commercial messages for mass-produced goods and services, including popular culture. The technologies of mass communication – from the printing press to radio, television, and the Internet – have reduced the gulf between the central zone and the peripheral areas of society.

Historical evidence from Europe's biggest struggle for men's souls, the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-reformation, was summarized in the saying "*cuius regio, eius religio,*" whoever holds power decides which religion shall prevail. The central zones, the courts of the sovereigns at that time, set the tone and dogma for the sermons preached in the churches of sixteenth century Protestant Europe. A central zone does not necessarily emerge around a political center. But wherever it

does emerge, there is a general tendency for a central zone to shape the climate of opinions and values:

10:11

Proposition 10:11. *Central Zone Sets the Tone:* The beliefs, values, and norms in the central zone in a society tend to become the beliefs, values, and norms of the entire society.

It is our hypothesis that the basic priorities in the central zone spread toward the periphery and, in due course, also tend to become the central priorities in the periphery. As a result, more than anywhere else in their study of society, social scientists and historians should record the basic dialectic priorities of the central zone. Do the elites making up the central zone favor tradition or modernity? Are their ideas expressions of fundamentalism or pragmatism? Are they materialists or humanists?

Likewise, opinion researchers ought to record the views of the central zone in a column separate from the national opinions. The nearest we have to this, at present, is when they report the local opinion of "the upper middle class." In the cities in the United States, studies show that this class tends to originate and implement the majority of the initiatives of *local* politics, and other areas of community living such as art, architecture, charities, and moral discourse (Boschken 2002).

"A central zone that sets the tone" is a useful image in the study of power. It includes both an old-fashioned truth that authority is located, not primarily in persons, but in identifiable central social structures. And the focus on the *tone* emanating from these central structures, allows us to study the insidious – Foucault said “secret” – aspect of power. The power over the minds of people is set by symbols from a central zone which seeps into the lives of people in more peripheral positions.

Realm Hegemony

We shall use the term 'realm hegemony' to signal the extent to which one societal realm rules over another. Hegemony specifically means that the cardinal value of one societal realm, for example money in the economy, becomes the ultimate measure in another realm, as well. Margaret Thatcher's Great Britain took big steps to secure such hegemony for the economy, and many

of these steps could not be reversed by her successors. Protests are normal, however, when the market reasoning of costs and benefits takes over an entire society, not only its business world in which it originates and is very useful and functional.

A societal realm trying to achieve hegemony is an 'imperialist realm.' Voltaire's closing phrase in many of his letters was "Écrasez l'infâme" (Wipe out the infamous). It referred to superstitions, particularly religious ones. This was his battle cry for the imperialism of the advancing scientific realm during the European Enlightenment. I wish to make it clear that as a scientist I do not want to see science, or any other realm for that matter, as a domineering one in my society.

A societal realm that has achieved full hegemony over other realms, and specifically over the central zone of a society, can be rightly called a 'totalitarian realm.' The latter sets the tune for an entire society. For example, religion became a totalitarian realm in Iran after Khomeini's revolution in 1979.

## The Concept of 'Society'

Nation state is a novel invention in human history. It has so captured the minds of people that many think that the nation state is the same as *society.* Society is a much older concept. Societies existed long before nation states. A society is not a state with stable and visible borders. Moreover, the people in a society are not necessarily ethnically and, linguistically similar, nor do they have to share a common history since time immemorial.

How shall we then define a society? Michael Mann, a British-American sociologist and historian, has taken his colleagues to task about their confusions of states, nations, and societies. He argues that all the orthodoxies of social science are on the wrong track. Let us cite him in full so that we will be immune to the pretentions of the latter:

> (S)ystems theory, Marxism, structuralism, structural functionalism, normative functionalism, multidimensional theory, dif-

fusionism, and action theory mar their insights by converging of "society" as an unproblematic, unitary totality. - - -

Societies are not unitary. They are not social systems (closed or open); they are not totalities. We can never find a single bounded society in geographical or social space. Because there is no system, no totality, there cannot be "subsystems," "dimensions," or "levels" of such a totality. Because there is no whole, social relations cannot be reduced "ultimately," "in the last instance," to some systemic property of it — like the "mode of material production," or the "cultural" or "normative system," or the "form of military organization." Because there is no bounded totality, it is not helpful to divide social change or conflict into "endogenous" and "exogenous" varieties. Because there is no social system, there is no "evolutionary" process within it. Because humanity is not divided into a series of bounded totalities, "diffusion" of social organization does not occur between them. Because there is no totality, individuals are not constrained in their behavior by "social structure as a whole" and so it is not helpful to make a distinction between "social action" and social structure. (Mann 1986, 1-2)

Michael Mann sees societies as multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial nets of ideological, economic, military, and political relationships, the so called IEMP-model. These spatial arrangements draw their power "not from human desires for *i*deological, *e*conomic, *m*ilitary, or *p*olitical satisfaction but from the particular *organizational means* each possesses to attain human goals, whatever they may be" (*ibid.*).

Using roughly the same approach as Mann, we can define society from our concept of the central zone. A 'society' embraces those societal realms that take their leads from one and the same central zone. It is as simple as that. Everything that is inside a fair reach of one particular central zone is a distinct society. Thus, French society is wherever the central zone in Paris sets the tone. At some periods of history, this tone may be heard in Montreal and influencing life there, making a slice of this metropolis part of French society.

There is no automatic overlap between state and society. Montreal remained a part of French society long after it had ceased to be a part of the French state. Nor do state and society have the same impact on history. *Societies* may globalize peacefully though international exchange and communication. When *states* globalize we are likely to get wars of colonization.

A many-splendored society is one in which the central zone is so constituted that no societal realm rules over any other realm.

## On Rationality in Societal Realms

Max Weber's main key to history is rationalization. Rationalization is a double star towards which development is heading: on the one hand, the multiplicity of human thought is arranged into systems, and on the other the great repertoire of action in human life is arranged in uniform institutions. The first star is guiding a rationalization towards a secularization of religions, a demystification of nature, a breaking down of the enchantment of art, a debunking of magic in the pursuit of knowledge and salvation, and a removal of the sense of drama from power. The second star guides a rationalization that elucidates everyday life, organizes working life, ritualizes spiritual life, calculates the various stages in business life, and bureaucratizes all aspects of governance. (We presented this vision of rationality in Volume 1 on page 1: 82-84.)

In later writings Weber opens the door ajar to the idea of different rationalisms in different areas of society (Schluchter 1985). We will take the latter step in full and assume that different realms have different rationalities. Thus, in our schema we do not presume that the same kind of rationality is found in all realms. It is open to the possibility that the rationalities producing the cardinal values of knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue may differ drastically from one another, and that dissonances exist between them. In Table 10.6 we have spelled out such varieties of rationality.

The issue of their communality is an empirical one and cannot be settled by a fiat.

T10.6

*Table 10.6. Types of Rationality in Different Realms of Social Reality.*

| | A Societal Realms | D Cardinal Values | G Type of Modern Rationality |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCIENCE | Knowledge | Scientific method |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Riches | Market economy |
| 3 | POLITY | Order | Democracy |
| 4 | ART | Beauty | Aesthetics |
| 5 | RELIGION | Sacredness | Theology |
| 6 | MORALITY | Virtue | Ethics |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224 below.

Cardinal values are embedded in the language-based realms, i.e., in science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. Each realm develops ways to enhance its cardinal value. These may be more or less rational, and the criteria for rationality may differ over time and between realms. Science seeks and produces knowledge and we confirm knowledge by means of the rational scientific method. The economy seeks and produces riches, in our days mostly via the market economy, a rational process. The polity seeks and produces order, in our days by the rules of democracy and diplomacy. Art seeks and produces what, in the old days, was called beauty, with an esthetics of harmony and proportions and nowadays with a freer esthetics which is also congruent with biological spontaneities. Religion seeks and produces sacredness, at least sometimes by redemption or other rituals. Morality seeks and produces virtue, perhaps by some logic with roots in mankind's interconnectedness. Even within one and the same realm we may sometimes find supplementary or competing rationalities. For example, we will find two competing rationalities, 'analysis', and 'system,' in the contemporary realm of science." We will deal with them in Volume 4 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Knowledge and Beauty*.

A sum of human wisdom, as I read history and social science, is that there is no master rationality in human society. There are

a number of islands of rationality. But as soon as you elevate any one of them to be Rationality with a capital R you invite trouble. For, as Michel Oakeshott wrote: "the conjunction of ruling and dreaming generates tyranny" (Oakeshott 1962, 194). The rational dream may be religious like that of Muhammad or Cromwell, or it may be Enlightenment as in the French Revolution, racial biology like Hitler's, or Marxian social science as interpreted by Lenin. All these dreams ended in tyranny and terror.

Oakeshott also puts minor and local attempts at rationality, such as Sir William Beveridge's *Report to the Parliament on Social Insurance and Allied Services* (1942) in the category of dangerous rationality. The report pledged to defeat "the five giants of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness," and it became a blueprint of British welfare policies.

I would not classify such local efforts as big and dangerous rationality. But when they extend to a dreamboat called "European welfare model," mistaken as unitary, and to be exported to the world at all costs, then, the big R of a utopia is there. Rationality is welcome, nay most welcome, if piecemeal and limited in time and place. And, most important, to obtain a many-splendored society, the rationality of one realm must not impose its criteria on another realm.

## On Freedom in Societal Realms

Language and similar systems of symbols are the locus of human liberty. There is a great deal of routine and ritual in our speech. But many of the sentences we utter have never been uttered before by us. And some have never been uttered before by anyone. Language is not just a storehouse of responses to be pulled out into the open by some stimulus, as the psychologists and opinion researchers trapped in behaviorism believe. Use of language is generally a creative activity.

Freedom for the language brain is different from freedom for the pre-language brain. The classical conception of freedom in-

cluded also the latter. In the introduction to *On Liberty* (1869) John Stuart Mill stated: "Over himself, over *his own body and mind*, the individual is sovereign" (italics supplied). Freedom thus came to mean that you can do what you like, including violating social norms with which you disagree, and engaging in uncivilized behavior. For the moment, I will avoid such complications and only deal with the freedom of the language brain, of one's mind. There is no absolute freedom to pursue any bodily spontaneities such as defecation, urination, fornication, and molestation.

T10.7

*Table 10.7. Types of Freedom in Different Realms of Social Reality.*

| | A<br>Societal<br>Realms | D<br>Cardinal<br>Values | H<br>Types of<br>Freedom |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCIENCE | Knowledge | Academic freedom |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Riches | Free trade |
| 3 | POLITY | Order | Civic liberties |
| 4 | ART | Beauty | Artistic license |
| 5 | RELIGION | Sacredness | Religious freedom |
| 6 | MORALITY | Virtue | Freedom of conscience |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224 below.

Freedom of speech is the basic freedom, the source of human creativity in all of its forms. Different realms and discourses develop their specific freedoms (Table 10.7). The search for an efficient description of the universe and of humanity requires academic freedom. Economic exchanges, i.e. the setting of prices by sellers and the offers to purchase by customers require freedom of trade. Political discourse requires civic freedom. Aesthetic discourse requires artistic license, and gives opportunities to present otherwise restricted bodily spontaneities. The practice of a faith requires religious freedom. Moral discourse is empty without the freedom to follow one's conscience.

Freedom is implemented in social reality, not as an abstract philosophical proclamation; it must be anchored in the routines of the respective realms.

The consolidation of freedom in the various societal realms is a most important achievement. I wish to stress that a philosophical ideal of individual freedom is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of this achievement. Freedom must have its frameworks and checks and become concrete in the form of enforceable civil liberties, free trade, academic freedom, religious tolerance, freedom of conscience, and artistic freedom. The achievement of such realm-related freedom is the silver lining among the dark clouds of European history.

## On Spontaneous Orders in Societal Realms

The Societal Realms have different types of networks. In the realm of science we have learned societies on a big scale and seminars on a small scale. In the economy, networks form the markets for raw material, goods, services, money, patents, et cetera. In the realm of polity, networks on the top level may be juntas or nomenclatures; in the middle level we find political parties, on lower democratic levels there are grids of concerned citizens. In the realm of arts we find coteries for dance, music, theater, visual arts, literature, et cetera. In the realm of religions, brothers and sisters in the faith mill in worship. In the realm of morality there are, for example, networks of charities that donate time and money.

Spontaneous formations grow in networks. Free markets are formations with spontaneous elements in economic networks. For example, they share no common leadership that decides the price and volume of exchanges of goods and services. But the participants in the market – buyers and sellers – have issues on which to focus: the refrigerator to purchase, the transport to provide, the credit required, and so forth. Voters may exchange political views while meeting for coffee; the issues may be a candidate's competence or a clause in the party platform. The resulting public opinion is an informal spontaneous order. In the literature on democracy, *agora*, the marketplace of ideas and util-

ities, has become a common metaphor for the phenomenon. This proposition generalizes and exemplifies:

10:12

> Proposition 10:12. *Spontaneous Orders:* Networks develop spontaneous orders: common sense in science, public opinions in the body politic, payable prices offered in the economy, graffiti and jazz in art, unprompted prayers in religion, and impulsive civilities in morality.

The characteristic of a 'spontaneous order' is that it does require a public space for its expression, but does not require any protocol of design. This is similar to bidding at an auction without a predetermined price, music, such as jazz, played without a score, paintings, such as graffiti, that have no norms, prayer by worshippers without a prayer book. When networks change their composition or when they meet changing conditions, the spontaneous orders are also likely to change.

As a concrete example of a spontaneous order, consider the graffiti on the west side of the Berlin Wall that divided Germany during the latter part of the Cold War. (The eastern side of the wall was considered state property and any damage to it was penalized.) Here were miles and miles of colorful drawings, the majority of which cannot be called immature, childish, or unskilled. The main message may be from the powerless: "We have been here," "We are many," "We don't respect you!", "See us!" Not all messages were directed at the Communists. Some were anti-American, a reminder that the United States was a warrior in the Cold War.

Notions of spontaneous orders are old. The Roman Empire did not like them. When Western Rome had collapsed, the theory of spontaneous orders developed at the University of Salamanca in Spain. The term and the phenomenon it stands for have in modern times been an important focus in the economics of Friedrich Hayek and his followers.

T10.8

*Table 10.8. Networks and Spontaneous Orders in Different Societal Realms.*

| | A Societal Realms | D Cardinal Values | K Networks | I Spontaneous Orders |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCIENCE | Knowledge | Learned societies | Self-correction (e.g. peer reviews) |
| 2 | ECONOMY | Riches | Markets | Market prices |
| 3 | POLITY | Order | Electorates Civic alignments | Public opinion |
| 4 | ART | Beauty | Bohemia Art coteries | Art improvisations (e.g. jazz, graffiti) |
| 5 | RELIGION | Sacredness | Sects | Non-ritual prayers |
| 6 | MORALITY | Virtue | Good Neighbors | Unplanned civilities |

The letters and numbers in the margins are from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 223-224 below.

The discovery of spontaneous orders in networks has revolutionized social planning. The traditional form of planning required everyone to adhere to a centrally designed vision. A new form creates conditions for decentralized networks that cultivate spontaneous orders. In practice, we need both forms of planning. I favor a central vision of a many-splendored society that is well grounded in constitutions, and a fully free experimentation within this framework.

## A Periodic Table of Societal Realms

Let us push the central aspects we have learned about social realms into a single spread in this book. Let us piece together into a large one, the many small tables about generalized aspects of social reality that we have presented. A table of this kind is

the nearest we can come in social science to the Periodic System of chemistry.

Similarities in columns and rows in our small tables on these topics indicate that a more extensive digest of language-based social categories is close at hand. The table has 108 cells, created by six columns that contain the Tri- and Bisections to which 18 rows have been added. The columns define societal realms, and the rows point at their most important attributes. Certain parallels and repetitions in the rows and columns of the categories will become obvious. Affinities between certain cells will appear, and morphologies between groups of cells of the schema emerge. Knowledge of the position of a phenomenon in the rows and columns gives us considerable information about a social phenomenon, always about its definition, and sometimes about its empirical regularities. This may be good enough, at least for the time being. It puts us at a level that chemistry had achieved in 1869 when Dimitri I. Mendelévy discovered its periodic system of elements.[14]

The Table of Societal Realms contains six columns of content and eighteen rows. Note that Rows C though G help define social phenomena, while the phenomena mentioned in Columns 1 through 6 rows J through S provide illustrations of social phenomena, not their definitions.

## A First Reaction to the Periodic Table of Societal Realms

Life is not only the pursuit of riches and power; it is also the pursuit of truth, beauty, sacredness, and virtue.

The spread on pages 2: 223-224 of Our Periodic Table of Societal Realms speaks loud and clear: Look up from your circumscribed life! You can live in a many-splendored society! Our seemingly drab categorical schema of social reality is actually an essential part of general education for choosing a full and rich life.

The social reality depicted in the table is created by the joint process of enabling and constraining we called the 'linguistic

mechanism of structuration' in the Fishing Story that served as the introduction to this Volume. For emerging human activities, this mechanism provides allowance and vocabularies that constrain them from any easy change. We can thus end our exposition of the taxonomy of social reality by this proposition:

10:11

> Proposition 10:11. *Structuration of Social Reality:* The linguistic mechanism of structuration applied to the tri-section of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language and to the bi-section of executive and emotive language produce social reality shown in the Periodic Table of Societal Realms.

Note that The Table of Societal Realms deals only with social reality, i.e. language-based parts of society. To include the rest of society, such as it has grown out of biological spontaneities, use of technology, and adaptations to nature, we need another table. The Table of Societal Realms is a table of mankind's "good life" that serves its "life of survival."

## A Quick Repetition

For those who have not read our nearly book-long above account of the elements of this table we may make a short summary. Please note that The Periodic Table deals with social reality, i.e. what is given and constructed by man's unique environment of symbols. Other aspects of human living belong in another table.

T10.9A

*Table 10.9. A Periodic Table of Societal Realms.*

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | Social realms | Science | Economy | Polity |
| B | Critical symbols | Executive descriptions | Executive evaluations | Executive prescriptions |
| C | Lifestyles | Learning Buffs | Money-centered | Civic Minded |
| D | Cardinal values | Knowledge | Wealth | Order |
| E | Stratification | Competence | Class | Power |
| F | Reward system | Priority of findings | Monetary devices | Positions, Tributes |
| G | Rationality | Scientific method | Market economy | Democracy |
| H | Freedom | Academic | Free trade | Civic liberties |
| I | Spontaneous order | Self-correction | Market prices | Public opinion |
| | | Below are examples not concepts. Tables 10.5 - | | |
| J | Organizations | Academies | Firms | Administrations |
| K | Networks | Learned societies | Markets | Electorates |
| L | Mass media | Science journals | Advertising media | Tribunes |
| M | Netorgs | Competing laboratories | B2B markets | Political parties |
| N | Makers | Scholars | Entrepreneurs | Legislators |
| O | Keepers | Librarians | Currency guardians | Judges |
| P | Brokers | Teachers | Salesmen | Bureaucrats |
| Q | Takers | Students | Consumers | Citizens |
| R | Providers | Consultants | Investment advisors | Legal advisors |
| S | Procurers | Research applicants | Taxmen | |

T10.9B

*Table 10:9 continued.*

| 4<br>Art | 5<br>Religion | 6<br>Morality | Social realms | A |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emotive descriptions | Emotive evaluations | Emotive prescriptions | Critical symbols | B |
| Aesthetes | Believers | Compassionate | Lifestyles | C |
| Beauty | Sacredness | Virtue | Cardinal values | D |
| Taste | Piety | Rectitude | Stratification | E |
| Artistic fame | Reverence | Testimonials | Reward system | F |
| Aesthetics | Theology<br>Salvation | Ethics | Rationality | G |
| Artistic license | Religious freedom | Freedom of conscience | Freedom | H |
| Art improvisations | Non-ritual prayers | Unplanned civilities | Spontaneous order | I |
| 10.9 and Volumes 4-6 have more | | | | |
| Theatres, etc. | Temples | Welfare orgs. | Organizations | J |
| Bohemia | Sects | Good neighbors | Networks | K |
| Stages, novels, exhibits | Holy texts, cults | Heralds | Mass media | L |
| Schools (approach) to art | Rival congregations | Contending moral groups | Netorgs | M |
| Creative artists | Prophets | Sources of high norms | Makers | N |
| Critics | Learned Clerics | Ethicists | Keepers | O |
| Performers, entertainers | Preachers | Moralists<br>Carers | Brokers | P |
| Fans of culture | Seekers | Decent people | Takers | Q |
| Esthetics advisors | Chaplains to other realms | Ethics counselors | Providers | R |
| Persons and organizations on the outlook to other realms for something beneficial to their own realm. | | | Procurers | S |

A closer look at symbolic environments allows us to specify communicative actions (Row B) as evaluations, or prescriptions, or descriptions. Such communications are either executive – map out the world around us, evaluate it, and manage it – or they are emotive – add and shape emotions to events in our outer or inner world. The six kinds of communicative acts are thus: executive descriptions (Column 1), executive evaluations (Column 2), executive prescriptions (Column 3); emotive descriptions (Column 4), emotive evaluations (Column 5), emotive prescriptions (Column 6). These are purely communications by symbols.

Science (Row B, Column 1) is connected with executive descriptions, for example, facts and generalizations. Economy and business (Row B, Column 2) are connected with executive evaluations, for example, prices and costs. Politics and administration (Row B, Column 3) are connected with executive prescriptions, for example, laws and regulations. Art (Row B, Column 4) in all its forms deals with descriptive visions that are emotive, expressive. Religions (Row B, Column 5) relate to expressive evaluations, for example, ideas about the fundamental value of mankind and the meaning of life. Morality (Row B, Column 6) contains expressive prescriptions, ethical rules of conduct. Thus, the six communicative acts provide a potential for six fundamental realms of life in human society: economy, polity, science, religion, morality, and art.

In the realms of society, important products are created which we refer to as their cardinal values (Row D). They are wealth in the economy, order in the body politic, knowledge in science, sacredness in religion, virtue in the realm of morality, and beauty in the sphere of art.

When the societal realms hold each other in balance so that no one rules over the other, and when each one can freely export and import their respective cardinal values, then, and only then, do we have a many-splendored society.

Each realm has its own pattern of ranking, its stratification (Row E): competence in science, class (purchasing clout) in the

economy, power in the body politic, taste in art, rectitude in morality, and piety in the realm of religion.

Reward systems (Row F) also differ between the realms. Each realm has its own way of expressing awe, admiration, and deference. In science the greatest testimonials are awarded to those who are the first to make and publish a discovery. In economy, deference is paid to money and the display of spectacular investments and consumption. In the body politic, deference to the powerful is expressed in the form of titles and public tributes. In art and entertainment, one achieves artistic fame. In religion, deference is shown in reverence, and in the realm of morality, it is expressed in the real brick of personal respect.

Societal realms are, more or less, rationally organized. However, each may develop its own type of rationality (Row G). In the contemporary institutions of knowledge, the most common rationality is the scientific method; in the economy the presently dominant type of rationality at the time of this writing is the market economy; in the body politic the modern rationality is that of democracy on the domestic scene, and diplomacy on the international scene.

Each realm also has its special type of freedom (Row H): academic freedom, free trade, civil rights, artistic license, freedom of faith, and freedom of conscience. Freedom is implemented in a society, not as an abstract philosophical proclamation; it must be anchored in the routines of the respective realms.

Each realm contains four recurrent structures. First, there are organizations (Row J), such as state agencies, firms, research institutes, churches, theatres, et cetera. Second, outside such formal organizations, we find networks (Row K), such as electorates, markets, grids of volunteers, colleagues, supporters, et cetera. Third, we note that each realm also has its media (Row L). In the printed media there are specialized publications, or specialized pages featuring politics, economy, science, art, religion, and the ethics of interpersonal relations. Fourth, we take special note of a combination of a full-fledged network as the environment of full-fledged organizations. These, "netorgs"

(Row M) seem to have greater effects on societies than any other structures.

Wealth is created by entrepreneurial producers, recorded by accountants, and preserved by insurers and bankers in financial institutions, conveyed by trading distributors, and possibly distributed to consumers. The political order is formulated by leaders and legislators, preserved by the judiciary, the police, and the military, and is implemented by technocrats and bureaucrats, and received by the subjects or citizens. Knowledge is created by scientists and learned men and women, is preserved by libraries, is communicated by teachers, and is received by students. Sacredness in religions is created by prophets, preserved by those versed in the Holy Scriptures and rites, conveyed by the clergy, and are received by congregations. Beauty in art is created by artists, is preserved on stages and in collections open to the public, is conveyed by interpreting artists, guides and critics, and is received by the public. Thus, each realm has four recurrent internal functions. They stand for the creation (Row N) or preservation (Row O) or distribution (Row P) or reception (Row Q) of the cardinal values that are produced in the different life spheres.

The relative autonomy of the categories in The Table of Societal Realms is more than an impetus to provide the categories with separate names, and is also more than an impetus for individuals to specialize in one sphere rather than being a jack of all trades. The relative autonomy signals *a confederative nature* of a society's parts. Every realm always embeds some "alien" elements from other life spheres, and needs these elements. The cells in our Table of Societal Realms are islands, but they are not alone and are never entirely to themselves. In Row R and S we have provided space for the individuals who are responsible for essential exchanges between realms, the Providers and the Procurers. A society does not have to create high walls between its realms.

The sum total of these differentiations is what we have called "the many-splendored society." Its lifestyles (Row C) hint at the

varied options an individual in such a society may enjoy in everyday life.

### Autonomy and Alienation

One of the checkpoints in the construction of our Table of Societal Realms is the observation that certain parts of every society can attain a coherence that can be manifested as an identity or as an autonomy. To a large extent, the history of the West has been characterized by a struggle for freedom from the interference of a central potentate, be it a king or pope or other power. Max Weber identified the relative freedom thus attained as *Eigengesetzlichkeit* – bounded autonomy. A useful criterion for a schema for society is whether its cells show a measure of actual or potential autonomy signified by a proper name in everyday language. Then, not only will social scientists be able to recognize the categories of the schema, but also the public.

The backside of *Eigengesetzlichkeit* is what the young Karl Marx and many others have called *Entfremdung* – alienation. If you spend most of your life in a bordered part of society, with relative autonomy, you become a stranger to other parts of society. In serious religious pursuits, one easily forgets necessary worldly pursuits. The scientist absorbed in his or her research easily becomes a foreigner in the worlds of politics, business, and art. In the same vein, the dedicated business executive becomes a stranger to politics and religion. The full-time democratic politician loses touch with his voters, who are devoted to other pursuits than political ones, and becomes dependent on mass media and pollsters to know how his constituents think.

## Societal Realms: Their Relations to One Another

We turn now from a focus on what happens inside a societal realm to a more systematic pursuit of what happens in the relations of one social realm to other social realms.

We know that conflict settlements can be accomplished by applying legislation (norms), or by creating a contract (treaty) between the contending parties. The latter, we have said, requires more sophistication than the former. We devoted Chapter 6 above to these fundamental mechanisms of law and contract in building a social order. Contentions between societal realms may also be settled by making use of norms and/or contracts. Both apply fully to the ordering of relations between societal realms.

First, there is the option of legislation creating legally valid and enforceable *norms* (laws) which the contenders representing different realms are required to follow. Societal realms are subject to legislation as realms, not just as people, organizations, networks, media, et cetera. In pre-capitalist Europe, for example, commerce outside city borders was prohibited. All modern cities have restrictions on graffiti. Ordinances prohibit artists practicing graffiti from presenting their work on properties other than their own, unless they have been granted permission by the owner. Restrictive legislation may also apply to persons or associations acting as representatives of a societal realm. France, for example, has laws prohibiting the exhibition and celebration of conspicuous religious symbols in public buildings and in schools.

Second, there is the option of making formal *contracts* between societal realms without invoking the majesty of the law. Contracting, as we have learned, is often a more sophisticated means of achieving order than is legislation. Contracts between realms are fundamental to a many-splendored society. I will, therefore, assign them a specific designation and will refer to them as 'concordats.' This term is, at present, restricted in use to treaties between political bodies and religious authorities that the Holy See of the Roman Catholic Church has concluded with (secular) states. We could use the term "concordat" more generously to stand for any contracts between realms. For example, modern concordats may establish endowments for the arts or science which channel tax money for free use in those societal realms.

Settlements achieved through the use of concordats (contracts, treatises) between realms may, in the long run, be more acceptable than settlements imposed trough legislation dictated by a stronger party. The achievements of concordats are the ultimate achievement of the Procurers and Providers of societal realms.

## The Valence of Societal Realms

Is a many-splendored society possible in which all societal realms flourish, and no one realm overwhelms any other realm? As the realms are constituted by different elements of language, this is far from self-evident.

> Proposition 5:2. Tri- and Bisections of Language Usages and The Understanding Principle: (a) Any symbolic environment tends to become differentiated by the language brain into a tri-section of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive usages, each of which contains a bi-section of executive and emotive components, i.e. totally six types of usages. (b) The language brain of persons in this symbolic environment has the capacity to differentiate these six usages regardless of their syntax (1: 149).

While all societal realms are different from one another, some are more different than others. For example, the religious language in the Judeo-Christian tradition is often close to ethical language, but alien to a great deal of economic communication. A simple reason for this affinity is that morality and religion are close to one another, as both religion and morality employ an abundance of emotively loaded symbols. Economic communication, by contrast, is essentially an executive (or instrumental) one and, thus, strange to more emotive dialogues.

Societal realms vary; they are dominated by different usages of language, what we call 'many-splendored lifestyles' and 'discourses' (1: 40-44). The latter are academic discourse, aesthetic discourse, economic discourse, religious discourse, political discourse, and ethical. These discourses originate from what we stated in Proposition 5:2, section "Tri- and Bi-sections of Language Usage" in Volume 1 on pages 1: 145-150 and reproduced

here on page 2: 230. The Tri-section consists of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language. The Bi-section consists of emotive and executive language.

Let us now identify all of the opportunities which societal realms have in interacting as pairs. This is done by cross-tabulating the realms. There are six discourses and a total of fifteen different ways in which these discourses can confront each other. We will call the results "The Table of Valences of Societal Realms." This table will show the "outer" relations of the societal realms just as The Periodic Table of Societal Realms shows their "inner" workings.

The constituent discourses of six societal realms are listed in the diagonal of Table 10.10. All of the opportunities of the realms to interact as pairs are tabulated in the other cells in the table. There are six discourses and a total of fifteen different ways in which these discourses can interact. 'Valence' stands for the likelihood that that two realms "get hooked" and remain together. First an explanation to entries and signs in the table:

*Legend 1. For the Table of Valences of Societal Realms (10.10).*

| Color | Light grey | Medium light grey | Medium dark grey | Dark grey |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Discrepancy | Low | Moderately Low | Moderately High | High |
| Valence | High | Moderately High | Moderately Low | Low |
| Sign | ≅ | ≠ | ≠≠ | ≠≠≠ |

T10.10

*Table 10.10. The Table of Valences of Societal Realms. Possibilities of Cooperation and Confrontation between Societal Realms in Terms of their Discourses.*

| | 1<br>Science | 2<br>Economy | 3<br>Polity | 4<br>Art | 5<br>Religion | 6<br>Morality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1)<br>Science | **Executive descriptions** | | | | | |
| (2)<br>Economy | Executive descriptions<br>≠≠≠<br>Executive evaluations | **Executive evaluations** | | | | |
| (3)<br>Polity | Executive descriptions<br>≠≠≠<br>Executive prescriptions | Executive evaluations<br>≠≠≠<br>Executive prescriptions | **Executive prescriptions** | | | |
| (4)<br>Art | Executive descriptions<br>≅<br>Emotive descriptions | Executive evaluations<br>≠≠<br>Emotive descriptions | Executive prescriptions<br>≠≠<br>Emotive descriptions | **Emotive descriptions** | | |
| (5)<br>Religion | Executive descriptions<br>≠≠<br>Emotive evaluations | Executive evaluations<br>≅<br>Emotive evaluations | Executive prescriptions<br>≠≠<br>Emotive evaluations | Emotive descriptions<br>≠<br>Emotive evaluations | **Emotive evaluations** | |
| (6)<br>Morality | Executive descriptions<br>≠≠<br>Emotive prescriptions | Executive evaluations<br>≠≠<br>Emotive prescriptions | Executive prescriptions<br>≅<br>Emotive prescriptions | Emotive descriptions<br>≠<br>Emotive prescriptions | Emotive evaluations<br>≠<br>Emotive prescriptions | **Emotive prescriptions** |

We pack a great deal of information in The Table of Valences of Societal Realms. We first locate dominant elements in the vocabularies of confronting realms. We then put these elements into four categories of different shades, depending on the type of discourses confronting each other. Finally, an ad hoc scale rates the degree of discrepancy between confronting realms by increasingly grey shadings. The Legend explains the labels and shadings used. We see that discrepancy and valence are mirror images of one another.

We have, on a couple of occasions, dealt with the relation between science and the body politic. Plato, in his proposed Republic, held that the rulers should be trained both in warfare and philosophy; the ruled, however, need not know philosophy. In Imperial China, we have an empirical case illuminating the same problem. Here, an elite with classical education, the literati, became top administrators after passing examinations. The literati had the main say on civil and military appointments, land distribution, taxation, and interpretations of the wishes of the Emperor's Court. They also ran the examination system (page 1: 102-104).

I use a shorthand expression "science≠≠≠polity" to refer to the relation between the realms of science and body politic. The sign ≠≠≠ indicates that the two realms are difficult to coordinate. In effect, their relation could be maintained in China mainly through a practice of requiring examinations for almost all ruling positions, whilst, at the same time, ensuring that, in real life, a fair portion of those who passed examinations with high honors were sidetracked and did not become administrators. It apparently takes more to run a country than to pass an examination.

An obvious driving force behind various relations among societal realms is found in Proposition 10:4 on page 180. As contributing authors of world history, the elites of the various societal realms — be they professors, great artists and critics, captains of finance and industry, prophets and priests, statesmen, or moralist — show predictable efforts to expand their reach and to

consolidate their respective realms and to monopolize the realm rewards.

## A First Look at the Table of Valences

Let us begin looking at the least shaded corner in The Table of Valences of Societal Realms. Emotively loaded speech spreads easily in human encounters. (See the section on "Circular Emotive Actions" in Volume 3.) Participants in a face-to-face encounter tend to copy each other's emotive communications, moving them into a spiraling mode of mutually reinforcing emotions. Three of the cells in the table — 4*(5), 4*(6), and 5*(6) — involve no executive differences, only degrees of emotive loading in the constituent vocabularies. They are marked "Low Discrepancy" on our scale (legend on page 2: 231) and have the lightest shade of grey in the table. In confrontations between these societal realms only low differences have to be overcome when these realms interact, since they all consist of vocabularies with more emotive than executive loadings.

Between art and morality, cell 4*(6), or in shorthand art≅morality, we have a first case of low discrepancy. Moral rectitude is often conceived as beautiful, while immorality is easily seen as ugly. However, we have noted that such rhetoric may deprive morality of some of its cutting edge. Max Weber, we remember, was critical of pushing ethical judgments into the esthetic realm in saying that something "is in bad taste," rather than openly proclaiming that it "is morally deplorable."

A second case of low discrepancy is found between the arts and religion, 4*(5), or in shorthand art≅religion. Both contain much emotively loaded symbolism. Religious temples easily blend the spoken holy words with music, pictures, sculptures, ornaments, stained glass, and architectural vaults and other attractiveness. For some efforts to restrict art in religious contexts, see the section "Art and Other Societal Realms" in Volume 4.

A third case is the low level of confrontation between religion and morality, 5*(6) or in shorthand religion≅art. This is particu-

larly evident in the Jewish and Christian religions, in contrast to the Greek and Roman. More on this in the chapter on religion in Volume 5.

Turning to our second category of confrontations between societal realms, i.e., cells 1*(4), 2*(5), 3*(6) in Table 10:10. When we modified the rational choice theory on pages 1: 155-159 in Volume 1, we formulated the result in Proposition 5:4, also reproduced here in the margin. Generally speaking, only after an initial emotive reaction is the human scene open for executive actions and rational considerations. That makes the discrepancy *moderately low* between emotive and executive versions of one and the same tri-section expression.

Proposition 5:4. *Emotive and Rational Choice:* (a) In scanning a symbolic environment or part thereof man initially reacts to the symbols, if any, that have emotive charges and then to the executive symbols. (b) In this reaction, negative emotive symbols get greater attention than positive emotive symbols. (c) If all symbols are roughly equally executive, i.e. emotive meanings are spread evenly or are absent, man exercises rational choice as otherwise takes place only after overcoming initial emotive reactions (1: 157).

We note that economic and religious discourses, cell 2*(5), are both full of the same type of sentences, i.e. evaluative ones. The executive sentences evaluate and set prices on products and services in our mundane life; the emotive ones evaluate the meaning of life, itself, and its afterlife, for example, the memory we want to keep of dead forbearers. One reason why economic discourse is more alien to religious discourse is that it is mainly executive, not emotive. The relevant cases, such as the economy-religion encounter, are colored medium light grey in The Table of Valences. They are confrontations between science and art, both at bottom with descriptive discourses, and confrontations between polity and morality, both employing mainly prescriptive discourses.

A *moderately high* discrepancy is found in the many confrontations in which two realms face each other, when one realm is constituted by an executive discourse and the other by emotive elements. Here belongs a number of fascinating dialogues: sci-

ence≠≠religion 1*(5), science≠≠morality 1(6), economy≠≠art 2(4), economy≠≠morality 2(6), polity≠≠art 3*(4), and polity≠≠religion 3*(5). They are shown in medium dark grey in The Table of Valences of Societal Realms, the most frequent shade in the table.

*High discrepancies,* meaning the most well-defined separations, are found between the three societal realms built on plain executive discourses. These are encounters between science≠≠≠economy 1*(2), science≠≠≠polity 1*(3), and last, but never least, economy≠≠≠polity 2*(3), the setting of the principal confrontation in the modern societies. These three realms are better able than any others to enter into contacts and contracts with one another that maintain mutually separate identities. They are colored dark grey in The Table of Valences of Societal Realms.

To tell the full story of the relations that societal realms have with one another one must address all of the pairs we have we have mentioned in the Table 10.10 on Valences of Societal Realms. There are 15 pairs in total. In addition to these "dyads," an observer or researcher would sometimes be required to look at "triads" and combinations, and alliances of higher order. A tall order indeed.

## Using a Table of Valences

A Table of Valences is useful for many studies in history and social science. To begin with, let us list five preliminary issues worthy of attention. Let's begin with the issue that has drawn the most recent attention.

### Issue One. Globalization of Societal Realms

How far do societal realms reach in time and space? We need to review how societal realms seek expansion, and sometimes hegemony, within their own society, and how some of the realms also seek, and obtain, a cosmopolitan reach. The latter leads to the intriguing perspective that the main actors in the

contemporary history of globalization are quite simply our familiar societal realms!

The current process of globalization spreads in all sorts of ways, perhaps easiest though networks and Netorgs, as stated in Proposition 10:7 on page 2: 143 above. The idea that globalization is the work of certain organizations, for example, business corporations, states, or UN agencies, is at best a half-truth. The states, in particular, want to be sovereign and are part of the problem of globalization, not the solution.

[TECH] To the surprise of many, at the time of this writing, art in the form of popular music has apparently the most rapid global reach. Music spreads as never before. The Internet, with its technology of downloading, and the adjacent new technologies for playing music, have combined with the easy flow of emotive messages – as seen in The Table of Valences – to globalize music.

In earlier centuries, the expansion of societal realms was mainly a matter of the spread of religions and political and military empires. Today, we see the emergence of a global economy. Trade, however, has been common for centuries in both East and West. What is new in recent centuries is capitalism, i.e. the spread of the profit motive.

The profit motive is found in industry and service, but also in the way modern world communications and trade are organized. A mystery is that capitalism has expanded without support from public opinion, art, science, and morality. Before the era of European colonialism, capitalism actually expanded with more resistance than support of rulers and government bureaucracies, except in a very few places, such as Venice.

### Issue Two. Coupling and De-Coupling of Societal Realms

To what extent are societal realms coupled to one another? Do they grow in consort so that growth in one of them – science, economy, polity, art, religion, or morality — promotes growth in the others? When the political and military organization of

Rome became effective and victorious, did the Roman economy grow as well? Did art, science, and engineering follow suit with the brilliant expansion of the body politic in ancient Rome? The answer is "Yes, they did." On the other hand, did the realm of morality with its sense of civic virtue become de-coupled from this development, as Edward Gibbon argues in his classical *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-89)?

Raising issues of this kind lifts the study of history from the narrative level to the analytic.

### Issue Three. Path Dependency of Societal Realms

Under what conditions do societies give priority to certain realms over others? Why did trade and philosophy have a dominant place in ancient Athens, while polity and military dominated Sparta? Is the answer simply a fact of geography; that one city state had access to the sea while the other was landlocked? Would the same apply, say, in the thirteenth century to the far-flung ship-born commercial empire of Venice and the equally far-flung Mongol empire of Genghis Khan, a polity on horseback?

Initial conditions may have disproportional consequences. In history, the very process of getting somewhere may contain its own cause of what follows. This is the core of an idea called 'path dependency,' to be discussed in Volume 4.

### Issue Four. Conflicts Between Societal Realms

On a personal level, we see contention between persons take place when they have different lifestyles, belong to different religions, or have different political ideologies. Or, contention appears when people are in any type of competition about territory, food and water, sex, property, or privilege.

Protests and contentiousness are legion in a differentiated society. However, they are not necessarily present between societal realms. We have seen them in the relations between Gemeinschaft (folk life) and Gesellschaft (city life). When city life rushes

to take over, folk life protests abound. (See Proposition 9:9 on page 2: 157 and the adjoining discussion.) The present modernization of societies is full of such conflicts.

Contentions between persons from different societal realms tend to occur when beliefs, norms, and values of one realm are applied to persons involved in another realm. Such contentions occur when religious norms are applied in scientific activities, or when economic norms about buying and selling are applied in making moral decisions about issues, such as corporal punishment.

An obvious driving force behind various contentious relations formed by societal realms is found in Proposition 10:4 above on page 180. As contributing authors of world history, the elites of the various societal realms — be they professors, great artists and critics, captains of finance and industry, prophets and priests, statesmen, or moralist — behave in somewhat predicable ways to expand the reach and to consolidate their respective realms and to monopolize the realm rewards.

When any one societal realm develops dominance or approaches hegemony, we should also look for contentious social movements seeking to protect the autonomy of the subjugated realm. These conflicts emerge with different contents from the ones between folk life and city life. In the real conflicts, we find struggles about academic freedom in the science realm, artistic license in the realm of art, freedom of trade in the economic realm, freedom of faith in the religious realm, civic freedom in the polity, and freedom of conscience in the realm of morality. In general, these conflicts are formulated in terms of cries for "liberty," and are unique to the special freedoms of the societal realms involved. See Table 10.7 on page 2: 183.

We will have occasions in the coming volumes of *The Many-Splendored Society* to study the issue that each societal realm tends to defend its specific freedoms. In the long run, many conflicts between realms tend to come to dead ends, albeit bearable dead ends if the parties to the conflicts retain the specific freedom dear to them.

It is worth restating that liberty is not just a matter of general rhetoric which anyone, even a notorious authoritarian leader, can express. Liberty is something concrete, a series of social designs by persons active in different societal realms, who have risen to, promote, implement, and defend their special freedoms, be they academic freedom, free trade, civic liberties, artistic freedom, religious freedom, or freedom of conscience.

### Issue Five. Mergers and De-Mergers of Societal Realms

What are the prospects and problems of merging societal realms? How do realms merge with one another, and how do they de-merge? Mergers between realms are much more exhaustive processes than realm embedding. Societal realms, as we know, have varying goals and rationalities and exhibit different spontaneous orders. They have different organizations, networks, and mass media.

During the first years of the Obama presidency, the United States merged aspects of the US polity and the US economy. The goal was to save the banking system and the auto industry in a major financial crisis that flourished in 2008. A political response was put into effect typical of a *socialist* state, namely to "socialize losses." Another merging effort took place in the same period between the realm of polity and the realm of morality. Its goal was to bring affordable medical care to a larger number of Americans. The government should assume a big part of the moral obligation to aid the sick. That was a political response typical of a *welfare* state.

The American public was offered a relief of both credit blockages and health worries, at the taxpayers' huge expense. Unaccustomed, however, to both socialism and state welfare, the rapid rise of the Tea Party Movement expressed also an angry and bewildered American public in the wake of these mergers[15]. Their basic instinct was that the American way is: "Keep Big Government Out!" Business, not the government and the tax payers, should take care of commercial losses. Patients and their

doctors should decide on treatments, not anyone from an official bureaucracy holding the purse. Funds for medical care for the public should be raised in civil society and by insurance companies on the market. The tea partisans held that societal realms should be kept separate[16].

When relatively marginal attempts at mergers between societal realms such as these meet with strong resistance, questions are raised about the entire logic of realm mergers and the social processes involved.

## Beyond Organic Collaboration

As a side-show, an embedding into a social realm of small alien elements from other realms tends to be useful for any realm. We made an effort to show this in Proposition 10:9 (2: 188) and in the idea of Organic Collaboration depicted in Figure 10.3 on page 2: 198. By contrast, a more full-fledged merger of a realm with other realms tends to become tense, and in due course destructive. There is every indication that the learning curve of mankind in these matters is very steep.

Let us first note that the initial reaction to merging societal realms may be optimistic, not just antagonistic like the Tea Party Movement in the United States. The merger promises that one social arrangement can achieve two (or more) cardinal values instead of only one, which many people would call a wonderful break.

The ambition of full-scale mergers between societal realms is typically to make human striving less complex and more hopeful. This is a rationale and a justification usually professed by prophets of mergers. The European mediaeval scholasticism merged the striving for salvation with the striving for knowledge into one and the same pursuit, aimed at bringing the best life into mankind's reach.

Another illustration of the optimism about mergers of societal realms is the promise offered by early socialism. On all continents, socialism after Marx has combined the striving for riches

with the striving for a political order into a joint program. This merger of economy and polity, the essence of all "really existing" socialism, was originally seen as hope for a bright future and promise of progress, equality, and justice to all.

A third illustration of the general optimism in the face of a merger of institutional realms is seen in the European welfare states. In particular, the Scandinavian version involves a far-reaching merger of morality and polity. The core of welfare is certain moral imperatives to take care of those who are down and out, too old or too young, or simple too unfortunate to take care of themselves. Such moral norms are found in families and households and parts of civil society. The welfare state is a merger of two societal realms: this caring morality and the traditional polity of state bureaucracies and taxation. Large publics cheered this merger, and in several countries the welfare state has become a part of a national consensus.

Note that we are not talking of mergers of organizations, networks *within* one and the same societal realm. Here, we do not deal with mergers of two businesses, or two political parties, or a merger of two research institutes, or a merger of different and distant consumer markets, such as the ones we see so often in the era of globalization. To merge different units within a societal realm is like mixing gin and vermouth; it may result in a new product, the martini, with a better taste than each of the ingredients.

Mergers of entire societal realms are much more problematic than mergers within one and the same realm. The former create new priorities inside organizations, networks, and media, and such mergers also shape the personalities involved in different ways. To merge whole realms is like mixing cognac and heat; it may produce a tasty bouquet at first, but at a certain temperature it just burns up. Alternatively, the flame simply fades out.

Mergers between realms are affected by their place are in The Table of Valences of Societal Realms (page 2: 232).

The Medieval union of philosophy and religion promoted by Thomas Aquino, represented by cell 1*(5), requires emotive evaluations to mix with executive descriptions. We apply the special signs ≠≠ associated with this combination, and tell the relation in shorthand as science≠≠religion, indicating a moderately high discrepancy and a moderately low valence.

A merger of societal realms actually tries to override the empirical differences in basic elements of language, that is, what we have discussed as Tri- and Bisections of Language Usages (1: 145-150). These elements are descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions in executive or emotive forms. These different usages of language have actually created the six different societal realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. Propositions 5:2 (1: 149), also reproduced above on page 2: 230, and Proposition 10:1 presented above on page 2: 168 tell us that the linguistic building blocks in any merger between societal realms involve incompatible minimum terms.

To oppose or reverse this process requires strong social designs that would appear difficult to maintain with the usual vocabularies of motivation. There is always a risk that they must be maintained by oppression and force.

Let us be explicit and summarize our reasoning as a new Proposition:

10:13

Proposition 10:13. *Merged Societal Realms:* (a) Initially, the proponents of mergers between societal realms tend to become approvingly evaluated in a society, particularly by its Takers. However, (b) any mergers of full societal realms (including their cardinal values, stratifications, organizations, networks, media, etc.) tend to create instable structures that deteriorate over time. (c) The depth and the speed of this deterioration are inversely related to the position of the merger on the Scale of Valence of Societal Realms.

The clause (b) in Proposition 10:13 reveals the presence of a process, or a probability, to keep the societal realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality apart from one an-

other, thus producing bounded independence of the realms. This measure of independent societal realms corresponds to what Max Weber (Weber 1920, 542-566) described as *Eigengesetzlichkeit der Wertsphären*. This autonomy of societal realms may never be total, but neither is it altogether missing.

Successful Communist revolutionaries and conquerors, such as Lenin and Mao, inspired by Karl Marx, did merge the polity and the economy of their countries into dictatorships of self-appointed proletarian elites. However, in the decades before the Millennium, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European Communist countries decayed in comparison with their West European neighbors who had kept polity and economy at arms lengths. This clearly illustrates the message about the deterioration of merged societal realms in clause (b) in our Proposition.

After two generations in power, the Chinese Communists began to de-merge economy and polity — and the country started to grow very rich and also very fast! The rapid rise of Communist China to a world power is essentially due to its steps toward demerging its economy from its polity.

The prophets of mergers of societal realms are usually cheered as their message of hope is heard when they raise their heads above the crowds. However, they run the risk of turning into false prophets; their mergers eventually fail. It does not matter if their name is Thomas Aquino promoting scholasticism, or Karl Marx promoting socialism.

## A Call for Redress

Various societal realms have different standards for their activities. It is not just a matter of different sets of rules for politics and business, as Plato already envisaged. Realms, such as science, art, religion, and morality, do not require political ideals, nor the ideals of the business economy in order to flourish. They have their own ideals. Moreover, they have their own rationality to reach their goals.

Democratic political parties have seldom understood this. The parties of the left seek to impose the rules and rationality of democracy (voting, majority rule, et cetera) not only on the body politic but on business, on cultural and religious life, on education and research, all in the mistaken belief that this will lead to a better society. Nor have the parties of a libertarian bend grasped the need to protect the distinctive character of the different realms. When they let loose the rules of the market economy in jurisprudence, in cultural and religious life, in education, and in the welfare system, in the universities and in research, they think they have done a good deed. Instead, they, too, have raised obstacles to many-splendored living.

We learn about the societal realms and their cardinal values primarily by studying economic, political, and juridical history, the history of ideas and learning, the history of religion, the education in morality, and in the study of art. A considerable amount of our knowledge about cardinal values and their realms is, thus, embodied in old-fashioned humanities. For this reason, the declining support for study and research in the humanities — imposed by an unholy alliance of democratic polity and capitalist economy — has imposed in many contemporary societies, is deplorable.

If we ever forget the details of what we learn about societal realms, we can, anyway, remain sophisticated, if we keep to the idea that these realms are always different in content from one another, even if they have many formal properties in common. The uneducated position we must avoid is the idea that if we know the workings of one realm, say the economy, we also know the workings of other realms, such as the body politic, art, or religion. Moreover, let us help each other avoid the opinion — as ill-advised as it is common — that one realm is destined to rule over all the others. Such claims to supremacy — be they by statesmen, businessmen, or holy men — are equally repugnant. They diminish mankind's glory.

[13] We have taken the list of lifestyles from a column in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2. Lifestyles from Figure 2.1 that elaborate bodily spontaneities are also relevant for a full account.

[14] [NAT] Allusions to terms in chemistry such as "periodic system" and "latency" carry a hazard that we import patterns of thinking that are unique to natural science into social science. Let us we warned, now as in 1965:

"Often we are drawn into truth-asserting by the use of analogous terms. In social science it has been common to draw analogies from physical science. An example is found in the definition of group "cohesiveness." Cohesiveness has been defined as the sum total or resultant of all forces that keep a member of a group (Festinger and others 1950, 164). Borrowing from the field of physics of the term "force" might seem innocent enough were it not for the fact that usage of the term implies at least two propositions. In Newton´s days these propositions were grand discoveries, but since then they have become so self-evident that we take them for granted. One of these hypotheses is that whatever the origins of the forces − whether from the moon or from an apple − they have the same consequences. Now, the forces keeping a member in a group may vary greatly. He may stay in the group because of the prestige the group offers him, because of the friends he has there, because of his need to be punished by an authoritarian leader, and so on. To assume without testing, that all these forces have the same consequences would indeed be presumptuous (Back 1951). The second assumption involved in the use of the term "force" in the definition of cohesiveness, is that whenever several sources of cohesiveness are present their effects are cumulative. This principle has proved to be immensely useful in physics: when several forces act simultaneously, the effect is the same as if they had acted in turn. This hypothesis is much less likely to be successfully maintained in social science than in physical science. The consequences of family cohesiveness deriving from both adequate communication and adequate sexual adjustment during one year of marriage are likely to be very different from the consequences of a family cohesiveness based on one year of adequate sexual adjustment and poor communication, followed by one year of adequate communication but poor sexual adjustment. Thus, we see how the person who borrows a term from another science runs the

risk of borrowing more than a word: inadvertently he may borrow also some propositions of this science." (Zetterberg 1965, 38-40).

[15] We will deal with European welfare and its Nordic merger with and ongoing demerger from the body politic in Volume 6 of The Many-Splendored Society.

[16] In passing, we may note that the born-again fringes of the Tea Party Movement 2010–11 were confused about the full implication of the principle of keeping the societal realms separate. They were adamant in the opposition to bailouts of banks and to socialized medicine. However, many thought it natural that the realm of religion should imbue capitols and legislatures with its morality.

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